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Introduction
Over the past several decades, the high returns to college completion have become
a stylized fact influencing both conventional wisdom and national policy. At the same
time, there may be significant heterogeneity in these returns both by student and by
school. This, combined with the increasingly nationwide and international college
application process, has helped to create industries and policies designed to match
students to the colleges of their choice. Preparatory industries exist solely to improve
students’ standardized test scores, automatic admissions programs are designed to
extend college access to diverse populations, and merit-based scholarships serve to
funnel students toward particular college choices. Each of these programs presents
certain sets of students with unique sets of incentives. In this dissertation, I study
the impact that each has on students’ preparation for college and their eventual
enrollment choice.
In my first chapter, “The Impact of Admissions Policies and Test Prep on SAT
Scores,” I study how the rules that college use in student evaluation impact student
behavior and test scores. Students have differential access to preparatory services
and to testing based on their socioeconomic status. Students are able to take the
SAT as often as they wish, and many colleges encourage them to submit their most
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favorable sets of scores. This allows affluent students to test repeatedly in hopes
of obtaining high scores, and has led to calls for more equitable student evaluation
via explicit or implicit restrictions on testing. However, such policy changes may
incentivize different levels of test preparation by SES level and thereby perpetuate
inequitable outcomes. I study the impact of several counterfactual admissions policies
by creating a model of test prep and retesting, calibrating parameter values, and
running simulations. I find that while policies geared towards reducing the amount
of testing bring students’ scores closer in line to their ability levels, they end up
reducing college access and increasing low-income students’ costs.
In my second chapter, “Does Student Effort Respond to Incentives? Evidence
from Automatic College Admissions,” co-authored with Lindsay Daugherty, Paco
Martorell, and Isaac McFarlin, Jr., I study how students respond to incentives while
in high school. Many high school seniors are susceptible to “senioritis,” the practice
of shirking once they have been admitted to a satisfactory college. Guaranteed
college admissions programs, which admit many students to similar sets of schools
early in the school year, provide a quasi-experimental setting in which to observe the
impact of senioritis. These programs may incentivize students to shirk or to work
harder in hopes of attending an elite college, making their net impact ambiguous. In
1996, Texas passed the “Top Ten Percent” law, which guarantees admission to any
in-state public university for students in the first decile of their high school class at
the end of their junior year. We use regression discontinuity methods and data from
a large urban school district to show that students barely qualifying for automatic
admission are substantially more likely to enroll at a flagship institution than those
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barely missing the cutoff. Qualifying students act as if they are “overinsured,” as
their GPA falls in their senior year. As shirking in high school may result in worse
college outcomes or lower wages, it is in our interest to reduce incentives to shirk.
Shirking might be countered by explicitly conditioning acceptances on senior year
performance.
In my third chapter, “Iowa’s National Scholars Award and the Efficiency of Merit
Aid: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis,” co-authored with Stephen L. DesJardins,
I study the impact that rule-based merit aid has on the probability of student en-
rollment at the University of Iowa. Between the rising number of students applying
to college and the rising costs of college, financial aid officers face large constraints
in their ability to attract students to a particular college. Finding ways to effectively
distribute financial aid money is therefore extremely important to colleges hoping
to maintain an academically talented and diverse student body. Iowa’s National
Scholars Award, given to students from out of state, uses a prescribed formula to
determine which students are eligible for an award worth nearly $5,000. We are
therefore able to use a regression discontinuity model to analyze the impact of award
receipt on several subgroups of out-of-state students, using in-state (and therefore
ineligible) students as an important falsification test. We find a large impact on
students’ odds of enrollment at the cutoff for award eligibility. Preliminary analysis
of an earlier, tiered version of the current single-valued award suggests that the NSA
could be effectively targeted towards very high-achieving candidates.
These chapters, taken together, analyze several different points in the college
application process, from entrance exam-taking to the choice of where to enroll.
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There is much additional work to be done in studying the transition to college, and
my work here represents a brief foray into a small subset of the issues worth studying.
It is my hope that future work – both my own and others’ – will build on the material




The Impact of Admissions Policies and
Test Prep on SAT Scores
Abstract
A common critique of standardized college entrance exams is that they
favor affluent students. Most colleges evaluate students only on their highest
exam scores, and affluent students can take advantage of this policy by repeat-
edly retesting. Therefore, the logic goes, retesting should be disincentivized,
perhaps by evaluating students on a different set of scores. However, affluent
students under such a policy may use test prep services as an alternative way
to improve their test scores, making the net impact on test scores ambiguous.
This paper therefore examines the effects that different score evaluation poli-
cies may have on SAT scores and on college access for students from varying
socioeconomic backgrounds. By modeling students’ decisions to retest and to
use test prep services, I provide the broadest examination of the college admis-
sions process to date. I find that when colleges incentivize additional testing,
such as by using students’ highest SAT scores in determining acceptances, the
gap between students’ submitted SAT scores and their true ability increases,
as does the gap between more affluent and less affluent students’ scores. How-
ever, more restrictive score evaluation policies may actually increase the costs
that poorer students face without increasing their odds of applying to college.
As a result, the optimal score evaluation policy remains unclear.
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I. Introduction
Despite disputes over the existence or nature of returns to attending college, economists
agree that there are high returns to college selectivity for low-income students. These
students, however, often face major hurdles. Bailey and Dynarski (2011), for in-
stance, find that low-income students are much less likely than high-income students
to attend or graduate from selective colleges. It is therefore crucial to examine bar-
riers to entry at these institutions that disproportionately affect low-income and
low-SES students.
The SAT has for generations been one of the highest-profile gatekeepers to selec-
tive colleges. While two-year and nonselective four-year colleges may admit students
who test poorly or do not test at all, state flagships and selective private colleges
often restrict their admissions to high scorers.1 As a result, the process by which
students obtain these scores should matter to policymakers. Organizations such
as FairTest (“The National Center for Fair and Open Testing”) insist that admis-
sions exams are heavily biased against low-income, minority, and female test-takers.
The National Association for College Admission Counseling has responded that “[a]
substantial body of literature indicates that test bias has been largely mitigated in
today’s admission tests due to extensive research and development of question items
on both the SAT and ACT.” The College Board, which administers the SAT, says
that score differences among student subgroups “[reflect] the unfortunate reality that
1While there are exceptions, such as the University of Texas’s requirement to accept any student
finishing in the top ten percent of her graduating high school class regardless of SAT scores, many
students admitted in this manner would score reasonably well regardless.
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there is a great disparity in educational opportunities for students across the United
States” and “should be viewed as a call to action to ensure access and equity for all
students.”
Altering the way in which SAT scores are evaluated could be a low-cost way
of ensuring equality in college access for equally able students from different back-
grounds; however, such policies could also exacerbate differences in college access.
In this paper, I combine the economic literature on school selectivity, score returns
to test preparation, and optimal retesting to determine the impact of hypotheti-
cal changes in score evaluation policies on testing, college-going behavior, and SAT
scores. I particular, I wish to examine whether admissions policies commonly per-
ceived as “fairer” have harmful unintended consequences, particularly for low-income
students. If there are benefits to attending a selective college, these policies might
contribute to intergenerational wage stagnation or reduce social mobility.
The argument for more restrictive test policies is straightforward. While testing
incurs substantial monetary and non-monetary costs, students from families of high
socioeconomic status face lower costs and thus are able to retest more often than
their low-SES counterparts. Permissive admissions regimes, which allow students
to submit their highest scores (either by exam or by subsection), encourage such
retesting and allow high-SES students to generate many score draws. Retesting is also
associated with an upward drift in SAT scores, possibly because students have gained
more knowledge or become more comfortable in test settings in the interim. As a
result, high-SES students will submit higher scores than low-SES students conditional
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on their ability levels. Therefore, using students’ average scores or explicitly limiting
how often students may retest should remove some of the advantages associated with
higher socioeconomic status and allow colleges to more accurately select students for
admission.
While this argument is appealing, it accounts for only one way to improve test
scores. It is unlikely that high-SES students will quietly abandon hope of score gains
if retesting is disincentivized. Instead, they will seek alternate sources of score im-
provement, most likely through the use of preparatory services. As these services are
typically very expensive or effort-intensive, it is more likely that high-SES students
rather than low-SES students will use them.2 As a result, if retesting is disincen-
tivized, high-SES students may instead seek score gains through test prep. It is
possible (if prep is both very effective and very costly) that score gaps between high-
SES and low-SES students conditional on their ability levels will be maintained or
grow, but that overall utility will fall. Even if score gaps are held constant, higher
levels of prep usage may widen SES-specific score distributions conditional on un-
derlying ability. If so, SAT scores will contain less information about student ability
levels than under current policies.
To investigate the impact of admissions policies on student outcomes, I develop a
model of retesting and test prep usage. Students may vary in actual ability, perceived
ability, and SES level. Low-SES students face higher costs of testing, test prep usage,
and applying to college than do high-SES students. At each node of the implied game
2If, for instance, students from Low-SES backgrounds are more likely to work to support them-
selves or their families, they will be less able to engage in testing or in test prep.
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tree, students may choose to take the SAT, apply to a nonselective university, apply
to a selective university (if they have previously tested), or use test prep services.
Prep services provide students with an extra ability signal, which may discourage
some from taking additional tests. Students are aware of admissions policies–here,
the combination of SAT scores that colleges will use to evaluate them–and use this
knowledge in determining their testing and prep decisions.
I limit my analysis to state flagship universities for several reasons. First, as these
institutions receive an extremely high number of applications, they are more likely
than smaller colleges to use broad admissions rubrics, sacrificing some intensity of
evaluation in favor of administrative efficiency.3 As a result, Second, the economic
literature suggests that there are large returns to college selectivity. At one extreme,
Hoekstra (2009) uses a regression discontinuity analysis of students’ GPAs and SAT
scores to show that attending a state flagship over other in-state institutions may
increase earnings by up to 20 percent for white men. Black and Smith (2006) use a set
of five variables to proxy for college quality, finding that a one standard deviation
increase in college quality improves wages by approximately four percent. Even
Dale and Kruger (2002 and 2011), who find minimal returns to college selectivity
among students attending at least somewhat selective schools, find that students
from low-income households earn more as they attend more selective universities.
Thus, even under conservative assumptions about the returns to college selectivity,
3For instance, the University of Iowa evaluates students based on a linear combination of their
high school GPA, high school class rank, standardized test scores, and courses taken. Students who
score above a fixed cutoff are guaranteed admission to the College of Liberal Arts. The Colleges
of Engineering and of Business use similar cutoff rules. Remaining students are evaluated on an
individual basis.
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social welfare could be improved if more low-income but high-ability students were
admitted to selective universities.
College choice also matters due to undermatch–highly qualified students’ attend-
ing weak universities. While it seems more likely that overmatched students would
suffer from attending highly competitive schools, Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson
(2009) find that it is instead undermatched students who graduate at surprisingly
low rates. Matching low-income students to the proper quality school is therefore
important not simply for the effect that their diploma will have on their wages, but
for making sure that they obtain the diploma in the first place.
I fit my model to data from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 and its
two follow-ups (“ELS:2002”). I also use publicly available data on state flagship
universities’ entering freshman classes as a proxy for college selectivity within each
state. I then match simulated data on students’ testing behavior and SAT scores to
actual data, assuming that colleges look only at students’ highest scores by section.
This allows me to determine which combination of parameter values best predicts
student behavior. I then use these parameter values to simulate student outcomes
under counterfactual admissions regimes.
Contrary to the conclusions in Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003), it is not clear that
using students’ highest SAT scores in college applications is a bad thing. On the
one hand, this policy results in a large gap between high-SES and low-SES students’
scores conditional on ability, providing high-SES students with a leg up in college
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admissions. On the other hand, score evaluation policies that reduce this gap discour-
age some students from testing or applying to selective universities. These policies
also lead students to substitute away from retesting towards more expensive test
prep programs; as a result, low-SES students may end up paying more but having
lower access to college. This suggests that changing policies to reduce score gaps
may be suboptimal policy.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section II, I discuss the use of
standardized tests and test prep and highlight a selection of the literature on test
prep and retesting. In Section III, I present my model. In Section IV, I discuss the
data available from ELS:2002. In Section V, I discuss how I apply my model to the
data and how my simulations are set up. In Section VI, I present the results of these
simulations and discuss how they should be interpreted. Section VII concludes.
II. Background and Literature
1. Test Scores and College Admissions
In applying to most four-year colleges, domestic students must submit their scores
on the SAT or ACT exams. I focus on the SAT in my analysis to take advantage
of its greater variation in composite scores.4 Both exams are typically taken during
4A similar study could be done using ACT scores, or combining the two using official concordance
tables. I prefer, however, to sacrifice some power in order to increase the amount of variation in my
data. Given the different scoring scales, concordance tables map ranges of SAT scores into a single
ACT score, but can only map each ACT score back to a single SAT score. As a result, the amount
of variation in converted ACT scores will be somewhat lower than would be observed if the same
set of students took the SAT and were equally proficient at both exams.
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the junior year of high school, though some students choose to (re)take them early
in their senior year. Approximately half of all SAT-takers take two or more exams,
while ten percent take three or more. I focus on the Math and Critical Reading (or,
less formally, Verbal) sections within the SAT as my data contain only these two
sections.
Score-sending policies have varied over time. Initially, students sent all of their
SAT scores to each college they applied to. Colleges were free to do with these scores
as they wished; quite often, they would evaluate students on their highest composite
score or highest Math and Verbal subsections.5 Of course, if a student took the SAT
five times in hopes of getting a lucky score, all five scores would be visible; this pre-
sumably discouraged excessive test-taking. Beginning with the high school class of
2010, however, the College Board instituted a “ScoreChoice” program, which allows
colleges to request specific combinations of scores. Students in turn are “encouraged”
to submit scores to each college in line with its policy; the default policy is to request
all scores. Of the 971 institutions with score policies listed by the College Board,
approximately 55 percent request students’ highest scores by section, another 13 per-
cent request students’ highest composite score at a single sitting, 20 percent request
all scores, and the remainder require that students contact them (“SAT R©Score-Use
Practices by Participating Institution”).6 Within each group, there are both elite
schools and nonselective schools. By requesting only high scores, schools are better
5The Princeton Review’s website states that most colleges “consider only your highest scores
(by section or by test date) when making admissions decisions.”
6As I am concerned chiefly with the admissions policies at selective academic institutions within
the United States, I omit 86 foreign institutions, 67 bible colleges and other seminaries, and 310
Community and Junior Colleges.
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able to advertise the test scores of their students, may attract some students nervous
about sending all of their scores, and may be able to reduce some administrative
costs. Students, meanwhile, are judged exclusively on favorable scores.7 The Col-
lege Board suggests that this will “reduce student stress and improve the test-day
experience.” Detractors counter that it allows affluent students to test repeatedly
without revealing this; as the exam costs $50, repeated testing may be prohibitively
expensive for budget-constrained households. While my data were collected before
ScoreChoice was implemented, its usage suggests that colleges are collecting less in-
formation than before and impacts potential policy options. For instance, colleges
may have difficulty incorporating upward score drift from retesting into applicant
evaluation.
2. Score Gains from Retesting and Prep
While the gains from test prep have been the subject of much debate, the general con-
sensus is that prep does improve scores moderately. Evidence that companies have
exaggerated these gains has hardly discouraged students from using prep services–a
1979 Federal Trade Commission investigation found that the Stanley H. Kaplan Co.
produced average gains of only 25 points rather than the 100 that Kaplan claimed,
but is credited with boosting Kaplan’s business (“Test-Prep Pioneer Stanley H. Ka-
plan Dies at 90”). There are several possible reasons that students continue to use
7Colleges may choose how to interpret the scores that they request; for instance, a school could
request all scores but evaluate students chiefly on their highest scores.
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test prep services despite these findings–students may believe that they will experi-
ence above-average score gains, may be striving for only incremental improvement, or
may not know of or trust these results. Regardless of the reasons, test prep remains
a multi-million dollar industry.
Most studies of the effectiveness of test prep have samples too small for accurate
inference, heavily selected samples with little external validity, or uninformative re-
search designs (such as lacking a control group). While three recent papers use more
advanced techniques to study the gains from SAT coaching, each has its flaws.
Powers and Rock (1999) run five separate analyses, using a self-designed survey in
addition to College Board data on students’ test scores and School Descriptive Ques-
tionnaire responses.8 These analyses include using an instrumental variable selection
model, a Heckman correction, and nearest-neighbor propensity score matching. How-
ever, they never make clear their exclusion restrictions. In their IV and Heckman
estimation, they use variables for ethnicity, previous SAT scores, father’s education,
high school GPA, grades in math (when estimating scores on the Math section) or
social science (when estimating Verbal scores), and the difference between students’
prior scores and the mean SAT scores of applicants to their first-choice college. None
of these appear to be ideal instruments, as each could plausibly affect both a stu-
dent’s odds of using test prep and her test scores independent of test prep usage.
Similarly, these variables taken together do not appear to satisfy the conditional
8The Student Descriptive Questionnaire asks students about demographics, parental education
and income, and college aspirations, among other topics.
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independence assumption required for propensity score matching–motivation, for in-
stance, is not fully captured in the above list of variables and certainly affects both
treatment status and untreated outcomes.
Briggs (2001) runs a linear regression of test scores on prep usage using data from
National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, controlling for similar background
characteristics as those in Powers and Rock and restricting his sample to students
who have taken the PSAT. However, the OLS estimates presented almost certainly
suffer from selection bias and omitted variable bias, and he does not report any
exclusion restrictions when presenting a Heckman selection model.
Domingue and Briggs (2009) appears to best account for the requirements of its
statistical techniques. In addition to replicating Briggs (2001) with new data, the au-
thors use propensity score matching to estimate the gains from coaching. Domingue
and Briggs do a better job than Powers and Rock of satisfying the conditional in-
dependence assumption, however, by creating several variables designed to measure
sources of motivation. These include identifiers for students who outperform their
predicted PSAT scores but have fairly low grades (as these students may perceive
the SAT as the easiest path to college admission) or students who significantly un-
derperform their expected PSAT scores (who may be more likely to turn to coaching
due to test-day anxiety). Using this methodology, Domingue and Briggs estimate
that test prep adds 6 to 9 points to Verbal scores and 11 to 15 to Math scores.
While it may contribute to one’s score, test prep is not likely to be a major source
of long-term skills. Papers have argued as much beginning with Campbell (1976),
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continuing with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and most recently with Neal (2011).
These papers all argue some variant of a principal-agent model–if the student (the
principal) is paying test prep services (the agent) for improvements in test scores, an
easy-to-measure product, then test prep services will have little incentive to produce
long-term skills, a harder-to-measure product. This is not to say that test prep
teaches no long-term skills, merely that they will be developed incidentally rather
than as their own end. Test prep may signal that students using such services are
dedicated to graduating, but I am not aware of any literature on this. I therefore treat
test prep services as adding to students’ scores but not to their underlying ability.
Colleges in my model (and likely in the real world) will be unable to distinguish test
prep from other sources of noise in test scores.
Alternatively, students may improve their test scores through retesting. Nathan
and Camara (1998) find that students who take a second test improve their scores
by an average of 10 to 15 points per section, with gains slightly larger for males
on the Math subsection. This result should be interpreted as treatment on the
treated, since students self-select into retesting. Though the direction and magnitude
of any composition bias are unclear, my prior is that these gains are overstated,
partly because the authors do not examine whether students use test prep and partly
because students will be more likely to retest the more they expect their scores to
improve.9 There is substantial variation in score gains on students’ second exams,
9These gains will be understated if students with large expected score gains fail to retest. For
instance, intelligent and motivated students might have large expected gains from retesting but also
score highly enough on their first test to guarantee admission to their university of choice, making
retesting unnecessary.
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with approximately ten percent of scores falling by at least 50 points and over twice
as many improving by over 50 points.
3. The Effects of Admissions Policies
Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) (hereinafter “VC”) examine the interaction between
admissions policies and SAT retesting. VC construct a model of how students retake
the SAT, calibrate parameter values to fit the data, and then analyze a range of
counterfactual admissions policies. In doing so, they use two groups of students–one
with high costs of test-taking and one with low costs of test-taking, both of which
have the same expected gains from attending college.
VC evaluate admissions policies on the metrics of “Accuracy,” “Precision,” “Bias,”
and “Cost.” Accuracy is defined as the mean difference between the percent of SAT
questions that students answer correctly and their true ability levels (which VC
treat as the probability that they get any particular question correct). Precision is
the standard deviation of this difference. Bias (not to be confused with the common
statistical usage) measures the difference in Accuracy between high-cost and low-cost
students. Cost measures the number of exams taken.
VC find that using students’ high scores in college admissions is socially inefficient.
In particular, this policy performs poorly in Accuracy, Bias, and Cost. In other
words, students’ scores are heavily inflated relative to their true ability levels, this
inflation occurs primarily among students with low costs of testing, and students are
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taking too many tests. While it performs somewhat better on Precision than on the
other three metrics, several other admissions policies outperform it on that metric
as well.
Unfortunately, VC’s model does not allow extra studying or prep to affect test
scores. While VC do account both for upward drift in scores and for lucky score
draws, students’ choices are reduced merely to whether to take an(other) exam. I
believe, and present evidence below, that this simplification qualitatively affects their
model’s results.
III. Model
1. Overview of Testing Process
I examine students’ optimal paths within a two-test framework, partly for tractability
and partly because it is difficult to determine in the data whether students have tested
more than twice; however, the vast majority of SAT-takers should be captured in
such a model.10 For comparison, a two-period version of VC’s model, which does
not include test prep, is shown in Figure 1, while my model is depicted in Figure
2. Students are forward-looking and maximize their utility (rather than their SAT
scores or probability of admission to a selective school). Use of prep services does
not obligate students to test.
10VC state that approximately 90 percent of college applicants in 1997 took fewer than three
SATs.
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Students are initially assigned an ability level and SES level. Ability is split




, which dictate students’ performance on the
Math and Verbal sections of the SAT respectively. Similarly to VC, though I refer
to α∗ as “ability,” I use the term loosely and do not take a stance on what specific
characteristics the SAT measures.11 Colleges value ability both in its own right and
as a predictor of graduation, future success, and ability to donate as an alumnus.
Socioeconomic status, ` ∈ {L,H}, reflects the costs of testing, prep usage, and
applying to college and the bonuses associated with retesting and with test prep.
Since the SAT and ACT both charge a flat testing fee with fee waivers for particu-
larly low-income students, non-monetary costs (such as psychic or travel costs) are
included in all costs.12 This is broadly consistent with Avery and Kane (2004), who
show that students from poorer backgrounds are less likely to show up on test day
even if they have already registered and paid exam fees.
To prevent students from following a purely deterministic testing process or tar-
geting unrealistically high or low scores, students do not know their true ability and
must infer it from their test scores and other signals received during the testing pro-
cess.13 Rather than observing their true ability levels, students see their score on the
11The SAT itself does not take a particularly strong stance on this question. Initially, SAT
was an acronym for “Scholastic Aptitude Test,” suggesting that the exam revealed some innate
measure of intelligence. In 1990, it was changed to “Scholastic Achievement Test,” implying that
the exam measured or predicted success in academic settings. Since 1993, the SAT has been an
empty acronym; the full exam title is currently the “SAT Reasoning Test.” Nevertheless, the exam
measures some quality that colleges find attractive, even if that quality can formally be described
only as “the ability to perform well on the SAT.”
12Neither VC nor I address fee waivers, which allow extremely low-income students to avoid
paying the SAT’s testing fee. However, as monetary costs are only one component of the costs that
I analyze, this should not threaten my results.
13Students are aware of all parameters other than their true abilities.
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14 The PSAT does not perfectly reflect a student’s
true test-taking ability–it has a slightly different format and is much lower-stakes–so
these scores consist of students’ ability levels plus a mean-zero, normally distributed
noise term, εj0 ∼ N (0, σ20). Students realize that this is the case, and understand that
their SAT scores may be significantly higher or lower than their PSAT scores would
suggest. As students take the SAT, they continue to update their beliefs, realizing
that some portion of their score reflects luck or exam-day idiosyncrasies. Similarly,
students who use test prep services must take simulated SATs, which provide yet
another source of information about their ability levels.
Students in this model eventually apply to either a selective university (“SU”) or
a nonselective university (“NSU”). The nonselective school functions as an outside
option–application is costless, admission is guaranteed, and attending gives zero
utility. The selective school admits students on the basis of their SAT scores and
other factors. In the primary specification I treat all other factors as unobserved.
Students anticipate enrolling in the nonselective school if they are rejected from the
selective one.
Students who apply to the selective university are evaluated differently under
each admissions regime. As students are forward-looking, the admissions regime
may influence decisions other than whether to retest. For instance, students will be
more likely to use test prep services the lower the expected gains from retesting.
14By omitting student-level subscripts I am sacrificing some notational rigor for the sake of clarity.
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2. Paths through the Testing Process
At each point in the testing process, students face a discrete set of decisions. They
may choose (depending on where they are in the game tree) to take the SAT, to
use test prep, to apply to the selective university, or to apply to the non-selective
university.
Students who test receive a score composed of three terms: their ability, any
“bonuses” from their test history, and a mean-zero noise term. Students there-
fore will receive scores xjt = α
j∗ + Y` + ε
j
E. The first term represents a student’s
true ability (determined by nature) on section j ∈ {M,V }.15 The second term,
Y` ∈
{




, reflects the choices that a student has made to that point
in the testing process. Students who have neither tested nor used a prep service
do not receive any bonus from their prior actions (or lack thereof). Students from
socioeconomic group ` who use test prep prior to their first exam receive a boost
to their score equal to Y P1,`, while students who retest without ever using test prep
receive Y2,`. Students who retest and who have ever used test prep receive bonus Y
P
2,`.
While the precise values of Y P1,`, Y2,`, and Y
P
2,` are an empirical question, we should
15VC treat ability as the probability that a student will answer any question correctly within a
given SAT section. I do not use this construction for several reasons. First, the odds of getting
questions right are not constant, as they may vary both by question type within each section and
with a student’s mental or emotional state as she takes the exam. Second, it ignores the possibility
of leaving a question blank, which on the SAT hurts one’s score less than an incorrect answer would.
Finally, by treating the SAT as a series of Bernoulli trials, VC ensure that students with very high
or low ability have much lower score variation than those with middling ability. While the bounded
score range may reduce variance for very high or low ability students, treating questions as binomial
trials goes too far in this direction. I instead treat ability as an unbounded constant on the same
scale as (bounded) SAT scores.
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. Testing costs CE,` in monetary, psychic, and other
non-monetary costs. Students may test zero times, once, or twice.
Using test prep has two functions in this model. First, using test prep increases
students’ expected scores. Students know exactly how effective test prep will be
in expectation, but understand that the uncertainty inherent in testing makes it
impossible to guarantee any particular gain in their actual score. However, since
practice tests are a large component of commercial test prep, prep will also help
students learn their true ability. Specifically, test prep provides students with ability
signals yj = αj∗ + Y` + ε
j
P . These ability signals are generated according to the same
process as test scores, but have several key differences. Chief among these is that
these signals are not usable in applying to college. Second, since students are able
to use test prep only once, Y` ∈ {0, Y2,`}. Finally, obtaining these signals costs CP,`





are drawn from the same distribution.16 Students who use test prep are not obligated
to actually take a test–those who receive particularly low ability signals may realize
that testing is not for them.
As they do not observe their true test-taking ability, students estimate their









= 0 if a student who has tested t times has not











= 0 if she has. In these equations, x̃jt
16This makes sense if practice tests make up a large part of the prep signal–presumably signals
from practice tests given under exam conditions are distributed similarly to those from actual
exams.
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and ỹjk represent scores and prep signals with any accumulated bonuses netted out.
Put differently, a student’s ability estimate will be somewhere in between her various
scores and ability signals, with the exact location depending on the relative amounts
of noise associated with each. Unlike in a Bayesian model, students do not adjust
their confidence levels–while they may update their ability estimate from one period
to the next, they have perfect faith in their ability estimate at any given point in
time. Accordingly, students simply use these estimates in place of their true ability
when predicting their test scores; while they do account for noise on test day, they
do not account for imprecise estimates of their ability.
At any point in time, students may opt out of the testing process and apply to
the non-selective school. Doing so functions as an outside option–it costs nothing to
pursue and provides zero utility with certainty. Admission to the selective university
provides a higher level of utility B, but applying costs fee CA,` and admission is not
guaranteed.
3. Applying to College






µ represents the degree of the university’s selectivity, σA represents the weight given
to the SAT conditional on that degree of selectivity, and x∗ is a function of their SAT
scores to date. The functional form Φ(·) makes an intuitive probability of admission;
a fixed score improvement will always improve a student’s odds of admission, but
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will have little impact at very low or very high scores, where she would be accepted
or rejected with near certainty.17 DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2006) show that
students’ probabilities of admission to the University of Iowa as a function of their
ACT scores and high school class ranks take on a similar shape; while I use SAT
scores and do not use class rank in my analysis, this still provides some evidence
in favor of the functional form I have chosen.18 As all of these values are known







The variable x∗, which reflects the score used in admissions, is the primary factor
driving my counterfactual policy simulations. Applicants to the selective university
who have taken T tests use score x∗ = f (x1, . . . , xT ) in their application (abstracting
again from the two-test restriction), where f(·) varies by admissions regime. The
most commonly used admissions regime is a high section regime. Under this policy,
a student who has taken the SAT T times would submit x∗ = max
{











. A closely related and commonly used system is a high test regime,










. Both of these policies
encourage retesting; the former slightly more so, as students may more easily seek
to improve one section score without lowering the other.
17For an extreme example, consider 50-point increments from 400 to 450, from 1200 to 1250, and
from 1550 to 1600. Any selective university would reject the first candidate both before and after
the 50-point improvement, while all but the most selective would accept the third both before and
after. The middle candidate, however, would see a nontrivial increase in her odds of admission at
many selective universities.
18Iowa admitted students and awarded merit aid at this time based on an “Admission Index
Score” equal to 2∗ACTi + %CRi, where ACTi represents student i’s composite ACT score and
%CRi represents her class rank listed as a percentile.
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Alternatively, universities could establish an average score regime, in which stu-







. If minimizing the amount of testing is of primary
importance, schools could implement a first score regime, in which students submit
x∗ = xM1 + x
V
1 .
19 Finally, universities may implement a last score regime, requir-
ing students to submit x∗ = xMT + x
V
T . All of these admissions regimes have two
attractive characteristics–they can be easily understood by the vast majority of stu-
dents intending to attend college, and they allow students to apply after taking a




I do not include any explicit measures of how often students have tested when
computing their estimated probability of admission. While VC do account for re-
peated testing in several of their simulations, policy changes such as ScoreChoice
that make it easier for students to submit a single set of scores may interfere with
many colleges’ ability to correct for score drift. As a result, while such policies were
undoubtedly relevant for VC’s paper, they may be substantially less practicable to-
day.
19Though they differ in the specific mechanism, this is functionally equivalent to having a low
score regime–in neither case is there anything to be gained from retesting.
20Some students may be unable to retest due to the monetary or opportunity costs of testing.




Working backwards, it is possible to set up value functions associated with each
decision point. In this model, students with two test scores may not retest or use
prep, and must instead apply to one of the two universities. That is, they face
maximization problem









I list only scores and SES level in the value function because these are the only
variables that should factor into a rational student’s application decision once the
testing process has stopped.21 As a result, this maximization problem will apply to
all individuals with two valid test scores, regardless of their prep history or perceived
ability.
Prior to this decision, some students will need to determine whether they should
retake the SAT. A subgroup of these students will have used test prep previously,
reducing their choice to whether to retest, apply to the selective school, or apply to
the nonselective school. These students will face a similar optimization problem, but
with one added option:
21Students in real life are of course affected by unobserved factors that do not affect their odds
of admission, but this is beyond the focus of my current work. It is also possible that expectations
or ability signals may affect the perceived benefit of admission (i.e. admission to the selective
university may be valued more by those who consider it a “reach” and rejection taken harder by
those who did not expect it).
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B − CA,`, E [V (x1,x′2, `)]− CE,`
}
Once again, they may choose whether to apply to the nonselective university or
to the selective one (though the interpretation of x∗ is different in this case than
in the value function above, since these students have only taken one SAT so far).
These students, however, are able to retest. They therefore must weigh the expected
benefit of a new SAT score (where x′2 represents the unrealized score) against the
cost of retesting and determine whether this gain represents an improvement over
applying to either university.
Students who have previously taken the SAT but have not used test prep face all
four possible decisions:








2, `)]− CE,`, E [V (x0,x1,y′, `)]− CP,`}
Using test prep operates analogously to retesting–in both cases, the student will
face an updated value function after receiving a new set of scores but must pay a
cost to do so.
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Students who have not yet taken the SAT cannot apply to the selective university,
as they do not yet have an SAT score. Students who use test prep prior to their
first exam must therefore decide whether to test at all or whether to apply to the
nonselective school:
V (x0,y, `) = max {0, E [V (x0,x′1,y, `)]− CE,`}
Meanwhile, those students starting at the beginning of the game tree must decide
whether to take the SAT, use test prep, or forego the testing process entirely:
V (x0, `) = max {0, E [V (x0,x′1, `)]− CE,`, E [V (x0,y′, `)]− CP,`}
Figure 3 depicts these choices as part of the game tree. Note again that all paths
must eventually end in an application to one of the two universities–students in this
model may not, for instance, decide to completely opt out of postsecondary education
following an unexpectedly poor SAT score.
IV. Data
Data for this paper came from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002, provided
by the National Center for Education Statistics. ELS surveyed approximately 16,000
students as they began 10th grade in 2002 and conducted follow-up surveys in 2004
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and 2006. Over these four years, ELS asked students questions about their high
school, college, and work experiences, among other topics.22 There is little attrition-
–fewer than 200 students drop out between the first and second follow-ups. The
study’s key feature, though, is that it is one of very few data sets that contain data
both on multiple SAT scores per student and on test prep usage. In particular, at
the 2004 follow-up, when most students were beginning their senior years, it asked
them to report their highest and most recent SAT scores by section and whether
they had used or planned to use several methods of studying for the SAT or ACT.23
At the second follow-up in 2006, it asked for their most recent SAT scores by section.
College selectivity data comes from the College Navigator at the Integrated Post-
secondary Education Data System (“IPEDS”). IPEDS provides the 25th and 75th
percentiles of SAT section scores and of ACT section and composite scores among
enrolling freshmen. While these values may not be the same as those for all ad-
mitted students, they should nonetheless be broadly indicative of selectivity. Two
states–Kansas and North Dakota–have a small enough number of SAT-takers that
they do not list SAT scores. I computed the interquartile ranges for these students
using their composite ACT scores and the concordance tables provided by ACT, Inc.
and the College Board. As New York does not have a true public flagship, I use
admissions values for Binghamton University, the public university with the highest
enrollee test values.
My model uses two parameters to measure colleges’ selectivity–the mean and
22I do not use their surveys of parents, teachers, or school administrators.
23Specific test prep methods listed are a) high school courses, b) commercial courses, c) private
tutoring, d) books, e) videos, or f) software.
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standard deviation of admitted students’ SAT scores. Using both parameters allows
me to gauge both how selective a university is and the amount by which a given
shift in an applicant’s SAT scores will increase her probability of admission. I rely
on several assumptions in computing these parameters. First, I assume that the
distribution of admitted students’ SAT scores (which is not publicly available) is
identical to that of enrolled students’ SAT scores.24 Second, I assume that colleges
evaluate applicants on their composite SAT scores rather than their individual section
scores, and that enrollees’ composite scores are normally distributed. Finally, I
assume that the average Composite SAT score is equal to the sum of the average
Math SAT score and the average Verbal SAT score, but that Math and Verbal scores
are not otherwise correlated among the sample of admitted students. While these
assumptions may be strong, the recovered values of µ and σA match the conventional
wisdom regarding university selectivity, use data available to applicants (who are
unlikely to adjust for shifts in composition), and allow me to incorporate state-level
variation in flagship selectivity. Formally, I compute the average composite SAT score
at a particular institution as µ = M25+M75+V25+V75
2
and the standard deviation of SAT
scores as σ = M75+V75−µ
Φ−1(0.75)
, where Mp and Vq represent the pth percentile Math score
and the qth percentile Verbal score respectively among enrollees at that institution.
Values for these parameters are described in more detail in the Appendix.
In creating my sample, I first dropped those ELS respondents who attritted be-
tween the first and second follow-ups (n = 180). I then dropped those students whose
24One example in which this would not hold is if the most highly qualified admits at a particular
university are lured away by other schools. In this case, the enrolling class would consist of the
remaining, less qualified students, and would not accurately reflect the qualifications of admitted
students as a whole.
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GPAs could not be computed from transcript data (n = 1, 500),25 as well as those
with missing data for sex (n = 710) or race (n = 110). Next, I dropped students who
had a most recent score listed in the first follow-up but not in the second (n < 10)
and those who had either a Math score or a Verbal score–but not both–listed for
any exam (n = 20). I dropped students from Alaska (n = 10) and Washington, DC
(n = 40); the former because Alaska’s state flagship school is nonselective and the
latter because Washington, DC does not fit into the state flagship framework.26
Finally, I dropped students who did not have PSAT scores listed (n = 10, 770)
or who had taken the ACT (n = 1, 570). The former group is omitted because the
PSAT is a natural signal of students’ ability in taking the SAT, making students with
a PSAT score a natural sample to examine. The resulting sample loss is troublesome,
however, and I discuss below how my sample compares with two subgroups of omitted
students. The latter is omitted because students who have taken both the ACT and
SAT may be systematically different from those who have taken the SAT alone; those
who have taken zero SATs but have taken the ACT will be particularly different
from those who have taken neither exam. To abstract from this issue, I focus on
students who have not taken the ACT. The final sample consists of 1,580 student-
level observations.
As ELS does not provide the number of exams taken by each student, I use the
implicit timing of scores in the data to create rough exam histories. Each student
25I list the number of observations dropped conditional on all prior drops.
26While the University of Maryland is the state flagship university closest to the District of
Columbia’s city limits, Washingtonians are currently eligible for in-state tuition in a number of
different states, further complicating efforts to incorporate them into my analysis.
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has up to six listed scores–their highest Math and Verbal scores as of 2004, most
recent Math and Verbal scores as of 2004, and most recent Math and Verbal scores
as of 2006. Considering one section at a time, I refer to these as “HI1,” “MR1,” and
“MR2” respectively. Given the previous data cleaning, a student will have a valid
score for MR2 if and only if she has taken at least one exam. If her (non-missing)
MR1 score differs, she must have taken at least one exam by the end of 2004 and at
least one between 2004 and 2006; I then increase her exam count to two. Otherwise,
I leave her exam count at one. Finally, if her HI1 and MR1 scores are different, she
must have taken at least two exams by the end of 2004; I then increase her exam
count from one to two or from two to three. I am therefore able to assign each student
an “observed” number of exams within each section. I find that approximately 360
students took zero SAT exams, 1,220 took at least one, and 490 took at least two.27
The chief drawback of this construction is that it presents an incomplete test
history. Students who test repeatedly may have fewer observed scores than actual
scores.28 A specific case of this involves the interaction between HI1 and MR1. To
illustrate, consider a student who initially scores 400 on both exam sections, then
retests and scores 500 on each. If both exams were taken before the first follow-up
survey, her highest section scores (500 and 500) will also be her most recent ones,
so taking the data at face value both understates her exam count and overstates her
scores. I take a moment-matching approach in calibrating the parameter values in
my model, as this allows me to easily compare simulated data to the available data
27Given the small number of students who must have taken three or more exams, I focus on the
distinction between those students who have taken one exam and those students who took multiple
exams.
28This goes doubly if these exams are concentrated before the 2004 follow-up.
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without additional assumptions about how often students have tested or what their
missing scores might have been.
Sample statistics sorted by the number of SAT exams taken are presented below.
Table 1.1.A lists student demographics, Table 1.1.B lists degree expectations as of
10th grade, and Table 1.1.C lists several college outcomes. These sub-tables should
be interpreted differently: test-taking behavior directly affects outcomes in Table
1.1.C in ways that would be impossible in Table 1.1.A and difficult in Table 1.1.B
(as these responses were given before most students would have tested). Nonetheless,
it does illustrate the types of students in each category. Those who take multiple
exams are more likely to be White or Asian and less likely to be African-American
or Hispanic than those who take just one; a similar pattern holds when comparing
ever-takers to never-takers. Expectations regarding college-going are relatively stable
among students who ever test, but students who test at least twice are somewhat
more likely to expect to receive an M.A. or higher degree.29 Students who test more
than once apply to more schools, are accepted at more schools, and attend more
selective schools than students who test only once.
Table 1.1.D explores which students are more likely to use various test prep
services. A majority of the students who ever take the SAT use some form of test
prep–in particular, over two-thirds of testers use some form of book to study for the
exam. This allows me to focus exclusively on those students who use more expensive
methods of test prep, such as tutoring or commercial courses. Accordingly, my
29As in Avery and Kane (2004), a surprisingly large number of students expect to receive a
Bachelor’s or postgraduate degree but then fail to take the SAT.
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findings will represent the gains from these two methods over and above those from
using cheaper methods, such as books or software. Unsurprisingly, students who
test more are more likely to use test prep. Students who use test prep are likely to
be wealthier than those who do not; while a nontrivial number of students in each
SES quartile use the two most expensive methods–commercial courses and private
tutoring–the share of students in the richest quartile using such services is nearly
double that in the next-highest quartile (which is itself higher than the bottom two).
Tables 1.2.A through 1.2.D also examine student demographics, expectations,
college outcomes, and prep usage. These tables sort students into three groups.
The first consists of those students who never reported taking the PSAT and who
did not have a score released by their school. The second consists of students who
reported taking the PSAT but do not have an observable PSAT score in the data.
The third group is the one I use in my analysis, which consists of students who do
have observable PSAT scores, regardless of whether they report taking the PSAT.
Students who take the PSAT are more likely to be White or Asian, have higher
educational expectations, are more likely to attend selective universities, and are
more likely to use any form of test prep than are students as a whole. Crucially,
students who report taking the PSAT but do not have a score listed in the data are
very similar to those students who do have a score listed, suggesting that my results
may be generalizable to this additional group of students. Just as importantly, few
students who do not take the PSAT end up attending highly selective colleges. While
this may be discouraging from a policy standpoint, it suggests that restricting my
data to students who have taken the PSAT will in fact capture most of the students
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who end up attending highly selective colleges and therefore is not an overaggressive
restriction.
V. Simulations
To fit the data to my model, I first define several variables according to information
contained in ELS. First, I define HSES students as those in the top SES quartile
and LSES students as all others. As Table 1.4 shows a large jump in the number of
students using a commercial prep service or tutor at the top SES quartile, this makes
a natural break point at which to define HSES status. I define “test prep” within
my model as using a commercial service or tutor, as the remaining methods are both
relatively widespread and do not contribute statistically significantly to students’
scores. Students’ highest PSAT scores are used as their initial ability signal. Students
use selectivity parameters equal to the mean and standard deviations of freshman
SAT scores at their state flagship university, and are counted as applying to a selective
university if their highest selectivity application is to a “highly selective” university.30
In my simulations, I aim to match several moments of the data. These, along with
other illustrative moments, are listed in Table 1.5. I consider two broad categories of
moments in my simulations–score-based moments and behaviorally-based moments.
In the former category, I include the mean and standard deviation of students’ high
30Unfortunately, some state flagships do not meet this standard; I use their selectivity data,
though, as they represent a combination of quality and affordability that many students may use
as a baseline for applications.
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Math and Verbal scores and last Math and Verbal scores; in the latter, I have the
mean and standard deviation of the number of observed scores by section, as well
as the means of prep usage and application to highly selective universities. While I
perform my matching on the full sample, I also present these moments (as well as
several others) by SES status.
I assign several values, listed in Table 1.6, based on previous paper results and
preliminary analysis. First, I normalize B, the benefit of attending the selective
university, to 1000. Maximum likelihood estimation (not shown here) of σ in an linear
regression of PSAT section scores on high SAT scores gives a value of approximately
5; somewhat surprisingly, this does not depend on depend on students’ test prep
usage or SES level. As PSAT scores are a proxy for ability, σ reflects the noise
from generating both PSAT scores and SAT scores. As the variance of the total
measurement error in SAT scores is the sum of the variances of each of its two
components, I assign a value of 4 to σ0 and 3 to σE.
31 As PSAT scores represent
x0, I assign true ability levels α0 by adding a normally distributed, mean zero noise
term.
I consider a wide range of bonus and cost values in my simulations, and conduct
searches separately within each SES group.32 Costs vary in increments of one util
31I assign a larger value to σ0 because the PSAT is a slightly different exam and because students
may experience slightly more score variation due to inexperience, increased nerves, or other factors
that fade with experience.
32VC assume that LSES students’ costs (relative to the benefit of being admitted) are a fixed
multiple of HSES students’ costs. With two additional types of costs, this assumption becomes
untenable–for instance, LSES students may face very similar test costs but much higher prep costs.
As a result, I search over separate ranges of parameters within each SES group.
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(normalized so that admission is 1000 utils for each group), while bonuses vary in
increments of one SAT point. Among HSES students, I consider over 13,000 distinct
combinations of the six parameters (three bonus, three cost) in question. Among
LSES students, I consider over 37,000 distinct combinations.33
For each combination of values, I evaluate fourteen moments of the simulated
data and compute their percentage difference from the corresponding moments of
the actual data.34 To compare specifications, I compute the sum of all squared
percentage moment differences; I do similar analysis for the moments of test scores
and for the moments of other outcomes separately.
VI. Results
1. Evaluation of Regimes
The metrics used by VC may not be the best way to evaluate admissions regimes.
Accuracy represents nothing more than a level shift in students’ scores above their
abilities. This is a problem only if we observe sizable mass points at perfect section
scores. While a valid concern in theory (or when observing applicants to the most
selective tier of colleges, as VC do), this is not the case even among the heavily
33It is worth noting that because I search more closely where particular parameter combinations
appear promising, I do not use a uniform grid of parameters.
34Specifically, I consider the mean and variance of students’ high Math and Verbal scores, last
Math and Verbal scores, and observed Math and Verbal sections. As prep usage and application
to the selective university are binary variables, I use only their mean values.
37
selected sample that I study. Bias, while a useful and interesting parameter, faces
a straightforward critique–if HSES students outperform LSES students conditional
on ability level, why not simply add a handicap to bring this score difference into
alignment? Finally, the cost of testing may be misleading without additional context.
If reducing the number of times that students test causes them to spend more on test
prep, then reducing the amount of testing may actually increase students’ overall
costs. Similarly, if incentivizing additional testing increases the probability that
qualified applicants will apply to appropriately selective institutions, the increased
costs that these students pay may be outweighed by the gain in their expected utility.
I therefore examine a variety of outcomes under my calibrated parameters. First,
I consider students’ testing patterns–the number of students in each SES group who
take any tests, the number who retest, and the number who use test prep. Next, I
look at students’ college outcomes–the number of students applying to the selective
university, the expected number of admitted students from this applicant pool, and
the implied acceptance rate.35 I then examine the total test and prep costs paid by
each SES group relative to the number of testers, the number of applicants, and the
number of applicants.
With a full set of simulated SAT scores, I am able to examine the impact of
students’ behavior and the university’s policy separately. That is, I am able to
simulate students’ score draws if they believe that they will be evaluated on one
metric and then gauge the expected number of admissions if colleges evaluate them
35I assume here that the university weights scores differently when students send multiple SAT
scores but keeps the same level of overall selectivity.
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on a different metric. This will shed additional light on the relative effects of behavior
and policy and on students’ testing strategies.
Finally, I examine the difference between students’ true abilities and their scores
under each regime. In particular, I evaluate the mean of this difference (whether test
scores predict student ability on average) as well as the standard deviation (whether
any particular student’s score is likely to be particularly far from her true ability).
Each set of outcomes is interesting for different reasons. Students’ testing behav-
ior will necessarily affect the pool of college applicants, implying that restrictive score
evaluation policies may discourage qualified students before they have the opportu-
nity to apply. Students’ application outcomes will determine the school that they
attend and whether they are undermatched. Finally, the examining the difference
between students’ scores and ability levels provides a window into whether colleges
are admitting the most able group of students.
2. Calibrated Parameters
The best-performing set of parameters is presented in Table 1.7. The first column
shows the parameters used in the grid search. The second provides a description
of each parameter. The third and fourth columns present calibrated values of each
parameter for LSES and HSES students respectively.
Moment matching results for the best-performing specification are presented in
Table 1.8. The first row of the table shows the simulated values of the moments
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being matched. The second shows the percentage deviation of these values from
those in the actual data. The table’s columns are separated into three groupings-
–one indicating how well the simulated distribution of scores matches the actual
distribution, another doing the same for student behavior, and a third synthesizing
this information.
The values in Table 1.7 show several interesting patterns. Unsurprisingly, HSES
students face lower costs of test prep and retesting. However, HSES face higher costs
when applying to selective universities. Looking at bonus parameters, LSES students
have lower returns than HSES students to retesting, regardless of whether they have
used test prep. In fact, HSES students who retest but do not use any test prep can
expect to boost their score nearly as much as LSES students who both retest and use
test prep. LSES students have surprisingly high returns to test prep on their initial
exam, while HSES students have surprisingly low returns. Finally, the bonuses to
retesting and to test prep “stack” differently for each SES group. The returns to
both test prep and retesting combined are less than the sum of their parts for LSES
students. An LSES student using test prep on her first exam can expect her score to
rise by approximately 18 points, while a similar student who retests without using
test prep can expect her score to rise by approximately 14 points. However, an LSES
student who both retests and uses test prep will get a bonus of only 24 points, eight
points lower than the sum of the two component bonuses. HSES students, however,
have bonuses that stack perfectly–prep alone yields 10 points, retesting alone yields
23 points, and the combination of the two yields 33 points.
These bonuses have several implications. Ceteris paribus, we should expect LSES
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students to take fewer tests than HSES students do. However, since retesting and
prep bonuses do not stack well for LSES students, these two paths to score im-
provement are much more likely to be treated as substitutes for one another. HSES
students, on the other hand, are more likely to treat the two as complements. Put
differently, if testing is restricted, LSES students may be more likely to use test prep
while HSES students may be less likely to do so. The different costs that the two
groups face further confirm this intuition. Given the high costs of test prep and the
low returns among HSES students, these students will prefer retesting over test prep
whenever possible.
Even the more surprising parameter values make some sense in context. The fact
that HSES student face higher application costs may reflect the different types of
selective schools to which LSES and HSES students are likely to apply, or may act
as a way of correcting for higher SAT scores among HSES students. Similarly, there
are three possible explanations for the fact that HSES students have lower bonuses
to test prep alone. First, HSES students may take their first SAT exam earlier than
LSES students do–returns to early prep may therefore reflect that these students have
learned less material to date. Second, the fact that HSES students can retest more
easily may lead them to treat their first SAT as a lower-stakes exam. Finally, it may
simply reflect the different timing of test prep among LSES and HSES students. If
LSES students can afford to either use test prep or retest and HSES tend to consume
both items together, these parameters values may reflect these tendencies.
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2. Calibrated Parameters
Tables 1.9.A - 1.9.D present an overview of counterfactual simulations. Table 1.9.A
shows testing behavior under each set of simulations, Table 1.9.B reflects college
outcomes, Table 1.9.C displays the costs associated with each policy, and Table
1.9.D analyzes how accurately scores reflect students’ ability levels. Rows in these
tables reflect the different possible score evaluation policies in increasing order of
restrictiveness–using students’ highest scores by section, highest scores by test, last
scores, average scores, and first scores. Columns reflect the different parameters of
interest by socioeconomic group.
Table 1.9.A backs up the intuition presented in the previous subsection. Since
HSES students face lower testing and prep costs, they will be significantly more
likely to test, retest, and use test prep. Interestingly, LSES students are more likely
to use test prep conditional on testing at all–in part because they are less likely
to retest. As score usage policies become more restrictive, testing patterns diverge,
largely because these students get most of their score bonuses from retesting rather
than from using test prep. Both groups test less and retest less–more HSES students
quit the testing process altogether, while the dropoff in retesting is greater among
LSES students. LSES students make up for their decreased testing by using more
test prep, while HSES students prep less.
Table 1.9.B reflects how these students apply to college. As test policy becomes
more restrictive, fewer students apply to college from both SES groups. This decline
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is larger among HSES students, in part due to the larger drop in their overall testing
rate. However, as these students test at a much higher rate to begin with, there
is still a sizable gap in the relative rates of application to selective universities.
A similar pattern appears in the relative rates of admission. LSES applicants are
admitted a lower rate, though this rate stays relatively stable as test policy becomes
more restrictive. HSES admission rates fall more sharply as score evaluation policies
become more restrictive, though they remain well above the LSES rate.
Table 1.9.C shows the costs that students pay as part of the testing process.36
Test costs generally fall as admissions policies become more restrictive. The main
exception to this occurs among LSES students under an average score regime. Stu-
dents under this policy pay more in absolute terms than under the less restrictive last
score regime. This exception becomes more pronounced when looking at the costs
that students pay per application and become more dramatic still when looking at
the cost per expected admission.
Table 1.9.D looks at how students’ scores reflect their true ability levels. As ex-
pected, when students take more exams and are evaluated on more favorable metrics,
their scores will overstate their true ability by larger and larger amounts. Interest-
ingly, LSES students under a first score regime appear to significantly outperform
similarly-qualified HSES students. While this is consistent with the parameters used
above, it is nonetheless puzzling. It may be the case that the parameters currently
36I do not examine the costs associated with applying to the selective university here, as higher
application rates would result in higher costs. As I do not wish to imply that higher rates of
application are a bad thing, omitting these costs results in a clearer metric.
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selected fit current policy rather well but that the model holds certain behaviors
constant that would certainly vary under different policies. For instance, the lack of
a significant prep bonus among HSES students may reflect that these students take
retesting almost for granted. If they are able to test only once, the increased stakes
may force them to use more intensive forms of test prep, time their testing more
strategically, or put greater effort into their first (and only) exam.
In general, the optimal testing regime from a score evaluation standpoint ap-
pears to be an average score regime. This policy appears to provide the most accu-
rate impression of LSES students’ scores; while HSES students score closer to their
true ability under a first score regime, I am skeptical of this result for the reasons
stated above and am more inclined to trust results predicted under an average score
regime.37 Moreover, there appears to be a tighter distribution of scores (conditional
on ability) for both socioeconomic groups under this policy than under any other.
VI. Discussion
The advantages and disadvantages associated with different policies make it difficult
to unambiguously recommend one particular score evaluation policy. On the one
hand, some policies do appear to reduce the advantage that high-SES students hold
in college admissions. On the other, these policies do so in part by discouraging
students from testing or applying to college, and may raise the costs that low-SES
37While the average difference between students’ performance and their ability is still fairly low
under an average score regime, it is far more intuitive than under a first score regime.
44
students face. While ensuring a level playing field for applicants is important, doing
so at the cost of accessibility may not be worthwhile.
There are several areas where future research may build upon the work presented
here. Chief among these is including multiple metrics along which students may form
their expectations or be evaluated. While the SAT is one of the primary measures
that colleges use in evaluating applicants, it is by no means the only one. Grades,
essays, and extracurricular activities are just a small subset of the items that col-
leges may choose to evaluate during the application process. While quantifying the
attractiveness of students’ essays or extracurriculars may not be practicable, GPA
data is available from ELS. It should therefore be possible to have colleges evaluate
students along two metrics simultaneously. Similarly, while the PSAT may provide
the single clearest signal of students’ test-taking ability, GPA will likely inform their
beliefs as well. It may, for instance, influence whether students put much stock in
their PSAT score as an accurate indicator of their ability.
This paper also is focused on short-term outcomes rather than long-term out-
comes. Students evaluate their likelihood of admission to selective universities with-
out taking into account that these universities have both selectivity and admission
targets. That is, if an admissions regime changes the scores submitted to these uni-
versities, they may eventually adjust their selectivity to account for this. Drastic
decisions may be less likely in the short term, as selectivity and SAT scores play into
colleges’ rankings, but may occur over a period of time. As a result, students facing
an alternative score regime may be able to anticipate lower admissions thresholds,
ceteris paribus.
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Figure 1.2: 2-Test Leeds Model
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Path A Path B Path C 
Paths A, B, and C show the respective maximization problems faced by individuals who test prior to their
first exam, second exam, or not at all. µ and σA depend on the distribution of SAT scores at students’ state
flagships and thus vary only at the state level. Further details on these values are presented in the Appendix.
48
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Tests Taken
Table 1.1.A: Demographics
0 SATs 1 SAT 2+ SATs
% Male 49.7 50.3 46.9
% White 54.2 62.7 64.5
% Black 14.0 7.5 8.2
% Asian 5.6 14.2 14.9
% Hispanic 21.6 10.8 9.2
% Other 4.5 4.8 3.3
% Father has B.A. 21.6 44.9 50.0
% Mother has B.A. 14.9 38.0 44.7
N 360 730 490
Columns are grouped according to whether zero, one, or two SAT exams are
visible in the ACT. Students taking any ACT exams are not included here or in
the following tables. “Hispanic” ethnicity includes response codes “Hispanic, no
race specified” and “Hispanic, Race Specified.” “Other” includes response codes
“Amer. Indian/Alaska Native, non-Hispanic,” “More than one race, non-Hispanic,”
and “Native Hawaii/Pac. Islander, non-Hispanic.”
Table 1.1.B: Expectations
0 SATs 1 SAT 2+ SATs
% Expect B.A. 78.5 94.3 98.2
% Expect M.A.+ 31.5 55.0 62.6
N 300 660 450
This table does not include students whose education ends with less than high
school, a high school diploma, some college, or an Associate’s degree. “Expect M.A.
+” includes students listing a professional degree.
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Table 1.1.C: College Outcomes








N 200 640 450
% at Public 4-year 11.6 44.9 50.1
% at Private NFP 4-year 6.9 26.5 36.0
% at Private FP 4-year 1.7 1.6 0.7
% at Highly Selective 4-year 1.7 30.6 42.5
% at Selective 4-year 11.6 61.5 78.0
N 170 630 450
Nine schools that liste selectivity levels did not list whether they were public,
private not-for-profit, or private for-profit. These schools have been omitted from
the table. “Highly Selective” and “Selective” reflect schools’ Barron’s rankings as of
2006.
Table 1.1.D: Prep Usage
0 SATs 1 SAT 2+ SATs
% Any Prep 26.1 60.6 69.6
% Comm or Tutor 7.9 21.1 27.4
% HS Course 13.9 23.9 31.7
% Commercial Course 6.5 20.1 24.8
% Tutoring 8.9 11.0 14.2
% Books 36.3 66.3 70.0
% Computer 26.7 31.8 37.8
“Any prep” refers to any of the methods listed above. “Comm or Tutor” refers
to usage of a commercial tet prep service or a private tutor. ELS does not specify
whether the tutor is associated with a commercial service, high school, or other
organization. Video test prep has been omitted due low resposne rates.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics by PSAT Score Reporting
Table 1.2.A: Demographics
Non-Takers Takers, No Score Score Total
% Male 55.3 50.1 46.2 52.8
% White 46.6 52.3 61.3 50.8
% Black 14.9 13.7 9.3 13.6
% Asian 8.4 14.7 12.5 10.8
% Hispanic 22.3 13.5 12.7 18.3
% Other 7.7 5.9 4.2 6.6
% Father has B.A. 16.5 41.4 41.3 24.2
% Mother has B.A. 13.7 34.7 34.9 23.1
N 4180 2280 1580 8670
Columns are grouped according to whether students have a PSAT score reported
in the data, do not have a PSAT score in the data but reported taking the PSAT, or do
not have a PSAT score and do not report taking the PSAT. Students taking any ACT
exams are not included here or in the following tables. “Hispanic” ethnicity includes
response codes “Hispanic, no race specified” and “Hispanic, Race Specified.” “Other”
includes response codes “Amer. Indian/Alaska Native, non-Hispanic,” “More than
one race, non-Hispanic,” and “Native Hawaii/Pac. Islander, non-Hispanic.”
Table 1.2.B: Expectations
Non-Takers Takers, No Score Score Total
% Expect B.A. 61.4 91.4 92.2 75.7
% Expect M.A.+ 23.4 51.0 52.4 36.6
N 3940 2080 1420 7440
This table does not include students whose education ends with less than high
school, a high school diploma, some college, or an Associate’s degree. “Expect M.A.
+” includes students listing a professional degree.
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Table 1.2.C: College Outcomes
Non-Takers Takers, No Score Score Total
# Schools Applied
1.09 2.85 2.93 1.94
(1.40) (2.34) (2.38) (2.11)
N 3860 2050 1430 7340
# Schools Accepted
1.32 2.16 2.36 1.86
(0.82) (1.50) (1.65) (1.39)
N 2220 1860 1280 5370
% at Public 4-year 16.3 44.4 42.1 33.5
% at Private NFP 4-year 5.4 22.9 27.2 17.6
% at Private FP 4-year 3.1 2.3 1.3 2.4
N 1750 1810 1250 4800
% at Highly Selective 4-year 3.2 28.1 30.8 19.7
% at Selective 4-year 13.3 56.7 60.0 41.8
N 1760 1810 1250 4820
Nine schools that liste selectivity levels did not list whether they were public,
private not-for-profit, or private for-profit. These schools have been omitted from
the table. “Highly Selective” and “Selective” reflect schools’ Barron’s rankings as of
2006.
Table 1.2.D: Prep Usage
Non-Takers Takers, No Score Score Total
% Any Prep 18.9 60.5 55.6 36.5
% Comm or Tutor 5.3 21.3 20.0 12.2
% HS Course 10.9 25.6 24.8 19.0
% Commercial Course 5.2 17.8 19.5 12.7
% Tutoring 6.9 11.7 11.8 9.6
% Books 30.9 61.1 62.5 48.3
% Computer 17.1 35.2 33.0 26.8
“Any prep” refers to any of the methods listed above. “Comm or Tutor” refers
to usage of a commercial tet prep service or a private tutor. ELS does not specify
whether the tutor is associated with a commercial service, high school, or other
organization. Video test prep has been omitted due low resposne rates.
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Table 1.3: SES and SAT Sittings by PSAT Score Reporting
Table 1.3.A: Socioeconomic Quartiles
Non-Takers Takers, No Score Score Total
Lowest Quartile 38.8 16.3 15.2 28.6
2nd Quartile 29.4 19.0 20.5 25.0
3rd Quartile 20.3 27.7 25.4 23.2
Highest Quartile 11.5 37.1 38.9 23.2
N 4810 2280 1580
Table 1.3.B: Observed SAT Sittings
Non-Takers Takers, No Score Score Total
Zero Tests 86.8 35.2 22.6 61.5
One Test 10.9 49.2 46.4 27.4
Two Tests 2.3 15.6 31.1 11.0
N 4810 2280 1580 8670
Columns are grouped according to whether students have a PSAT score reported
in the data, do not have a PSAT score in the data but reported taking the PSAT,
or do not have a PSAT score and do not report taking the PSAT. Students taking
any ACT exams are not included. Socioeconomic quartiles are determined based on
respondents’ parents’ income, employment, and education.
Table 1.4: Prep Usage by SES Quartile
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
% Any Prep 50.0 45.1 55.3 63.6
% Comm or Tutor 13.8 12.7 18.8 27.2
% HS Course 23.8 18.3 23.6 29.0
% Commercial Course 13.2 11.3 18.5 26.1
% Tutoring 9.0 7.4 9.7 16.2
% Books 64.7 53.7 59.1 68.3
% Computer 34.1 31.6 31.8 34.1
“Any prep” refers to any of the methods listed above. “Comm or Tutor” refers
to usage of a commercial tet prep service or a private tutor. ELS does not specify
whether the tutor is associated with a commercial service, high school, or other
organization. Video test prep has been omitted due low resposne rates.
53
Table 1.5: Data Moments
All LSES HSES
Moment µ σ N µ σ N µ σ N
High Comp. 1071.57 204.16 1220 1009.99 188.55 670 1145.23 197.76 560
High Math 540.84 111.06 1220 511.01 105.27 670 576.42 107.37 560
High Verbal 530.73 106.28 1220 498.89 97.47 670 568.81 103.90 560
Last Comp. 1052.18 203.82 1220 994.42 189.93 670 1121.26 198.45 560
Last Math 530.72 111.57 1220 503.74 105.90 670 562.99 109.68 560
Last Verbal 521.46 107.38 1220 490.68 99.34 670 558.27 105.11 560
Ever Tested 0.7743 - 1580 0.6898 - 960 0.9070 - 610
Selective App 0.4046 - 1580 0.2956 - 960 0.5759 - 610
Used/Plans to Prep 0.2004 - 1580 0.1546 - 960 0.2724 - 610
Observed Tests 1.0850 0.7277 1580 0.9357 0.7433 960 1.3197 0.6357 610
Observed Math 0.9905 0.6650 1580 0.8600 0.6791 960 1.1958 0.5865 610
Observed Verbal 0.9734 0.6515 1580 0.8413 0.6610 960 1.1811 0.5786 610
“High” scores refer to the highest visible SAT scores as of the 2006 follow-up,
while “Last” scores refer to the most recent score available as of the 2006 follow-up.
High composite scores reflect students’ highest math and verbal scores, while last
composite scores reflect the most recent math and verbal scores available. HSES
students consist of the top SES quartile, while LSES students consist of all other
students.
Table 1.6: Fixed Values
Parameter Interpretation Value
B Utility from attending SU over NSU 1000
σ0 Variance of noise associated with PSAT 40
σE Variance of noise associated with the SAT and test prep 30
B is listed in utils rather than in dollars. σ0 and σE are in units of SAT points.
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Table 1.7: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Description LSES HSES
CE,` Cost of testing 27 24
CP,` Cost of prep 51 45
CA,` Cost of applying to SU 37 51
Y P1 Bonus from prep, no retesting 18 10
Y2 Bonus from retesting, no prep 14 23
Y P2 Bonus from retesting and prep 24 33
CE,`, CP,`, and CA,` are all listed in utils rather than in dollars and should be
interpreted relative to the parameter B listed in the preceding table. Y P1 , Y2, and
Y P2 are in units of SAT points.
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Table 1.8: Moment Matching
Table 1.8.A: Score Moment Matching
SES Spec. mMHS sMHS mVHS sVHS mMLS sMLS mVLS sVLS
LSES
Level 58.7 9.4 56.8 8.9 57.8 9.6 55.7 9.1
% Diff. 0.1492 -0.1115 0.1388 -0.0911 0.1476 -0.0922 0.1356 -0.0800
HSES
Level 62.7 9.5 60.9 9.6 62.0 9.6 60.3 9.7
% Diff. 0.0876 -0.1187 0.0703 -0.0789 0.1016 -0.1291 0.0806 -0.0746
Table 1.8.B: Behavioral Moment Matching
SES Spec. mSU mPU mMT sMT mVT sVT
LSES
Level 0.317 0.157 0.453 0.699 0.452 0.452
% Diff. 0.0737 0.0134 -0.4729 0.297 0.0506 -0.3157
HSES
Level 0.610 0.271 0.798 0.713 0.768 0.768
% Diff. 0.0595 -0.0060 -0.3329 0.2153 -0.0289 0.3279
Table 1.8.C: Overall
Scores Behavior All
LSES 0.1173 0.3323 0.4497
HSES 0.0720 0.2691 0.3411
The first row in each table lists the simulated level of each parameter, while the second lists the percentage difference of
simulated data from the actual data. Table 1.7.A matches the mean of students’ high Math scores, the standard deviations of
students’ high Math scores, the mean of students’ high Verbal scores, the standard deviation of students’ high Verbal scores,
the mean of students’ last Math scores, the standard deviation of students’ last Math scores, the mean of students’ last Verbal
scores, and the standard deviation of students’ last Verbal scores. Table 1.7.B matches the percentage of students who apply to
selective universities, the percentage of students who use test prep, the mean number of “observed” Math scores, the standard
deviation of “observed” Math scores, the mean number of “observed” Verbal scores, and the standard deviation of “observed”
Verbal scores. Table 1.7.C lists the sum of the squared entries from columns from Table 1.7.A and Table 1.7.B.
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Table 1.9: Counterfactual Outcomes
Table 1.9.A: Counterfactual Testing
Policy TestL TestH RetestL RetestH PrepL PrepH
High Section 0.335 0.626 0.278 0.576 0.157 0.271
High Test 0.328 0.625 0.216 0.564 0.173 0.194
Last Score 0.328 0.625 0.173 0.511 0.171 0.184
Average Score 0.323 0.600 0.077 0.401 0.245 0.191
First Score 0.323 0.600 0 0 0.245 0.160
Columns refer to the percentage of LSES students and of HSES students who ever take
the SAT, the percentage of LSES students and of HSES students who retake the SAT, and
the percentage of LSES students and HSES students who use test prep services. Rows refer
to each of the possible score evaluation policies, in increasing order of restrictiveness.
Table 1.9.B: Counterfactual Applications





High Section 0.321 0.604 0.127 0.311 0.395 0.515
High Test 0.317 0.600 0.120 0.303 0.379 0.505
Last Score 0.310 0.604 0.116 0.289 0.374 0.478
Average Score 0.306 0.564 0.111 0.259 0.363 0.459
First Score 0.308 0.564 0.112 0.238 0.364 0.422
Columns refer to the percentage of LSES and of HSES students who apply to the selective
university, the percentage of LSES and of HSES students who expect to be admitted, and
the expected rate of admissions.
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High Section 23,658 25,206 76.6 68.1 193.9 132.2
High Test 22,692 22,851 74.2 62.1 195.5 122.9
Last Score 21,456 21,789 71.8 58.9 191.9 123.2
Average Score 22,431 20,001 76.0 57.8 209.2 125.9
First Score 20,433 13,017 68.8 37.6 189.2 89.1
Columns refer to the total costs associated with testing and with test prep paid by LSES
and HSES students. The first two columns present these costs in levels, the next two present
total costs relative to the number of students who apply to the selective university, and the
final two columns present total costs relative to the expected number of students admitted
to the selective university.
Table 1.9.D: Score Accuracy
Policy. µL(δ) µH(δ) σL(δ) σH(δ)
High Section 54.0 62.8 44.4 43.6
High Test 46.9 57.8 41.4 43.8
Last Score 39.4 44.6 47.9 44.6
Average Score 32.3 22.4 41.2 36.9
First Score 35.2 3.5 43.9 42.8
Columns refer to the mean amount by which LSES students’ scores will overstate their
true ability levels, the mean amount by which HSES students’ scores will overstate their
true ability levels, the standard deviation of the amount by which LSES students’ scores
will overstate their true abilities, and the standard deviation of the amount by which HSES
students’ scores will overstate their true abilities.
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Does Student Effort Respond to










It is common to observe high school seniors shirking once they have been admit-
ted to a sufficiently preferred college. Guaranteed college admissions programs,
which admit many students at once to similar sets of schools, provide a quasi-
experimental setting in which to observe the impact of college admission on stu-
dent effort. Such programs may either incentivize shirking or motivate students
to prepare for demanding academic curricula. Therefore, their effect on student
effort is theoretically ambiguous. In 1996, Texas passed the “Top Ten Percent”’
law, guaranteeing admission to any public university in Texas for any Texan
student in the top ten percent of her class at the end of her junior year. We use
regression discontinuity methods and data from a large, urban school district to
show that students barely qualifying for automatic admission are more likely to
enroll at a flagship institution than those barely missing the cutoff. Qualifying
students act as if they are “overinsured,” getting slightly lower grades in their
senior year, while narrowly ineligible students reduce their course-taking. As
lower effort in high school may result in worse college outcomes or lower wages,
it is our interest to reduce these incentives. Shirking might be countered by
explicitly conditioning acceptances on senior year performance.
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I. Introduction
Automatic admissions programs are one of several tools that colleges can use to re-
cruit students from a diverse set of backgrounds. Some of these students may come
from disadvantaged backgrounds, some may underestimate their competitiveness or
be unaware of their academic options, and others may have their preferences influ-
enced by being proactively selected for admission. Colleges usually extend offers of
automatic admission early in the application cycle, possibly to avoid preemption or
to ensure that students are able to complete application requirements.
These offers may function as a form of insurance in the college admissions process.
Students who might end up in a negative state (rejection from preferred colleges,
inability to gain access to college, or ignorance of the process, e.g.) are instead
given the option of attending a (potentially) attractive institution. As a result,
students who are aware of automatic admissions offers face a guaranteed level of
utility provided that they meet set requirements – the analogue of premiums in an
insurance model.
Once admitted to college, students face issues of moral hazard. Typically, agents
who face moral hazard may be more likely to engage in risky behavior and less likely
to protect themselves against negative outcomes (see Pauly (1974) and Akerlof and
Katz (1989), e.g.). In our context, college admission implies that students may ratio-
nally choose to study less once they have been admitted to a sufficiently attractive
institution. In many cases, students do not receive college admissions offers until well
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into their senior years, making this shirking little more than a nuisance for teachers.
Students with automatic admissions offers, though, may be guaranteed admission
extremely early in their senior year, which could induce year-long shirking. As a
result, early admissions offers may function as overinsurance. Highly qualified stu-
dents in particular face little incentive to exert extra effort in school, as the odds of
having acceptances revoked are fairly low.
The previous literature is vague on the potential impact of admissions offers on
student effort levels. Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos (2010) find that the “negative”
intervention of warning college freshmen with low GPAs may have multiple effects
– it may both discourage students from continuing in school and encourage higher
effort levels in those who remain, with ambiguous impacts on eventual graduation.
However, they note that the impact of a negative intervention may be qualitatively
different from that of a positive intervention. Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009)
find that positive interventions have little effect, but find that effects vary signifi-
cantly by student subgroups. Students’ responses to incentives matter because ad-
ditional schooling may have high pecuniary returns and nonpecuniary returns both
inside and outside of the labor market (see Oreopoulos (2006) and Oreopoulos and
Salvanes (2011), e.g.). If these returns depend on both the quantity and the quality
of schooling, shirking may prevent students from capturing them.
We intend to test our hypothesis – that automatic admissions offers may induce
suboptimal effort – using a model based on Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law and data
from an urban Texas school district. As students may invoke automatic admissions
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offers at the end of their junior year, they may adjust both their course selection
and their effort levels. While previous studies have examined aspects of the Top Ten
Percent Law ranging from college enrollment to strategic high school enrollment and
early high school performance, none have studied the impact of this law on senior
year outcomes.
We find that students who barely qualify for automatic admission tend to receive
slightly lower grades than comparable students who do not qualify. We also find
evidence that some students who do not qualify for automatic admission may be
discouraged from further academic effort, taking substantially fewer courses both
overall and at the Honors or AP level. There is also some evidence that White
and Asian students are more likely to graduate with Recommended-level diplomas
(required as part of the guaranteed admission policy), displacing both less-valuable
Minimum diplomas and more-valuable Distinguish diplomas.
The literature suggests that offering partial insurance and engaging in monitor-
ing may solve problems relating to moral hazard. As our outcomes are consistent
with overinsurance and moral hazard, it may therefore be optimal to condition auto-
matic admissions offers on senior year performance or to extend increasingly selective
admissions offers to students with higher GPAs or class rank.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the Texas
Top Ten Percent Law in further detail. Section III examines several related studies,
some dealing with academic responses to incentives, others addressing the Top Ten
Percent Law itself. Section IV lays out the RD model to be used. Section V discusses
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the dataset used and how it was set up for this study. Section VI contains the
results and interpretation of our analysis. Section VII concludes and presents several
extensions for further study.
II. The Texas Top Ten Percent Law
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in the case
of Hopwood v. Texas that the University of Texas’s race-based affirmative action
policies were unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. Later that year, in an
attempt to circumvent the ruling, the Texas Legislature passed Texas House Bill 588,
guaranteeing admission to any public university in Texas for any Texan student in
the top ten percent of her graduating class.38 This law (hereinafter the “Top Ten
Percent Law”) took effect at the beginning of the 1997-1998 school year, and has
remained in effect since.39 While other states – most notably Florida and California
– have adopted similar percentage plans, they do not guarantee admission to any
single campus. Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law, however, allows students to select the
campus to which they are admitted (though they may still need to apply to specific
programs within each university).
Two campuses in particular – The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M
College Station, hereinafter “UT” and “A&M” – may be particularly attractive to
38While students must still submit a complete application, including SAT or ACT scores, presence
in the Top Ten Percent will override any concerns arising from these scores. The law applies to
students at both public and private high schools.
39This is despite the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 affirmation of the constitutionality of
certain types of race-based Affirmative Action.
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these students. These two campuses, the flagships of their respective university sys-
tems, have significantly higher U.S. News and World Report rankings than any other
public schools in Texas. Given their statuses as highly-respected and selective insti-
tutions, a guarantee of admission to either of these universities will dominate many
other admissions offers (let alone labor force participation or home production), and
for even the most talented and ambitious students will provide a valuable fallback.40
As many students begin making college application decisions at the beginning of
their senior year of high school, the Top Ten Percent offer becomes official at the end
of their junior year.
Upon learning their class rank at the end of their junior year, eligible students
may react in one of three ways. Some will maintain the study habits that got them
into the Top Ten Percent. These students may be unaware of the impact of their class
rank or may simply be comfortable with their existing routine. Others will increase
their study effort. These students may not have expected to go to college or may
be worried about their preparedness. Finally, some students will lower their study
effort. These students may be more worried about where they attend than about
how they will perform when they are there. The Top Ten Percent Law does not
apply to any student ranked outside of the Top Ten Percent, potentially leading to
vastly different outcomes between nearly indistinguishable students. This provides
an intuitive basis to study student outcomes in a regression discontinuity (“RD”)
framework.
40Credit-constrained students might forgo selectivity in favor of affordability and/or proximity
to home. Several studies find that poor and/or minority students are less likely to apply to UT
and A&M than economically secure and/or white students are. For our purposes, it is sufficient to
assume that students are admitted to their most-preferred university.
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While the law guarantees admission, it makes no mention of tuition, fees, or other
affordability concerns. Data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System suggest that in-state applicants for the 2011-2012 school year who receive
some form of financial aid and come from families earning less than $30,000 could
expect to pay an average net price of approximately $5,000 at A&M and $9,000 at
UT. Students from more affluent backgrounds could expect to pay more than this.
Some students may therefore choose to enroll in less-selective in-state institutions
rather than in UT or A&M.41 While A&M offers a scholarship for Top Ten Percent
students, UT does not.
The Top Ten Percent law has implications both for students’ access to college
and their choice of where to attend. Bailey and Dynarski (2011) find that differences
in college enrollment and completion by both race and socioeconomic status have
been growing. Much of this can be attributed to stagnant rates of enrollment and
completion among low-SES students and underrepresented minorities and growing
rates among high-SES and white students. Given the de facto racial segregation
of many Texas high schools, the Top Ten Percent law is designed to ensure that a
large number of low-income and underrepresented minority students have guaranteed
college prospects. It also ensures that students of all backgrounds stay in Texas -
– as Hoxby (2009) documents, the growing globalization of the college application
process makes attending school in other states much easier and complicates colleges’
(implicit or explicit) mandates to serve their local and state communities. The Top
41As Texan undergraduates are not eligible for tuition reciprocity from other states, credit-
constrained students are unlikely to substitute towards out-of-state colleges and universities will be
unlikely.
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Ten Percent law may preempt this process and ensure that students remain in Texas.
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Fisher v. University of Texas
that race-sighted affirmative action policies are permissible only if universities can
demonstrate that race-blind policies would not effectively achieve the same goals. As
universities often wish to maintain a racially and socioeconomically diverse student
body, many may examine the feasibility of programs such as the Top Ten Percent
law, making it crucial to understand all effects of the law.
III. Literature and Background
Several studies have been published on the impact of the Top Ten Percent Law.
A large subset focuses on college outcomes. For instance, Long and Tienda (2010)
examine how several student characteristics have changed at a number of Texas
public schools, finding evidence that the Top Ten Percent Law slowed or stopped
steady gains in SAT scores at UT and A&M, crowded out students who fell short of
the Top Ten Percent at these institutions, and benefited institutions such as Texas
Tech, which were able to attract some of the students crowded out of UT and A&M.
Domina (2007) runs fixed-effects regressions on panel data from 1993 to 2002 to
examine school-level changes in college applications and in high school performance,
finding evidence that the Top Ten Percent Law increased applications to selective
Texas universities by students in low-performing high schools and improved school-
wide student attendance and advanced course-taking. These results do not separate
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students by class; so, for instance, a negative effect on seniors’ attendance and course-
taking might be dominated by a positive effect among other students. Cortes and
Zhang (2011) study the incentive effects of the Top Ten Percent Law, finding that
students in low-performing high schools, regardless of race, are more likely to attend
UT or A&M and perform better on 10th grade achievement exams.
Both Niu and Tienda (2010) and Daugherty, Martorell, and McFarlin (2013) use
RD designs to estimate the impact of membership in the Top Ten Percent on flagship
university attendance and other outcomes. Niu and Tienda find particularly sharp
impacts among Hispanic students and those at predominantly minority high schools;
DMM find that students of all racial groups are more likely to attend a flagship
university but that overall college-going is largely unaffected. These findings imply
that UT and A&M’s student bodies will be largely composed of students in the top
decile of their high school. Highly qualified students who do not meet this class rank
requirement will be crowded into private schools or lower-tier public schools in Texas
or into schools in other states.
Several studies examine the incentive effects of other programs on academic out-
comes. Jackson (2010a and 2010b) uses randomized rollout to study the impact of
another Texas innovation – a program paying students and their teachers for above-
average performance on Advanced Placement exams – finding positive impacts in
areas ranging from SAT scores to college attendance. These gains were not accom-
panied by negative unintended consequences, as students still performed comparably
in non-AP classes, and were not subject to fadeout in college, suggesting that study
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habits practiced late in high school will carry over to college. Just as crucially, he
states that the monetary rewards from this program are almost certainly lower than
the psychic and opportunity costs of the higher effort needed to secure them. This
provides evidence that improving students’ estimates of the gains from education
may be the driving factor in their altered behavior. Two papers by Cornwell, Lee,
and Mustard (2005 and 2009) examine how the Georgia HOPE State Merit Scholar-
ship affects student behavior, finding that recipients of the scholarship whose GPAs
put them on the margin of eligibility were less likely to enroll in math and science
courses, more likely to declare an Education major, less likely to sign up for a full
credit load, and more likely to withdraw from courses.42
Several other papers study the impact of academic interventions on college stu-
dents. Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos (2010) find using an RD model that a “neg-
ative” intervention – putting underachieving students on academic probation – has
mixed positive and negative effects. Students who were put on academic probation
after their first semester at college were more likely than comparable students not
on probation to drop out prior to their second semester, but those who remained
at college saw their GPAs increase by more than the control groups’. The impact
of probation on eventual graduation was ambiguous, possibly because only students
who had previously been placed on probation could be suspended from the university.
Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) find that positive interventions – additional
tutoring resources and financial incentives – have only limited effects on student
42The latter two findings are attributed to the fact that scholarship eligibility is evaluated at
benchmarks corresponding to fixed credit levels. This gives students who are at risk of becoming
ineligible incentives to push the checkpoint into later semesters, ensuring additional semesters of
eligibility.
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performance. In particular, female students receiving both additional tutoring and
financial incentives saw their GPAs increase, while male students and female students
receiving only one of the two interventions did not. This suggests that analysis by
subgroups may yield stronger results than pooled analysis.
There is also an extensive literature on the impact and effectiveness of various
types of affirmative action policies. Fryer, Loury, and Yuret (2007) provide evidence
that race-blind affirmative action policies such as Texas’s may select students for ad-
mission based on traits correlated more with race than with future achievement and
may reduce the impact of effort on students’ probabilities of admission. They argue
instead that race-sighted affirmative action is the most effective admission policy
conditional on a targeted level of diversity. Fryer and Loury (2005) argues several
additional points in an attempt to dispel the “mythology” surrounding affirmative
action. Among these are the myths that affirmative action necessarily undercuts
investment incentives, is best deployed as early as possible, and always helps its ben-
eficiaries. Taken together, these conclusions have several implications for our work.
It is possible that percentage plans such as Texas’s may encourage or discourage
student effort. It is also possible that the timing of Top Ten eligibility may affect
these incentives and the timing of student effort. If the Top Ten Percent law does
discourage effort, then it may be worthwhile to examine policy options that preserve
the goals of the law while minimizing unintended consequences.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. In particular, while most
other studies focus on outcomes such as college choice or class composition and a
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few examine whether students work harder to achieve Top Ten Percent eligibility,
we choose to focus on the remainder of students’ high school careers. There are
several reasons why this time period matters. First, some of these students, despite
offers of admission, may not be able to attend college due to budget constraints, aca-
demic unpreparedness, or other factors. Students who underachieve in their senior
years and do not attend college may find their employment prospects or earnings
harmed. Second, students who underachieve in their senior years are more likely to
be underprepared for college and may do worse in college as a result, while those
who overachieve might outperform prior expectations. It is also possible that un-
derachieving in college may prompt some students to drop out, facing poorer career
options (and sizeable loans).
IV. Regression Discontinuity
In our analysis, we use an RD framework to measure the impact of Top Ten Percent
status on several outcomes. In particular, following DMM, we estimate
Yi = θi ∗ TTPi + f(CRi) +Xiβ + εi
where Yi is one of several outcomes proxying for effort in a student’s senior year,
TTPi is an indicator of Top Ten Percent status, CRi is student i’s class rank in
percentage terms (the “running variable”), f(·) is a flexible function mapping class
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rank to various outcomes, Xi is a vector of observable student characteristics,
43 and
εi is a mean-zero, normally-distributed error term. In this setup, E[θi], the coefficient
of interest, measures the average treatment effect associated with Top Ten Percent
status.
This effect is composed of two principal factors – the effect on students who barely
qualify for guaranteed admission and the effect on students who narrowly miss the
cutoff for guaranteed admission. It is possible, for instance, that students who qualify
for automatic admission do not lower their effort level at all and that any “negative”
effects we find are due to increased performance among non-qualifiers who work
harder both in an attempt to qualify for guaranteed admission during their senior
year and to strengthen their college admissions profile if they are unable to qualify.
To better interpret our results, we examine both the extent to which performance
varies among students and how students’ performance in their senior year compares
to their performance in previous years.
Several assumptions must hold for E[θi] to represent a true ATE. These are that 1)
student characteristics, especially the variables in Xi, must trend smoothly through
the cutoff for Top Ten Percent status; 2) there are no simultaneous or confounding
treatments; and 3) students near the cutoff must be randomly assigned to treatment.
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee (2008) formalize the first two assumptions, while
McCrary (2008) does the same for the third.
43In the regression results presented below, Xi consists of dummies for race, sex, whether the
student was ever eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, ever in special education classes, or ever
classified as possessing limited English proficiency. There are also year and school of graduation
fixed effects. Coefficients and standard errors on these variables are not listed, but are available
upon request.
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Evidence on the first assumption is shown in Table 1. These results come from
local linear regressions of various student characteristics on class rank, an indicator
for Top Ten Percent status, and an interaction term allowing for different slopes on
either side of the Top Ten Percent cutoff. None of the coefficients on the Top Ten
Percent indicator is statistically significant, suggesting that these traits do not vary
discontinuously at the cutoff. We can therefore be fairly confident that our results
are not due to dramatically different student characteristics around the cutoff for
guaranteed admission.
As for the second assumption, while some students may have their own incentives
for maintaining or graduating with a high class rank, it is hard to imagine a more
powerful incentive than admission to UT or A&M. Even if there is one, it would
be most likely to improve outcomes within the Top Ten Percent; this might weaken
results from positive discontinuities, but would strengthen those from negative dis-
continuities, as students would have to maintain Top Ten Percent status for longer.44
The issue of nonrandom assignment is dealt with in the next section. For now, suffice
it to say that while assignment may not be entirely random, it may be “as good as”
random.
Rather than imposing a functional form on the data, we run RD estimation using
local linear analysis. We use bandwidths of ten class rank percentiles, five class rank
percentiles, and Imbens-Kalyanaraman (“IK”) bandwidths (which vary by outcome
and by subgroup). Each of these has its own advantages and drawbacks. At one
44College scholarships that account for class rank at time of enrollment might cause a similar
effect.
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extreme, estimates using bandwidths of ten percentiles tend to be less affected by
noise within any particular percentile bin but may be more affected by nonlinearities
in the data. At the other extreme, IK bandwidths are typically extremely small;
therefore, estimates using these bandwidths provide accurate linear approximations
but are extremely susceptible to noise in observations near the cutoff for guaranteed
admission. We therefore prefer bandwidths of ten class rank percentiles as our pri-
mary specifications, using smaller bandwidths to confirm our intuition and determine
the impact of nonlinearities in our data.
In running the RD estimation, we examine several outcomes, all of which may
proxy for effort. First, we examine whether students in the Top Ten Percent are more
likely to graduate with at least a Recommended diploma or with a Distinguished
diploma.45 We also examine whether students take more classes or more courses
worth five grade points in the neighborhood of the Top Ten Percent cutoff and
whether these values constitute positive or negative changes from the previous year.46
We also examine whether students who are barely eligible for guaranteed admission
have higher senior year GPAs than those who are barely ineligible and how these
45The district has three levels of diplomas: Minimum, Recommended, and Distinguished. Stu-
dents graduating with a Minimum diploma must complete 22 credits; 4 in English Language Arts,
3 in Mathematics, 2.5 in Social Studies, 0.5 in Economics, 2 in Science, 1 in an elective consisting of
World History, World Geography, or Approved Science, 1 in Physical Education, 0.5 in Health Edu-
cation, 0.5 in Speech, 1 in Fine Arts, and 6 in various electives. Students obtaining a Recommended
diploma must take one additional credit each in Mathematics and Social Studies and two more each
in Science and World Languages, but are exempted entirely from the former elective requirement
and from one credit of the latter. Students completing a Distinguished diploma must complete one
additional World Language credit above the Recommended standards, but are allowed to take one
less elective credit; these students must also complete their choice of four advanced-level courses
specified in state guidelines.
46Most courses are worth four grades points; those worth five are generally at the honors or
Advanced Placement level.
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GPAs compare to their cumulative GPA at the end of 11th grade. As a Recommended
or Distinguished diploma is necessary to qualify for Top Ten Percent eligibility, the
likelihood of obtaining one of these degrees should at least weakly rise. It is unclear,
however, how any other outcomes would be affected.47
Analysis was run on subsamples according to race, gender, economic background,
school college-sending patterns, and likelihood of attending college based on char-
acteristics other than class rank. Intuitively, this can be expected to yield more
accurate estimates for individual subgroups; different groups of students may have
offsetting reactions to Top Ten Percent status, or a single group’s reaction could
be drowned by other groups’ unresponsiveness. Our prior was that minorities and
students from disadvantaged backgrounds or underachieving schools would on aver-
age have more to gain from putting forth higher effort and increasing their college
readiness, while well-to-do students attending successful school – those more likely
to treat UT and A&M as “safety” schools – would be less likely to put forth high
effort in their senior years.
The chief drawback of segmenting the data is the reduction in sample size. Even
using a large data set, running local estimates on very specific subsamples may result
in a sample size too small (and standard errors too large) for valid inference. It is
also possible that some students attended lower-quality high schools in hopes of
achieving Top Ten Percent eligibility, according to findings by Cullen, Long, and
47As it is easy to picture some students working harder and others shirking, a heterogeneous effects
framework yielding an average treatment effect rather than a single treatment effect is certainly
appropriate here.
76
Reback (2011). If true, it is unclear what effect this would have on RD estimates,
but it would almost certainly increase standard errors.
V. Data
We run our estimation using transcript data from a large, urban, majority-minority
school district in Texas. This district (hereinafter “the district”) is relatively poor,
with a large number of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. About half
of the district’s students are Hispanic, about a quarter each are African-American
or White, and the remainder are of other races.
Data were initially listed at the course level, with multiple observations per stu-
dent. Each school year was a separate data file. Within each year, variables indicated
the semester, the school at which each course was taken, the course name, and the
course number. Every course taken at every public school in the district between the
1999-2000 and 2010-2011 school years was a separate observation. Sixteen of these
schools were standard-curriculum public high schools of various racial makeups and
qualities. The remainder fit into several broad categories: “alternative” schools, spe-
cial education programs, vocational and technical schools, centers for at-risk youth,
and middle schools.48. Notably, the data did not contain information on class rank,
48We assume that courses listed at middle schools were generally of a remedial quality or geared
towards students with learning disabilities, but the data do not indicate for certain that this is the
case. Fortunately, these account for a relatively small number of observations and therefore can be
safely dropped.
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though they did contain data on demographics, class, degrees awarded, and course
grades on a 0-100 scale.
It took several steps to put the data into a form from which class rank could
be recovered. First, several courses were listed as being “Local Credit Only.” These
included most “athletic” courses, several courses offered only at specific high schools,
and several highly advanced language courses. These courses did not contribute to
students’ GPAs, and were therefore dropped from the data. Courses taken at middle
schools or at the middle school level were also dropped; while this was not mentioned
in the district guidelines, it is logical that high schools would not count courses taken
below the high school level. Together, Local Credit Only and middle school courses
comprise between five and ten percent of courses taken in most school years.
Next, grades were converted into a uniform grade point scale. Each course could
have several grade entries – one corresponding to a semester grade, which could be
split into up to three component “cycle” grades. First, any courses with uninter-
pretable non-numeric grades were dropped.49 Where necessary, cycle grades were
averaged to obtain a semester grade. These grades were then converted into a five-
point grade point scale according to district guidelines.50 At this point it was possible
to compute semester and cumulative GPAs.
49While semester grades of “79.” and “I00” could be easily be inferred to read “79” and “100”
respectively, semester grades such as “W” or “*” would be dropped. These corrections apply to
several hundred course-level observations per year, compared with a full sample of over 200,000
courses taken per year.
50100-90 was given an A grade, 89-80 a B, 79-70 a C, and everything else an F. A’s were worth
four points (five if the course was a five-point course); B’s were worth three (four); C’s were worth
two (three); F’s were worth zero regardless of the course.
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With each student assigned a cumulative GPA for each semester, it was possi-
ble to rank students’ GPAs by year, semester, high school, and grade level. Ties
were broken using randomly assigned student ID numbers. We then merged in data
on demographics, degrees, and college outcomes. Some students who could not be
merged these individuals were dropped from further analysis. As students had sepa-
rate observations for demographic data in each semester in which they appeared, we
assigned some students values for race and gender.51 When running separate anal-
yses by racial background, we grouped students into group of “White and Asian”
and “Non-Asian Minority.” This allowed us to both run valid inferences by racial
subgroups and account for the relatively small number of students who could not
be classified as White, African-American, or Hispanic. Students who had ever been
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch were labeled as “economically disadvantaged.”
In performing our analysis we omitted students who did not have valid obser-
vations for gender, ethnicity, economic status, or limited English proficiency, who
had not graduated, had graduated with Special Education degrees, or who had miss-
ing data on Special Education status. We omitted students who did not attend a
standard-curriculum high school, as class rank at other institutions might not be as
meaningful due to altered curricula, selection on classmates, or smaller class sizes.
51Given the slippery definitions of racial groups, some students were listed as belonging to different
groups in different semesters. If one ethnicity was listed in a majority of a student’s observations,
we assigned her to that ethnicity. If no ethnicity appeared in a majority of observations, we declared
students Hispanic if any observations stated that they were Hispanic. Students who were listed as
White and as one other ethnicity (presumably with some observations missing) were assigned the
other ethnicity. Students with multiple non-White and non-Hispanic ethnicities listed were labeled
as being two or more races. Students with multiple genders listed were assigned the modal gender;
the 70 students with an equal number of male and female observations were dropped from our
analysis.
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We omitted those students who were never listed as being in 11th grade, as the run-
ning variable could not be defined for these students.52 Finally, we omitted students
who were listed as taking no courses or having no GPA in their senior years. The
modified data thus consists of 20,000 student-level observations across 16 high schools
over nine years; restricting further to observations within 10 class rank percentiles
of the cutoff for guaranteed admission gives us a final sample of 4,196 students.
Given the large amount of data and cleaning, some measurement error is unavoid-
able. Some of this could be due to data entry or keystroke error. It is also possible
that some students may be assigned incorrect class ranks. Finally (and most wor-
ryingly), teachers may have assigned grades in ways that systematically affect their
students’ GPAs or fudge the definition of “Top Ten Percent” (labeling a student with
a class rank of 10.6%, for instance, as being in the Top Ten Percent). If any of these
sources of measurement error is serious enough, it could invalidate the results of the
RD setup.
Fortunately, this is unlikely to be the case. The largest threat to an RD framework
is if measurement error is systematically present around the cutoff. Measurement
error attributable to data entry or to coding should not be systematic in this way. If
anything, these sources of measurement error would bias RD estimates towards zero,
strengthening most of our results. Measurement error in grading, though, may be
designed to put specific students in the Top Ten Percent, which would be a distinct
52It is unclear whether these students transferred into the school district, skipped a grade, were
victims of a clerical error, or were dropped from the sample, but the end result each case is the
same.
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threat to RD analysis, according to McCrary (2008). It is unclear, though, whether
this threat would materialize. Certainly renegade teachers can affect the cardinal
distribution of GPAs, but in equilibrium the rank-ordering around the cutoff may
not be significantly altered,53 so according to Lee (2008) the assignment to treatment
may be “as good as” random. Similarly, while fudging the precise definition of “Top
Ten Percent” may result in systematically spurious assignment to treatment, this
will if anything bias results towards zero rather than towards a positive or negative
outcome.
A more likely scenario is that teachers feel pressured or obligated to give the
benefit of the doubt to “good” students on the cusp between grades. This may not
threaten our results, though. If such pressure occurs uniformly among these students,
class ranks (and the thus makeup of the Top Ten Percent) will be largely unaffected.
Even if teachers are able to select which marginal “good” students are in the Top Ten
Percent, it should be possible to guess the impact of such selection on RD estimates.
In particular, given a choice between two students with roughly equal grades, it
seems likely that a teacher would choose the more motivated and harder-working
one for Top Ten Percent status, as that student would be more likely to succeed
in future academic settings. As a result, any selection into Top Ten Percent status
based on relevant unobservables would bias RD estimates toward positive (rather
53For the rank ordering to be affected, teachers would need to a) know which students are near
the cutoff, b) be able to credibly affect those students’ course grades, and c) either make certain
that a single course grade can affect the rank ordering of GPAs or coordinate with other teachers
to affect multiple grades. Of course, this assumes that there is no disagreement among teachers
about how to influence the rank ordering of GPAs. As this is unlikely to be the case, and given the
vast number of moving parts (to say nothing of ethical issues) involved, it appears unlikely that
teachers will be able to have large and systematic effects on class rankings.
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than negative or zero) outcomes. If this is the case, positive RD estimates might
be threatened, but negative RD estimates would be strengthened. The net effect of
all forms of measurement error would therefore be ambiguous for positive estimates,
but would bias negative estimates towards zero. As a result, while the barely Top
Ten eligible students in our sample may be disproportionately motivated, we are
confident that our results will not falsely imply that moral hazard is taking place.
VI. Results
We find some evidence that students who are barely eligible for guaranteed admission
exert lower effort in their senior year than their ineligible peers. This difference is
attributable more to a drop in their effort level rather than to an increase in effort
among ineligible students.
We begin by examining students’ college-going patterns. As the primary goal of
the Top Ten Percent law is to achieve diversity at public colleges and universities,
we should expect students to modify their college enrollment habits accordingly.
Conversely, if the Top Ten Percent law does not have a direct effect on college-going
patterns it will be difficult to argue that it has an indirect effect on student effort.
We show that while the Top Ten Percent law does not significantly affect college
access it does affect college choice, primarily by shifting students into UT and A&M.
In studying how students react to their Top Ten Percent status (or lack thereof)
over their senior year, we examine both twelfth-grade outcomes and how those
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twelfth-grade outcomes differ from eleventh-grade outcomes. Running regression
discontinuity analysis on twelfth-grade outcomes illustrates how eligible students’
outcomes differ from those of ineligible students; it does not say why these outcomes
differ. If, for instance, we were to find that eligible twelfth-graders got substantially
lower grades than ineligible twelfth-graders did, additional analysis would still be
necessary to determine whether this constitutes shirking on the part of eligible stu-
dents or extra effort on the part of ineligible students. Examining the difference in
twelfth-grade outcomes from eleventh-grade outcomes allows us to more conclusively
state which of these is likely to be the case.
Students in the Top Ten Percent may react to their status along several margins.
First, they may target a different type of degree. Students on track for Minimum
diplomas may focus on earning Recommended diplomas in order to take advantage
of their Top Ten Percent status, those on track for Recommended diplomas may
increase their effort in order to be more competitive college students, and those on
track for Distinguished diplomas may reduce their effort due to the lower-stakes
nature of their college admissions process.
Next, Top Ten-eligible students may take a different mix of courses. Some may
take alter the number of courses that they take. Top Ten-eligible students may
take more courses or fewer courses than comparable ineligible students. Eligible
students may take additional courses if they wish to become more competitive at
the college level or may take fewer courses if they feel that additional effort has been
disincentivized. Ineligible students may also react to the TTP cutoff–in particular,
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some may take fewer courses either in an effort to improve their grades or out of
discouragement. We therefore examine both the number of courses taken in 12th
grade and the change in this number from the previous year.
Students may also alter the type of courses that they take. In particular, stu-
dents may choose between five-credit AP or honors courses and four-credit standard
courses.54 Top Ten-eligible students may take more five-credit courses if their taste
for risk increases as a result of guaranteed admission or may take fewer if they prefer
to consume leisure. Ineligible students may take more five-credit courses if they be-
lieve that such courses will improve their GPA or believe that such courses make them
more attractive applicants in the standard college admissions procedure. They may
take fewer five-credit courses if they are especially risk-averse and prefer a moderate
GPA with certainty over risking a low GPA.55 We examine both the total number
of credits that these students take in their final year and the change in this number
from the previous year.
Finally, conditional on taking the same set of courses, Top Ten-eligible students
may exert different effort levels than their ineligible peers within these courses. On
the one hand, they may exert greater effort in order to improve their college readi-
ness; on the other, they may begin to shirk if their grades do not affect their college
admissions prospects. Similarly, ineligible students may exert greater effort in an at-
tempt to become eligible prior to graduation or may become discouraged and exert
54We treat single-semester honors courses as being worth 2.5 credits and standard courses as two
credits.
55As any grade a standard course is treated the same as the next grade down an honors or AP
course, students opting to take standard courses due to risk aversion must believe that there is a
chance that they would do particularly poorly in the corresponding honors course.
84
less effort than previously. We examine students’ first semester, second semester and
full-year grades over the course of 12th grade. We do so because the effects of guar-
anteed admission may vary over time. For instance, the relative impact of automatic
admission offers on students’ grades may be larger in the second semester as course
material builds on itself or may be larger in the first semester while ineligible stu-
dents have strong incentives to study their way to eligibility. To determine whether
any discontinuities are more attributable to eligible or to ineligible students, we also
examine the difference between students’ cumulative GPAs at the end of their junior
year and their senior-year GPAs.
a. College Outcomes
We present estimates of college outcomes in Table 2 and Figure 1. Top Ten eligibility
does not appear to affect college access. Students are no more likely to attend any
college, to attend a four-year college, to attend a selective college, or to attend a
selective college. Surprisingly, Top Ten eligibility does not make students any less
likely to attend an out-of-state university.
Top Ten eligibility does affect college choice along two important margins. Stu-
dents who are eligible for guaranteed admission enroll in private universities as sig-
nificantly lower rates, and are over five percentage points – over 50 percent – more
likely to attend UT or A&M. This finding is corroborated both by previous literature
(Niu and Tienda and Long and Tienda, e.g.) and by a 2009 law exempting UT from
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Top Ten Percent requirements in filling the final 25 percent of their in-state entering
class.56 Readers interested in learning more about the Top Ten Percent law’s effect
on college choice are advised to read Daugherty, Martorell, and McFarlin (2011),
which provides a fuller analysis of this topic by student subgroups.
b. Recommended and Distinguished Diplomas
Top Ten Percent status has the clearest implications for the odds of acquiring (at
least) a Recommended diploma, as students who graduate with a Minimum diploma
are ineligible for automatic admission to college, regardless of their class rank.57
This is balanced, however, by the fact that many eligible students are on track
for a Recommended diploma anyway. Among the full sample of students, over 95
percent obtain a Recommended or Distinguished diploma near the cutoff for Top
Ten eligibility. Even among economically disadvantaged students, nearly 95 percent
of those who are barely ineligible for guaranteed admission obtain one of these two
diplomas. As a result, any increases in the probability of obtaining such a degree
will be small – there may even be spurious negative estimates of E [θi] if there is any
noise in the relatively small treated group.
56UT is required to admit the top one percent of high school graduates, then the top two percent,
and so on until 75 percent of its in-state quota is filled. It may then use its discretion in filling the
remainder. As this law did not go into effect until 2011, its passage does not affect our results.
57Top Ten Percent students who do graduate with a Minimum diploma are still eligible for
admission to the university of their choice if they score over 1500 out of 2400 on the SAT or satisfy
the ACT’s College Readiness Benchmarks. That said, the set of students who simultaneously qualify
for Top Ten Percent status, choose to obtain a Minimum diploma anyway, score suitably on either
exam, and then apply to college cannot be a large one.
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Table 3 contains the results of regression discontinuity analysis using the jump
in the probability of obtaining at least a Recommended diploma as the outcome of
interest. Columns (1) and (2) have bandwidths of five class rank percentiles, columns
(3) and (4) have bandwidths of ten class rank percentiles, and column (5) uses an IK
optimal bandwidth. Coefficients are generally positive and nearly always statistically
insignificant. Graphs for the full sample and for two subgroups are presented in
Figure 2. In the full-sample graph, there is little evidence of a discontinuity. It is
worth noting, however, that students in the 11th percentile obtain Recommended or
Distinguished diplomas at a rate distinctly below trend. This is even more visible in
the graph for economically disadvantaged students, and is a likely contributor to the
one statistically significant coefficient in Table 3. It is unclear exactly why this is
the case; one possibility is that some fraction of students who are ineligible become
discouraged and either drop out or get Minimum-level diplomas. There is some
graphical evidence of a positive discontinuity among White and Asian Students, but
the point estimate of two percentage points is not statistically significant.
While there is no clear discontinuity in the probability that students graduate
with at least a Recommended-level diploma, Table 4 shows a statistically significant
drop in the probability that students get a Distinguished-level diploma using a band-
width of ten class rank percentiles. This drop is stronger when focusing on several
particular subgroups, such as female students and students with a high probability of
enrolling in college. Graphical evidence, however, suggests that these discontinuities
may be due to nonlinearities in students’ probabilities of graduating with Distin-
guished diplomas. The top graph in Figure 3 illustrates this – as students advance
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into more competitive class ranks, the probability that they graduate with a Dis-
tinguished diploma begins to rise more sharply. Accordingly, linear predicted values
with a bandwidth of ten class rank percentiles have a much steeper slope than those
with a bandwidth of five class rank percentiles. Using the smaller bandwidth shrinks
our estimates by over an order of magnitude, making them statistically insignificant
in the process. Perhaps the most convincing case of Top Ten eligibility overinsuring
students appears among White and Asian students, who are over eight percentage
points less likely to obtain a Distinguished diploma when using a ten-point band-
width. Using a five-point bandwidth shrinks these estimates as well, but there is less
evidence of nonlinearities among Top-Ten eligible students – instead, it appears that
much of the difference is due to noise among ineligible students.
c. Courses Taken
Course-taking patterns suggest that while students do not significantly alter the
number of courses they take, they do take fewer honors or AP classes. Table 5 lists
the impact of Top Ten eligibility on the number of courses taken in 12th grade.
Point estimates using a 10-percentile bandwidth are uniformly negative but insignif-
icant. Figure 4 shows that there is not much variation in course-taking – even if
our estimates were significant, they are so small as to render any analysis almost
meaningless. Estimates using an IK optimal bandwidth are somewhat larger and
positive, but appear to reflect noise in our sample rather than trends in the data.
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It is possible that Top Ten-eligible and ineligible students could take the same
number of courses in their senior year because one of the two groups fundamentally
altered their course-taking patterns. However, both Table 6 and Figure 5 suggest
otherwise. Estimates using bandwidths of ten percentiles and five percentiles are
statistically insignificant. While estimates using an IK optimal bandwidth are sta-
tistically significant in several cases, this does not appear to reflect actual trends in
the data. Notably, students who are just barely ineligible for guaranteed admission
take fewer classes in their senior year than in the previous year. There are three
possible explanations for this. First, students who barely miss the cutoff for guar-
anteed admission may take fewer classes due to discouragement. Second, they may
take fewer classes in an effort to improve their GPA – if there is a quality-quantity
tradeoff in course-taking, then students who are able to focus intensely on a small
number of courses may expect to do better in those courses than if they had a heavier
course load. Finally, students who barely missed the cutoff for guaranteed admission
may be more likely to have taken a suboptimally high number of courses during
their junior year. These students may therefore rationally adjust their course-taking
downwards.
Students who wish to take a set number of courses have additional margins along
which they may adjust their effort levels. In particular, students may take additional
five-credit honors or AP courses or may take less challenging four-credit courses. We
therefore examine the number of credits that students take to account for differences
in course difficulty. This metric does not reveal systematic discontinuities either-
–though the point estimates in Table 7 are almost frequently negative, they are
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rarely statistically significant. Figure 6 similarly shows no clear evidence of major
discontinuities. Even among the two group with statistically significant indicators
for Top Ten Percent status–non-Asian minority students and students whose high
schools send few students to college–it appears that the statistical significance in
Table 7 may be an artifact of nonlinearities.
Point estimates for the difference in credits taken between 11th grade and 12th
grade are contained in Table 8. Point estimates are generally positive but statis-
tically insignificant. Results are statistically significant only when using Imbens-
Kalyanaraman bandwidths, which tend to be narrower than the other two band-
widths that we use. Closer inspection of the data shows that much of this effect
may be due unexpected drop-offs in course-taking among students who barely miss
eligibility for automatic admission. This provides additional evidence that students
who narrowly fail to qualify for automatic admission may be particularly discouraged
from future academic effort.
d. Course Grades
Table 9 shows that students who are barely eligible for guaranteed admission do only
slightly worse in their senior year than those who are barely ineligible. This result
holds across nearly all subgroups when using a ten percentile bandwidth – the lone
exception being students who are highly likely to attend college anyway. Results
become statistically insignificant when the bandwidth is reduced to five percentiles,
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though point estimates fall farther in some cases than in others. Figure 8 shows
graphs for the overall sample and for three of the groups most affected by Top Ten
eligibility. In each of the subgroups there is a clear break in the steady upward trend
as students rise into higher class rank percentiles. However, even if the differences
are statistically significant, they are fairly small. The largest discontinuity in Table
7 – a difference of close to .15 grade points among students attending low-sending
schools – does not reflect a huge drop in GPA. For context, a student who takes six
courses (somewhat above par for students near the cutoff) and gets five A’s and one
B would do .17 grade points worse than a student who gets six A’s in the same set
of courses. It is worth noting, however, that guaranteed admission almost certainly
affects individuals heterogeneously, and that this effect may be substantially stronger
in the five percent of individuals around the cutoff who are induced to attend UT or
A&M.
This drop in GPA is larger in the first semester of 12th grade than in the second,
as shown in Tables 10 and 11. Point estimates in Table 10 are approximately .01
grade points larger in magnitude than those in Table 9 and in some cases are more
than .02 grade points larger. Point estimates in Table 11 are smaller and less likely
to be statistically significant, though they do still reflect lower performance among
eligible student than among ineligible students at the cutoff. This image is consistent
with students’ slightly reducing their effort levels (either by getting lower grades or
taking fewer honors or AP courses) as soon as they are admitted to their preferred
university. Students who are admitted under the Top Ten Percent law are able
to shirk earlier than those admitted under the normal timeline. Students who are
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admitted during the normal admissions process are often unable to shirk until the
second semester of 12th grade, which explains why the GPA gap is smaller in the
second semester than in the first.
To verify that the difference in GPAs at the cutoff reflects lower effort among
Top Ten-eligible students rather than increased effort among ineligible students, we
take the difference in students’ 12th grade GPAs and their cumulative GPA at the
end of 11th grade and run regression discontinuity estimation on this analysis. If
guarantees of admission cause shirking, we should observe that students who are
eligible for guaranteed admission have lower GPAs in 12th grade than in previous
semesters. Similarly, if Top Ten ineligibility causes students to work harder in an
effort to become eligible, we should observe that such students have higher GPAs in
12th grade than in previous semesters.
Evidence on the nature of GPA gaps is mixed. While the point estimates in Table
12 are mostly statistically insignificant, graphical analysis will be more useful for
determining whether GPA gaps are due to higher effort among ineligible students or
lower effort among eligible students. Several of these graphs are contained in Figure 9.
Among the full sample of students there is some evidence for both of these. In several
cases, however, there may be clearer evidence that students who qualify for automatic
admission see their grades fall rather than the reverse. Ineligible non-Asian minority
students and students with low probabilities of attending college perform similarly in
12th grade to previous years, while corresponding eligible students have lower GPAs
in 12th grade. In schools that send few students to college, most students near the
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cutoff for guaranteed admission do worse in 12th grade than in previous years, but
this decrease is more pronounced among eligible students.
VII. Conclusion
While students do not react uniformly to the Top Ten Percent Law, there is evidence
that they do respond to academic incentives for effort. Top Ten eligibility may induce
White and Asian students to graduate with Recommended diplomas at greater rates,
reducing both the number who graduate with Minimum diplomas and the number
who graduate with Distinguished diplomas. These students act as though they are
overinsured – they do enough to meet the guidelines for admission, but since they
are protected against poor results in their college search, they are free to shirk with
little chance of being punished.
Students respond along other margins as well. While students as a whole do not
alter the number of courses that they take, there is evidence that a small group of
students who do not qualify for guaranteed admission may do so, possibly out of dis-
couragement or as a way to capitalize on a quantity-quality tradeoff in course-taking.
We find similar results when examining the number of credits that students take.
Students’ grades provide some evidence for both of these possibilities–non-qualifiers
get slightly better grades in 12th grade than in previous years, while qualifiers get
slightly worse grades.
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The challenge that colleges and high schools face is therefore to combat overin-
surance and moral hazard by maintaining programs that expand college access while
limiting the negative incentives from these programs. One way of doing this might
be to offer only partial insurance. States could do this by adopting percent plans
similar to California’s and Florida’s. Presenting students with a series of cutoffs
and increasingly valuable prizes rather than providing access to flagship universities
at a single cutoff might keep students better engaged for longer. Students would
be motivated to work harder in part to gain automatic access to more prestigious
universities and in part because their worst-case scenario in the college application
process would no longer be quite as rosy. Even this, however, does not address the
fact that students, once admitted to the school of their choice, have little incentive
to keep working.
A more practical solution might involve additional monitoring, changing auto-
matic admissions programs to conditional admissions programs. For instance, col-
leges could request to view students’ GPAs midway through their senior year. Stu-
dents who underperform or do not take a sufficiently challenging set of courses would
have admissions offers at certain schools revoked. While this would require additional
work on the part of colleges, it would affect all admitted students, regardless of their
intended destination.
This paper may understate the impact of Top Ten Percent eligibility. In part, this
is due to measurement error of various sorts; while unfortunate, it is unlikely that
other sources of transcript data would be qualitatively better. Similarly, while some
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students may be incorrectly assigned high school class ranks, there is no evidence
that this is systematic in either direction around the cutoff, and therefore does not
drastically affect our results. The results presented above should therefore be taken
as lower bounds of the true effects of Top Ten Percent eligibility.
One possible extension of this work involves using data from other school districts.
While the district analyzed here is useful for analyzing the responses of minorities,
low-income students, and those who might not otherwise have planned on attend-
ing college, these groups are also the ones least likely to think strategically about
college admissions. These students may therefore react less dramatically than those
from wealthier or higher-achieving school districts. Analyzing the responses of other
students may thus provide not only a clearer picture of strategic thinking, but also
a better idea of the relative impacts of the treatment of college admission versus the
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Table 2.2: First-Stage Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enrolled, Any
University
0.00287 0.0270 -0.0403 -0.0337 -0.0228 -0.0283
(0.0436) (0.0394) (0.0307) (0.0279) (0.0703) (0.0593)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 963
Enrolled, 4-Year
University
0.0174 0.0149 -0.0406 -0.0335 -0.0504 -0.0517
(0.0430) (0.0377) (0.0303) (0.0268) (0.0672) (0.0544)




0.0549 0.0541 -0.0088 -0.0050 0.0654 0.0541
(0.0384) (0.0331) (0.0273) (0.0238) (0.0603) (0.0492)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 1037
Enrolled,
Out-of-State
0.0049 0.0064 -0.0121 -0.0115 0.0132 0.0142
(0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0363) (0.0344)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 931
Enrolled, Private
University
-0.0329 -0.0329 -0.0689 *** -0.0657 *** -0.0895 * -0.0847 *
(0.0269) (0.0266) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0521) (0.0481)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 827
Enrolled, UT or
A&M
0.0717 ** 0.0701 ** 0.0582 *** 0.0575 *** 0.1314 *** 0.1197 ***
(0.0291) (0.0271) (0.0208) (0.0197) (0.0476) (0.0418)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 807
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.3: Probability of Obtaining at Least a Recommended-Level Diploma
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
0.0109 0.0134 0.0046 0.0088 0.0240 0.0273
(0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0316) (0.0278)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 788
Male
-0.0083 -0.0082 0.0010 0.0032 0.0120 0.0049
(0.0290) (0.0266) (0.0195) (0.0183) (0.0418) (0.0344)
N = 743 N = 1475 N = 336
Female
0.0223 0.0229 0.0068 0.0116 0.0285 0.0295
(0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0399) (0.0337)




-0.0079 -0.0111 -0.0041 -0.0045 -0.0009 0.0061
(0.0193) (0.0179) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0331) (0.0236)
N = 1173 N = 2328 N = 484
Economically
Disadvantaged
0.0318 0.0481 * 0.0142 0.0245 0.0478 0.0734 *
(0.0314) (0.0289) (0.0203) (0.0186) (0.0515) (0.0236)
N = 934 N = 1868 N = 427
White or Asian
0.0170 0.0205 0.0165 0.0206 0.0048 0.0212
(0.0221) (0.0186) (0.0150) (0.0136) (0.0349) (0.0260)
N = 957 N = 1954 N = 424
Non-Asian
Minority
0.0043 0.0082 -0.0058 -0.0019 0.0337 0.0368
(0.0267) (0.0255) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0436) (0.0391)
N = 1150 N = 2242 N = 516
High-Enrolling
School
-0.0008 0.0079 0.0064 0.0099 -0.0003 0.0135
(0.0191) (0.0168) (0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0288) (0.0240)
N = 1304 N = 2585 N = 563
Low-Enrolling
School
0.0300 0.0286 0.0021 0.0081 0.0651 0.0410
(0.0344) (0.0337) (0.0224) (0.0212) (0.0602) (0.0505)
N = 803 N = 1611 N = 368
High Enrollment
Probability
0.0022 0.0220 0.0043 0.0025 0.0051 0.0101
(0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0280) (0.0240)
N = 1031 N = 2096 N = 413
Low Enrollment
Probability
0.0168 0.0328 0.0069 0.0187 0.0317 0.0623
(0.0305) (0.0285) (0.0202) (0.0189) (0.0512) (0.0449)
N = 1076 N = 2100 N = 501
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.4: Probability of Obtaining a Distinguished-Level Diploma
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
-0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0525 *** -0.0496 *** 0.0267 0.0221
(0.0257) (0.0222) (0.0193) (0.0166) (0.0392) (0.0340)
N = 2107 N = 4196 N = 983
Male
-0.0743 -0.0160 -0.0347 -0.0233 -0.0237 0.0741
(0.0537) (0.0480) (0.0380) (0.0329) (0.0894) (0.0730)
N = 743 N = 1475 N = 360
Female
0.0307 0.0084 -0.0585 *** -0.0625 *** 0.0522 0.0258
(0.0269) (0.0233) (0.0213) (0.0183) (0.0348) (0.0306)




-0.0058 -0.0166 -0.0708 ** -0.0667 *** 0.0291 0.0082
(0.0414) (0.0360) (0.0304) (0.0329) (0.0614) (0.0522)
N = 1173 N = 2328 N = 612
Economically
Disadvantaged
0.0092 0.0082 -0.0275 -0.0214 0.0105 0.0378
(0.0241) (0.0234) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0319) (0.0254)
N = 934 N = 1868 N = 445
White or Asian
-0.0392 -0.0362 -0.0803 ** -0.0802 ** -0.0026 0.0144
(0.0480) (0.0430) (0.0348) (0.0301) (0.0719) (0.0616)
N = 957 N = 1957 N = 530
Non-Asian
Minority
0.0290 0.0260 -0.0093 -0.0081 0.0391 0.0249
(0.0243) (0.0220) (0.0184) (0.0173) (0.0362) (0.0280)
N = 1150 N = 2242 N = 511
High-Enrolling
School
-0.0069 -0.0091 -0.0574 ** -0.0510 ** 0.0448 0.0387
(0.0393) (0.0343) (0.0287) (0.0247) (0.0578) (0.0505)
N = 1304 N = 2585 N = 694
Low-Enrolling
School
0.0028 0.0008 -0.0454 *** -0.0440 *** 0.0100 0.0021
(0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0100) (0.0105)
N = 803 N = 1611 N = 315
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.0203 -0.0200 -0.0609 * -0.0703 ** 0.0203 0.0120
(0.0459) (0.0401) (0.0388) (0.0290) (0.0668) (0.0567)
N = 1031 N = 2096 N = 559
Low Enrollment
Probability
0.0130 0.0154 -0.0115 -0.0081 0.0170 0.0618 **
(0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0256)
N = 1076 N = 2100 N = 457
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.5: Number of Courses Taken in 12th Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
0.0660 0.0215 -0.0628 -0.0541 0.2140 0.2135
(0.1060) (0.0980) (0.0746) (0.0688) (0.1476) (0.1331)
N = 2100 N = 4182 N = 1128
Male
-0.1150 -0.0662 -0.0049 -0.0300 0.0642 0.1573
(0.1817) (0.1733) (0.1270) (0.1192) (0.2154) 0.(1897)
N = 741 N = 1468 N = 519
Female
0.0657 0.0418 -0.0877 -0.0732 0.1919 0.1169
(0.1306) (0.1208) (0.0921) (0.0848) (0.1675) (0.1460)




0.0397 0.0016 -0.0668 -0.0936 0.1370 0.0733
(0.1388) (0.1302) (0.0985) (0.0931) (0.1695) (0.1538)
N = 1171 N = 2321 N = 838
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.0698 0.0175 -0.0562 -0.0108 0.1865 0.2215
(0.1594) (0.1501) (0.1107) (0.1040) (0.2076) (0.1806)
N = 929 N = 1861 N = 643
White or Asian
0.0504 0.0284 -0.0328 -0.0495 0.3427 0.3284 *
(0.1598) (0.1475) (0.1088) (0.0991) (0.2165) (0.1805)
N = 954 N = 1948 N = 577
Non-Asian
Minority
-0.0403 -0.0417 -0.1303 -0.1123 0.0887 -0.0026
(0.1397) (0.1300) (0.1010) (0.0946) (0.1701) (0.1506)
N = 1146 N = 2234 N = 789
High-Enrolling
School
0.0992 0.1011 -0.0444 -0.0298 0.1608 0.1860
(0.1412) (0.1297) (0.0984) (0.0905) (0.1824) (0.1671)
N = 1301 N = 2577 N = 880
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.1417 -0.1513 -0.0937 -0.1199 0.1979 0.1419
(0.1532) (0.1470) (0.1104) (0.1048) (0.2019) (0.1764)
N = 799 N = 1605 N = 444
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.0821 -0.1280 -0.1076 -0.1145 0.0112 -0.0274
(0.1480) (0.1392) (0.1046) (0.0975) (0.1798) (0.1623)
N = 1029 N = 2090 N = 763
Low Enrollment
Probability
0.1024 0.1464 -0.0586 -0.0260 0.3066 0.3379 **
(0.1489) (0.1384) (0.1047) (0.0973) (0.1873) (0.1599)
N = 1071 N = 2092 N = 758
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.6: Difference in Courses Taken
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
0.0895 0.1213 0.0023 0.0179 0.3505 ** 0.3330 **
(0.1176) (0.1114) (0.0810) (0.0777) (0.1699) (0.1567)
N = 2100 N = 4182 N = 1119
Male
-0.1892 -0.0386 0.0490 0.0681 0.0607 0.2511
(0.2066) (0.1942) (0.1390) (0.1354) (0.2564) (0.2062)
N = 741 N = 1468 N = 551
Female
0.2282 0.2081 -0.0100 0.0003 0.3316 * 0.2201
(0.1413) (0.1361) (0.0986) (0.0948) (0.1803) (0.1625)




0.1843 0.1463 0.0285 0.0256 0.3627 ** 0.3334 *
(0.1460) (0.1411) (0.1031) (0.1001) (0.1813) (0.1721)
N = 1171 N = 2321 N = 845
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.0252 0.0476 -0.0322 0.0218 0.0840 0.1125
(0.1910) (0.1787) (0.1283) (0.1222) (0.2376) (0.2059)
N = 929 N = 1861 N = 737
White or Asian
0.1040 0.0844 0.0117 0.0123 0.5136 ** 0.4976 **
(0.1646) (0.1580) (0.1107) (0.1067) (0.2318) (0.2020)
N = 954 N = 1948 N = 558
Non-Asian
Minority
0.0673 0.0814 -0.0143 -0.0123 0.1427 0.0770
(0.1640) (0.1534) (0.1151) (0.1102) (0.2133) (0.1858)
N = 1146 N = 2234 N = 752
High-Enrolling
School
0.1789 0.1918 0.0179 0.0411 0.3383 * 0.3172 *
(0.1481) (0.1415) (0.1009) (0.0979) (0.1960) (0.1777)
N = 1301 N = 2577 N = 974
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.0565 -0.0674 -0.0249 -0.0496 0.1159 0.1272
(0.1921) (0.1808) (0.1342) (0.1269) (0.2332) (0.2012)
N = 799 N = 1605 N = 597
High Enrollment
Probability
0.0971 0.0266 0.0263 -0.0048 0.3383 * 0.3070 *
(0.1519) (0.1442) (0.1062) (0.1027) (0.1960) (0.1790)
N = 1029 N = 2090 N = 682
Low Enrollment
Probability
0.0811 0.1347 -0.0028 0.0190 0.1877 0.2287
(0.1784) (0.1664) (0.1213) (0.1154) (0.2214) (0.1855)
N = 1071 N = 2092 N = 868
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.7: Number of Credits Taken in 12th Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
-0.1344 -0.0515 -0.5731 -0.4652 0.2843 0.3106
(0.5036) (0.4702) (0.3542) (0.3290) (0.5629) (0.5148)
N = 2100 N = 4182 N = 1930
Male
-1.0201 -0.6501 -0.3391 -0.3409 -0.5675 -0.0898
(0.8742) (0.8449) (0.6078) (0.5748) (0.8560) (0.7698)
N = 741 N = 1468 N = 895
Female
0.2875 0.1601 -0.6495 -0.5326 0.6394 0.3178
(0.6133) (0.5776) (0.4345) (0.4040) (0.6954) (0.6237)




0.1223 -0.1438 -0.5067 -0.6012 0.4324 0.0804
(0.6691) (0.6272) (0.4764) (0.4460) (0.7002) (0.6411)
N = 1171 N = 2321 N = 1217
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.5702 -0.0470 -0.6855 -0.3388 -0.1527 0.3830
(0.7606) (0.7180) (0.5261) (0.4939) (0.8185) (0.7235)
N = 929 N = 1861 N = 974
White or Asian
-0.0414 -0.0796 -0.4278 -0.4250 0.5466 0.5190
(0.7816) (0.7115) (0.5325) (0.4804) (0.9078) (0.7663)
N = 954 N = 1948 N = 835
Non-Asian
Minority
-0.2508 -0.2775 -0.8689 * -0.7567 * 0.0406 -0.1054
(0.6566) (0.6192) (0.4733) (0.4464) (0.6760) (0.6132)
N = 1146 N = 2234 N = 1248
High-Enrolling
School
0.2667 0.3173 -0.4496 -0.3275 0.4932 0.5658
(0.6842) (0.6287) (0.4768) (0.4371) (0.7634) (0.6951)
N = 1301 N = 2577 N = 1221
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.7812 -0.8592 -0.7809 -0.8115 * -0.3392 -0.4869
(0.7167) (0.6919) (0.5138) (0.4899) (0.7075) (0.6485)
N = 799 N = 1605 N = 936
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.5135 -0.7035 -0.6834 -0.7137 -0.1590 -0.3612
(0.7248) (0.6775) (0.5119) (0.4736) (0.7801) (0.7033)
N = 1029 N = 2090 N = 1020
Low Enrollment
Probability
0.2270 0.5902 -0.6105 -0.3428 0.6376 1.0258
(0.7014) (0.6553) (0.4914) (0.4578) (0.7687) (0.6732)
N = 1071 N = 2092 N = 1047
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.8: Difference in Credits Taken
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
0.4146 0.5769 0.0679 0.1380 0.9514 1.0219 *
(0.5398) (0.5107) (0.3721) (0.3557) (0.6378) (0.5881)
N = 2100 N = 4182 N = 1788
Male
-0.8839 -0.1246 0.2429 0.3784 -0.2827 0.4659
(0.9386) (0.8924) (0.6349) (0.6163) (0.9227) (0.8077)
N = 741 N = 1468 N = 941
Female
1.0521 0.9754 0.0328 0.0518 1.3767 * 0.9518
(0.6529) (0.6273) (0.4550) (0.4360) (0.7772) (0.7049)




0.8215 0.6349 0.1384 0.1234 1.4331 * 1.2779 *
(0.6712) (0.6505) (0.4762) (0.4622) (0.7601) (0.7287)
N = 1171 N = 2321 N = 1032
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.0912 0.3187 -0.0126 0.2241 0.2042 0.5187
(0.8767) (0.8122) (0.5872) (0.5543) (0.8830) (0.7697)
N = 929 N = 1861 N = 1142
White or Asian
0.4560 0.3624 0.1229 0.1041 1.3095 1.3257
(0.7658) (0.7370) (0.5149) (0.4974) (0.9143) (0.8356)
N = 954 N = 1948 N = 797
Non-Asian
Minority
0.3405 0.4405 -0.0057 0.0097 0.5296 0.5474
(0.7479) (0.6949) (0.5253) (0.4997) (0.7662) (0.6791)
N = 1146 N = 2234 N = 1131
High-Enrolling
School
0.7444 0.7910 0.0715 0.1755 1.2349 1.2179
(0.6790) (0.6516) (0.4654) (0.4509) (0.7853) (0.7417)
N = 1301 N = 2577 N = 1191
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.1254 -0.1314 0.0545 -0.0648 0.0951 0.0146
(0.8863) (0.8275) (0.6145) (0.5722) (0.8633) (0.7711)
N = 799 N = 1605 N = 990
High Enrollment
Probability
0.4216 0.0934 0.1709 0.0243 1.1091 0.9249
(0.7046) (0.6724) (0.4924) (0.4770) (0.8254) (0.7615)
N = 1029 N = 2090 N = 860
Low Enrollment
Probability
0.4022 0.6565 0.0658 0.1373 0.5887 0.7287
(0.8141) (0.7516) (0.5547) (0.5221) (0.8382) (0.7167)
N = 1071 N = 2092 N = 1405
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.9: 12th Grade GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
-0.0193 -0.0107 -0.0914 *** -0.0879 *** 0.0417 0.0321
(0.0463) (0.0340) (0.0322) (0.0241) (0.0743) (0.0511)
N = 2095 N = 4176 N = 955
Male
-0.0850 -0.0216 -0.1334 ** -0.0894 ** -0.0650 -0.0283
(0.0833) (0.0631) (0.0572) (0.0437) (0.1153) (0.0767)
N = 740 N = 1467 N = 430
Female
0.0137 -0.0114 -0.0695 * -0.0865 *** 0.0877 0.0609
(0.0554) (0.0405) (0.0387) (0.0290) (0.0973) (0.0626)




-0.0117 -0.0238 -0.0846 ** -0.0799 *** 0.0775 0.0214
(0.0591) (0.0430) (0.0416) (0.0309) (0.0914) (0.0575)
N = 1167 N = 2316 N = 561
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.0160 0.0069 -0.1120 ** -0.1012 *** -0.0519 0.0169
(0.0656) (0.0551) (0.0452) (0.0385) (0.0936) (0.0713)
N = 928 N = 1860 N = 561
White or Asian
-0.0635 -0.0417 -0.0809 ** -0.0712 ** -0.0494 0.0063
(0.0591) (0.0474) (0.0411) (0.0331) (0.0829) (0.0600)
N = 951 N = 1945 N = 522
Non-Asian
Minority
0.0119 0.0116 -0.0879 * -0.0712 ** 0.0510 0.0467
(0.0589) (0.0483) (0.0416) (0.0348) (0.0881) (0.0699)
N = 1144 N = 2231 N = 593
High-Enrolling
School
-0.0154 0.0028 -0.0573 -0.0497 * 0.0365 0.0142
(0.0571) (0.0398) (0.0402) (0.0290) (0.0848) (0.0534)
N = 1297 N = 2573 N = 668
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.0299 -0.0311 -0.1481 *** -0.1478 *** 0.0506 0.0263
(0.0627) (0.0612) (0.0430) (0.0419) (0.1034) (0.0882)
N = 798 N = 1603 N = 369
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.0105 -0.0197 -0.0441 -0.0675 ** 0.0041 -0.0138
(0.0593) (0.0432) (0.0417) (0.0314) (0.0824) (0.0529)
N = 1026 N = 2087 N = 575
Low Enrollment
Probability
-0.0477 0.0070 -0.1145 *** -0.0986 *** 0.0106 0.1082
(0.0586) (0.0525) (0.0413) (0.0371) (0.0960) (0.0825)
N = 1069 N = 2089 N = 488
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.10: 12th Grade GPA (1st Semester Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
-0.0395 -0.0323 -0.1042 *** -0.0994 *** -0.0155 -0.0311
(0.0478) (0.0352) (0.0334) (0.0252) (0.0716) (0.0492)
N = 2093 N = 4171 N = 1046
Male
-0.1235 -0.0703 -0.1588 *** -0.1132 *** -0.1654 -0.1380 *
(0.0824) (0.0619) (0.0572) (0.0433) (0.1128) (0.0750)
N = 739 N = 1466 N = 379
Female
0.0013 -0.0188 -0.0735 * -0.0901 *** 0.0558 0.0191
(0.0587) (0.0435) (0.0412) (0.0312) (0.0945) (0.0627)




-0.0232 -0.0273 -0.1022 ** -0.0939 *** 0.0220 -0.0229
(0.0599) (0.0445) (0.0426) (0.0322) (0.0856) (0.0563)
N = 1167 N = 2315 N = 628
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.0456 -0.0324 -0.1214 *** -0.1111 *** -0.1266 -0.0714
(0.0684) (0.0577) (0.0472) (0.0402) (0.0959) (0.0730)
N = 926 N = 1856 N = 564
White or Asian
-0.0630 -0.0414 -0.0993 ** -0.0876 *** -0.0808 -0.0195
(0.0598) (0.0493) (0.0421) (0.0343) (0.0844) (0.0639)
N = 951 N = 1945 N = 529
Non-Asian
Minority
-0.0224 -0.0239 -0.0970 ** -0.1079 *** -0.0266 -0.0303
(0.0614) (0.0501) (0.0436) (0.0365) (0.0843) (0.0669)
N = 1142 N = 2226 N = 643
High-Enrolling
School
-0.0241 0.0000 -0.0736 * -0.0623 ** -0.0016 -0.0229
(0.0594) (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0308) (0.0825) (0.0540)
N = 1296 N = 2571 N = 744
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.0696 -0.0764 -0.1566 *** -0.1556 *** -0.0437 -0.0690
(0.0647) (0.0624) (0.0444) (0.0429) (0.1002) (0.0876)
N = 797 N = 1600 N = 399
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.0206 -0.0242 -0.0591 -0.0768 ** -0.0086 -0.0231
(0.0604) (0.0454) (0.0428) (0.0330) (0.0836) (0.0552)
N = 1026 N = 2086 N = 557
Low Enrollment
Probability
-0.0776 -0.0305 -0.1255 *** -0.1118 *** -0.0843 0.0036
(0.0616) (0.0549) (0.0435) (0.0388) (0.0935) (0.0791)
N = 1067 N = 2085 N = 543
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.11: 12th Grade GPA (2nd Semester Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
0.0014 0.0040 -0.0798 ** -0.0813 *** 0.0914 0.0842
(0.0527) (0.0421) (0.0365) (0.0298) (0.0862) (0.0652)
N = 2044 N = 4087 N = 925
Male
-0.0587 0.0115 -0.1157 * -0.0717 0.0232 0.0586
(0.0967) (0.0814) (0.0664) (0.0562) (0.1309) (0.0951)
N = 733 N = 1450 N = 478
Female
0.0341 -0.0083 -0.0632 -0.0865 ** 0.1193 0.0844
(0.0620) (0.0490) (0.0432) (0.0350) (0.1084) (0.0763)




-0.0031 -0.0330 -0.0719 -0.0758 ** 0.0989 0.0193
(0.0668) (0.0520) (0.0469) (0.0374) (0.1052) (0.0706)
N = 1141 N = 2268 N = 565
Economically
Disadvantaged
0.0140 0.0412 -0.1001 * -0.0899 * 0.0307 0.1081
(0.0781) (0.0692) (0.0539) (0.0487) (0.1105) (0.0915)
N = 903 N = 1819 N = 561
White or Asian
-0.0731 -0.0500 -0.0700 -0.0642 -0.0306 0.0122
(0.0679) (0.0562) (0.0470) (0.0399) (0.0939) (0.0694)
N = 930 N = 1904 N = 520
Non-Asian
Minority
0.0500 0.0425 -0.0783 -0.0957 ** 0.1349 0.1231
(0.0695) (0.0608) (0.0491) (0.0435) (0.1089) (0.0908)
N = 1114 N = 2183 N = 583
High-Enrolling
School
-0.0256 -0.0111 -0.0543 -0.0486 0.0403 0.0063
(0.0623) (0.0467) (0.0437) (0.0341) (0.0904) (0.0625)
N = 1269 N = 2516 N = 706
Low-Enrolling
School
0.0213 0.0225 -0.1319 ** -0.1335 ** 0.1488 0.1321
(0.0809) (0.0793) (0.0557) (0.0548) (0.1341) (0.1172)
N = 775 N = 1571 N = 358
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.0030 -0.0175 -0.0292 -0.0603 0.0222 -0.0059
(0.0675) (0.0520) (0.0474) (0.0379) (0.0983) (0.0676)
N = 1007 N = 2052 N = 528
Low Enrollment
Probability
-0.0162 0.0385 -0.1090 ** -0.0917 ** 0.0954 0.1946 **
(0.0700) (0.0648) (0.0494) (0.0461) (0.1082) (0.0971)
N = 1037 N = 2035 N = 560
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.12: Difference in GPAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
-0.0110 -0.0081 -0.0335 -0.0332 0.0340 0.0284
(0.0361) (0.0339) (0.0249) (0.0236) (0.0570) (0.0510)
N = 2095 N = 4176 N = 1025
Male
-0.0013 -0.0070 -0.0541 -0.0423 0.0405 0.0982
(0.0662) (0.0640) (0.0448) (0.0430) (0.0976) (0.0874)
N = 740 N = 1467 N = 398
Female
-0.0157 -0.0144 -0.0252 -0.0288 0.0325 0.0417
(0.0427) (0.0403) (0.0297) (0.0283) (0.0723) (0.0618)




-0.0070 -0.0227 -0.0210 -0.0254 0.0880 0.0254
(0.0454) (0.0435) (0.0320) (0.0307) (0.0744) (0.0625)
N = 1167 N = 2316 N = 484
Economically
Disadvantaged
-0.0162 0.0089 -0.0517 -0.0418 -0.0166 0.0297
(0.0579) (0.0544) (0.0391) (0.0374) (0.0870) (0.0726)
N = 928 N = 1860 N = 525
White or Asian
-0.0451 -0.0399 -0.0207 -0.0184 0.0126 0.0266
(0.0490) (0.0474) (0.0338) (0.0327) (0.0698) (0.0639)
N = 951 N = 1945 N = 480
Non-Asian
Minority
0.0106 0.0122 -0.0422 -0.0488 0.0307 0.0373
(0.0510) (0.0482) (0.0356) (0.0341) (0.0784) (0.0708)
N = 1144 N = 2231 N = 606
High-Enrolling
School
-0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0088 -0.0091 0.0311 0.0018
(0.0424) (0.0398) (0.0298) (0.0285) (0.0626) (0.0551)
N = 1297 N = 2573 N = 673
Low-Enrolling
School
-0.0277 -0.0157 -0.0738 * -0.0699 * 0.0355 0.0356
(0.0636) (0.0615) (0.0428) (0.0413) (0.1062) (0.0906)
N = 798 N = 1603 N = 377
High Enrollment
Probability
-0.0079 -0.0151 0.0035 -0.0053 0.0143 -0.0034
(0.0459) (0.0439) (0.0324) (0.0312) (0.0660) (0.0590)
N = 1026 N = 2087 N = 507
Low Enrollment
Probability
-0.0211 0.0076 -0.0607 -0.0548 0.0448 0.0982
(0.0544) (0.0520) (0.0374) (0.0632) (0.0990) (0.0874)
N = 1069 N = 2089 N = 452
Bandwidth 5 10 IK
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Iowa’s National Scholars Award and the






The costs of attending college have been rising steadily over the past thirty years,
making financial aid both an important determinant of college choice for many
students and a subject of concern for financial aid offices and state governments.
In this paper, we estimate the effect of rule-based merit aid assignment on stu-
dents’ enrollment decisions at the University of Iowa. Iowa evaluates many stu-
dents using an admissions score that is a linear combination of their high school
GPA, class rank, core high school courses, and ACT test score. Students from
out-of-state who meet a specific threshold on the admissions score qualify for the
National Scholars Award (NSA), presently worth nearly $20,000 (approximately
one-fifth of tuition) over a four-year period. We employ a regression discontinuity
model to take advantage of award assignment criteria, finding that the award does
increase the odds that students enroll at Iowa. This result is robust for several
applicant subsamples and passes falsification checks using Iowa residents, who are
not eligible for the award. Preliminary analysis of an earlier, tiered version of the
current single-valued award suggests that the NSA could be effectively targeted
towards very high-achieving candidates.
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I. Introduction
Over the last three deca-des, the cost of attending college has soared – outpacing
inflation and the oft-cited costs of medical care.58 Recent state budget cuts have
exacerbated this trend. Meanwhile, college attendance has been rising. These
two patterns have put many financial aid officers in a quandary: more students
require financial aid, and each requires more aid to cover the same share of college
expenses.
The primary role of financial aid officers is to provide money to students.
Some of this money is portable for students – National Merit Scholarships and
Pell grants, for instance, may be used at any four-year college. Some aid, however,
is institution-specific. Individual colleges may use this aid, which can be awarded
based on financial need or based on merit, to attract particularly desirable stu-
dents. Because colleges have limited financial aid budgets, it is worth asking how
aid can be distributed to achieve institutional objectives such as attracting a high-
quality class and distributing aid in an efficient and equitable manner. Perhaps
providing aid to a large number of students is effective, or perhaps it makes more
sense to target a small group of students who meet specific criteria (e.g., merit or
need).
To examine some of these issues we analyze data from the University of Iowa.
Iowa awards its National Scholars Award (henceforth, NSA) to out-of-state ap-
plicants with admissions test scores above a specific threshold that is equal to a
linear combination of high school GPA, class rank, core courses in high school,
and ACT score. These admissions scores are mechanically generated and allow
58Taken from http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/10/27/cost-of-college-on-the-rise-again/
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little room for student manipulation. As a result, students with similar admissions
scores may have very different probabilities of being offered the NSA.59 Because
the NSA is awarded to a large number of students and is (as of 2012) worth
over $4,800 per year for up to four years, a regression discontinuity (henceforth,
RD) analysis of NSA receipt is potentially very informative about the impact of
this merit-based aid on student enrollment decisions. For comparison, tuition for
out-of-state freshmen in 2012-2013 was set at just over $26,000, meaning that the
NSA represents a substantial decrease in costs for these students but does not
lower tuition to the level used for in-state students.
Using data on students’ application profiles and scholarship receipt, we find
that receiving the NSA leads to a statistically significant increase in the enrollment
rates of admitted students. This finding is robust to multiple bandwidth specifi-
cations and multiple subsamples of out-of-state students. Falsification tests also
demonstrate that for Iowa residents, who are not eligible for the NSA, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no effect. A final specification compares an earlier,
tiered version of the NSA where students received different award amounts, to
the flat award regime currently in place. We find statistically significant positive
discontinuities at the threshold for the award’s highest tier, suggesting that re-
calibrating the award structure may allow the University of Iowa to better target
this funding to the highest-achieving students.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines the use
of admissions scores in awarding the NSA and provides an overview of the relevant
59Students’ admissions scores may be updated after they submit their applications, but we view
their scores at the time that they apply. As a result, some students who do not appear eligible are
offered the NSA. Despite this, the probability of a student being offered the NSA rises by over 70
percentage points at the cutoff for NSA receipt.
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literature. Section III explains the regression discontinuity model to be estimated
and analyzes potential threats to the validity of our RD estimates. Section IV
describes the data used in our analysis. Section V presents our results, and Section
VI provides a discussion of the policy implications and the conclusion.
II. Background/Literature
Since 1999, the University of Iowa has made admissions and merit aid decisions
based on a fixed metric. The initial measure used was known as the Admissions
Index Score (or “AIS”) and defined as:
AISi = HSR%i + 2 ∗ACTi (1)
where HSR%i refers to the percentile of student i’s high school rank (from zero
to 99) and ACTi is her Composite ACT score.
60 In theory, this value could
range from a minimum of one to a maximum of 171, but among the 52,968
applicants with valid AIS scores in our sample the maximum score was a 171 and
the minimum score was a 27, with a median of 126.
Beginning with applicants for the fall of 2009, the university began using a
new index, the Regent Admission Index (or “RAI”), to help make admissions
decisions. This index contains four components and is defined as:
RAIi = HSR%i + 2 ∗ACTi + 20 ∗HSGPAi + 5 ∗ COREi (2)
60Because the majority of University of Iowa test-takers take the ACT rather than the SAT,
applicants with SAT scores have these scores converted to ACT scores using equi-percentile method
concordance tables.
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where HSR%i and ACTi are defined as in (1), HSGPAi is student i’s high
school grade point average on a 4.0 scale, and COREi is the number of high
school courses completed in core subject areas.61 Among the 19,629 applicants
in our sample with RAI values, the maximum score on the RAI was 410, the
minimum was 93, and the median was 299.62
The Iowa Board of Regents currently states that students graduating from
Iowa high schools will be automatically admitted to the University of Northern
Iowa, Iowa State University, or the University of Iowa’s College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences if they have an RAI of at least 245 and have completed a pre-specified
number of core courses in high school.63 Out-of-state students are required to
have an RAI score of 255 for automatic admission to the University of Iowa’s
College of Liberal Arts, whereas the College of Engineering requires a score of
265.64 Students with an RAI score below 245 or who do not have all of the
information necessary to calculate their RAI are evaluated on an individual basis,
61The website of the Board of Regents of Iowa refers to these as “English, mathematics, natural
science, social science, and foreign language” courses, with single-semester courses counting as half
a course for RAI purposes. A full list of the NCES codes of qualifying courses may be found at
http://www.regents.iowa.gov/RAI/NCES.pdf.
62Students within 5 RAI points of the cutoff for NSA eligibility have a mean ACT score of 24.4
with a standard deviation of 3.1 below the NSA cutoff and a mean ACT value of 24.8 with a
standard deviation of 2.9 above the cutoff. Corresponding GPA values take on a mean of 3.49
below the cutoff with and a mean of 3.55 above the cutoff; both groups have a standard deviation
of approximately 0.19.
63To provide some perspective, a student with an RAI value of 410 would be exceptional – a
student ranked first in her high school class, with a perfect GPA and ACT score, would have had
to complete 32 core courses to obtain this score. On the other hand, a score of 93 is very poor,
corresponding (among other possibilities) to an ACT score of 12, a last-place class rank, a GPA of
1.0, and only 10 core courses completed. 245, on the other hand, corresponds almost exactly to a
straight-B student with an ACT score of 18, a class rank in the 50th percentile, and 20 completed
core courses.
64The Business School has only ACT and GPA requirements, while the Nursing school requires
minimum ACT scores of 28 overall and 25 in science, a GPA of 3.8 out of 4.0, and “no deficiencies
in the minimum High School Course Requirements.”
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and we omit such students from our analysis.65 The AIS has been, and the RAI
is currently used to award institutional financial aid, including the NSA.
The NSA simultaneously addresses the University of Iowa’s goals of student
quality and diversity by targeting qualified students from other states. Initially,
the NSA was awarded in tiers, with the lowest award offered to students with an
AIS score of at least 129, a higher amount offered to students with a score of at
least 140, and the highest amount offered to students scoring at least 154. Begin-
ning in 2005, the award was changed to a flat rate, with all enrollees scoring at
least a 129 receiving the same amount. In 2009, when the RAI was implemented,
the cutoff for NSA eligibility was set at 290 on the RAI scale. The rule-based
nature of the award therefore makes it possible to evaluate the causal impact of
financial aid at the cutoff for NSA receipt and to examine whether, and if so how,
the effect of the award has changed over time.
Several previous studies have also examined the impact of monetary awards on
college attendance. Dynarski (2000) and Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006;
henceforth, CMS) both studied the impact of the Georgia HOPE scholarship on
college enrollment and found different results – Dynarski found a large impact,
whereas CMS found relatively small effects, driven primarily by college choice.
Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005 and 2009) also studied the impact of the Geor-
gia HOPE on academic outcomes while students were enrolled in college, finding
that recipients were more likely to take easier courses and lighter course loads
with the goal of delaying GPA checkpoints and thereby extending the receipt
of the scholarship. Dynarski (2003) and Garibaldi, Giavazzi, Ichino, and Rettore
(2011) examined the effect of tuition on time to college completion; Dynarski used
65Many high schools choose not to disclose class ranks, for instance.
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a difference-in-differences approach and Garibaldi, Giavazzi, Ichino, and Rettore
employed a RD design. Both papers found that students inside higher tuition
brackets were significantly more likely to graduate early.
The paper most similar to ours is Van Der Klaauw (2002). He employs a RD
design to capitalize on discontinuities in the amount of financial aid offered to
otherwise similar applicants to a highly selective East Coast university, with the
goal being to determine the causal impact of financial aid on student enrollment.
He finds an enrollment elasticity with respect to financial aid of .86 among appli-
cants who filed for financial aid. He also finds a larger impact on higher ability
students.
Our paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, the time period ana-
lyzed is qualitatively different than that analyzed by Van Der Klaauw. While an
excellent and oft-cited paper, he examines twenty-year old data, and the cost of
college attendance has risen considerably since then. According to the National
Center for Education Statistics, the cost of tuition, room, and board at four-year
public institutions has risen by over 30 percent between the year prior to Van
Der Klaauw’s sample and the first year of our data. During the years of our
sample, 2004-2011, costs have risen by more than 20 percent. Additionally, over
a similar period the number of recent high school graduates (defined as individ-
uals 16-24 receiving a high school degree in the past 12 months) has increased
by almost seven percent. It is ex ante unclear how the impact of financial aid
on college enrollment has changed over this time. If more low-income or credit-
constrained students are applying to college, financial aid may have a larger effect
on 1) whether students enroll in college at all and 2) where they choose to enroll.
However, if employers are demanding higher levels of education from prospective
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employees, demand for college degrees may be relatively inelastic. If so, financial
aid would still affect where applicants choose to enroll but would not alter their
decision to attend college. Similarly, if employers place a large premium on their
employees’ having a degree from a highly selective school, financial aid packages
may affect neither college attendance nor college choice.66
We also expect to find different results from those cited by Van Der Klaauw
because the University of Iowa is a different type of institution than the “Univer-
sity X” he studied. Where University X is a private, East Coast university, Iowa
is a public, Midwestern institution; University X is also somewhat more selective
and significantly more urban than Iowa. For these reasons, Iowa’s students may
be qualitatively different from those attending University X, and may therefore
respond differently to financial aid offers.
III. Model and Theory
We implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity model (henceforth, FRD) in our
analysis of students’ enrollment choices. FRD models are defined by two stages.
The first estimates the probability of receiving a given “treatment” (denoted by
Wi below):
Pr (Wi = 1) = f (SCi) + γ ∗ 1 (SCi ≥ c) + νi (3)
Here Wi is an indicator of treatment status, in this case, whether an admitted
applicant received the NSA. SCi is a student’s admission score (either RAI or AIS,
depending on the year), c is the cutoff value for NSA receipt, and νi is a mean-
66For an example of how this might work, see Hershbein (2011).
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zero error term. The probability of receiving the NSA is a continuous function
of a student’s admissions score (the “running variable”), with a discontinuity at
c. In sharp regression discontinuity (i.e., SRD) models, f(SCi) = 0 and γ = 1,
implying that treatment is completely determined by whether the running variable
has crossed the threshold value. FRD models, however, are generalized so that
the jump in the probability of treatment at the cutoff may be less than one. As a
result, while crossing the cutoff value has a substantial and statistically significant
effect on the probability of treatment, it is not the sole determinant of treatment
status.
The second stage in the estimation process is presented formally as:
Yi = g (SCi) +Xiβ + δiWi + εi (4)
where Yi indicates whether student i has, conditional on admission, enrolled at the
University of Iowa, Xi is a vector of student characteristics, and εi is a mean-zero
error term. We expect the probability of enrollment to vary continuously with
students’ admissions scores and discontinuously as students cross the threshold
for NSA receipt. In SRD models it is possible to estimate the effect of treatment
using the second stage equation and the fact that Wi = 1 (SCi ≥ c), but FRD
models require both stages to account for the non-deterministic nature of the
running variable.In particular, whereas SRD point estimates and standard errors
are equivalent to the treatment effect (δi), FRD second-stage point estimates must
be weighted by the probability of receiving treatment and are therefore equal to
E[δi]
E[γ] . FRD estimates and standard errors are also equivalent to those from Two-
Stage Least Squares (“2SLS”), where the treatment equation is the first stage in
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2SLS and the outcome equation is the second stage.
According to Imbens and Lemieux (2008), McCrary (2008), and Lee (2008),
for E[δi]E[γ] to represent a true causal estimate several assumptions must hold. First,
there cannot be any confounding treatments at the cutoff. Second, student char-
acteristics must not vary systematically around the cutoff. Third, students may
not alter their treatment status (i.e., whether they received the NSA) by ma-
nipulating the running variable. All of these are potential concerns, addressed
below.
First, in addition to the NSA, Iowa offers many scholarships to their prospec-
tive students. Fortunately (from an analytic perspective), the NSA appears to be
the only scholarship explicitly awarded based on the AIS or RAI. As demonstrated
in Figure 3.1, the probability of an out-of-state student getting any other award
trends continuously through the cutoffs for the NSA. The bottom two graphs in
Figure 3.1 are for students applying for Fall 2004 entry and thus have three cutoffs
– one for each level of the NSA. The first cutoff is for students receiving at least a
low-value NSA, the second is for students receiving at least a medium-value NSA,
and the third is exclusively for students receiving a high-value NSA. As the prob-
ability of receiving any other award trends continuously through the NSA cutoff,
and since many more students receive the NSA than receive any other award,
it is unlikely that other awards (i.e., aid “treatments”) are driving our results.
Furthermore, because being offered another award does not preclude receiving
the NSA, students qualified for the NSA should all receive the same treatment in
terms of their NSA award.
It is unlikely that scholarships or admissions offers from other schools would
affect the validity of our RD estimates. The only other schools using the AIS or
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RAI are Iowa State University and the University of Northern Iowa, neither of
which offers a scholarship analogous to the NSA. Since other schools do not use
these score indices, it is unlikely that policies at other schools will discontinuously
impact students’ enrollment decisions. For example, while public universities in
Texas will admit any Texan high school student in the top ten percent of her high
school class, class rank is only one element of AIS or RAI. Depending on their
other characteristics, students in the top ten percent of their high school class
may have a wide range of AIS or RAI values. Since Texan high school students
do not become eligible for automatic admission at a uniform AIS or RAI value,
this admissions guarantee should not discontinuously affect student enrollment
decisions and should therefore not affect the validity of our RD estimates. By
similar logic, our estimates should remain unaffected by any other awards based
on GPA, class rank, or standardized test scores.
It is also possible that shifts in student characteristics around the NSA cutoff
could affect the validity of our results. For example, consider a hypothetical case
in which students admitted to the Business School enroll with probability one and
all other admitted applicants enroll with probability 0.20, and NSA receipt causes
more students to apply to the Business School but does not change the proba-
bility that any given applicant enrolls. In this case, failing to control for these
between-group differences will falsely imply that the NSA affects the probability
of enrollment rather than affecting the types of applications that the university
receives.
We therefore run density tests of the running variable by subgroup to deter-
mine whether student characteristics trend continuously through the cutoff for
eligibility. For each of four subgroups, we pool across three sets of years (depend-
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ing on whether the NSA was awarded at a flat rate based on RAI, at a flat rate
based on AIS, or in tiers based on AIS). If students who are narrowly eligible for
the NSA are significantly different from those who are narrowly ineligible, it would
be difficult to argue that our results represent the causal impact of NSA receipt
on enrollment decisions. They could just as easily represent different tastes for
attending the University of Iowa, as in the example above.
To run these density checks, we first determined the number of applicants
belonging to particular subgroups at each RAI or AIS value. We focused on four
subgroups – applicants from Illinois, nonresident applicants from states other than
Illinois, applicants to the College of Liberal Arts, and White applicants. Using
these large subgroups allows us to focus on meaningful variation in the number
of applicants and provides a clear picture of this variation to the reader. For
each of these subgroups, we ran regressions of the number of applicants at each
RAI or AIS value on RAI or AIS values, an indicator for RAI or AIS values
above the threshold for NSA eligibility, and an interaction of RAI or AIS values
with this indicator. These regressions were done for a large number of potential
bandwidths – regressions using RAI used every possible bandwidth between five
RAI points and 30 RAI points, regressions using a single AIS cutoff used every
possible bandwidth between five AIS points and 20 AIS points, and regression
using a tiered NSA structure used every possible bandwidth between five AIS
points and ten AIS points.
Graphical results of these density tests are contained in Figures 3.2.A, 3.2.B,
and 3.2.C. Figure 3.2.A uses the years 2009-2011, Figure 3.2.B uses the years
2005-2008, and Figure 3.2.C uses the year 2004. These graphs largely support a
causal interpretation of our RD results. In Figure 3.2.A, three of the four graphs
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show either no statistically significant discontinuity or one that is only significant
at very small bandwidths (11 RAI points or fewer). As smaller bandwidths are
much more susceptible to noise, and since our estimates tend to rise sharply in
magnitude as bandwidths become very small, this is not a great threat to our
RD estimates. To the extent that it does affect our estimates, the fact that
the statistically significant discontinuities are positive may imply downward bias,
strengthening our RD results, though the precise effect depends on the type of
students attracted as well as their number. A more significant concern is the top-
right graph, which shows a noticeable discontinuity in the number of applicants
from states other than Illinois at the cutoff for NSA eligibility. It is not clear why
this discontinuity is negative – some students who learn that they are eligible for
the NSA may be tempted to apply to more selective schools, but this should affect
the number of students who enroll rather than the number who apply. Regardless,
a decrease in the number of applicants at the cutoff may bias our results for this
subgroup upwards. While this will not automatically be the case, it is worth
noting when we present our RD results.
Figure 3.2.B contains no statistically significant discontinuities at any of the
bandwidths we use. This bodes particularly well for our RD estimates in 2005-
2008. Figure 3.2.C, however, contains a large number of discontinuities at a large
number of bandwidths. The clearest pattern is that applicants from Illinois, White
applicants, and applicants to the College of Liberal Arts are all discontinuously
more likely to apply at the middle cutoff for NSA eligibility. Students may also be
less likely to apply from states other than Illinois or to the College of Liberal Arts
at the lowest cutoff for NSA eligibility. That said, the magnitude of our results
makes it difficult to attach any particular interpretation to them, especially since
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Figure 3.2.C appears to contain more noise than Figures 3.2.A and 3.2.B. However,
it is worth noting that these discontinuities exist and may affect our RD estimates
– though only at the low and middle tiers of NSA eligibility – in 2004.
The largest threat to the validity of our estimates is that students may manip-
ulate their AIS or RAI in order to qualify for the NSA. Fortunately, the margins
along which high school seniors may affect these scores are fairly small and in-
volve some degree of error. For example, students may retake the ACT in hopes
of obtaining a higher score. However, students’ ACT scores are subject to uncer-
tainty – it is unclear whether they will improve their score and, if they do, by
what margin they will improve. Other inputs for AIS and RAI are even harder
to manipulate. Substantially improving one’s GPA or class rank is a challenging
proposition. By the time students apply to college, they have already received
three years’ worth of grades and have only one more year to improve their (cumu-
lative) GPA. Even if they do improve their GPA, it is unclear whether this will
result in an improvement in their class rank.67 While particularly motivated stu-
dents may take additional courses in hopes of improving their RAI, it is unclear
that many students are likely to be this proactive and strategic. Even among this
subset of students, additional courses may prove overwhelming and may lower
some students’ GPAs and class rankings. Given these difficulties in manipulating
score indices, we are relatively confident that students’ score indices are “as good
as” random.
Nonetheless, students who improve their ACT score or class rank will see
their AIS and RAI rise, and those who increase their GPA or class rank or who
67Altering one’s class rank is made all the more difficult by the fact that class rank is an ordinal
measure, not a cardinal one. If one’s peers are similarly motivated and all improve their GPAs by
the same amount, their rank ordering will remain unchanged.
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take more courses will see their RAI rise. Similarly, those who do poorly in
their senior year will see those metrics fall. In these cases, NSA receipt is based
on students’ highest RAI or AIS scores – students may become eligible for the
NSA by performing well, but will not lose their award if they perform poorly.
As we observe students’ scores at the time of application, some students who
appear ineligible for the NSA will still receive the award, although the reverse does
not hold. As a result, the probability of NSA receipt increases continuously as
admissions scores increase and then jumps to one at the cutoff. This necessitates
using a FRD design, but does not invalidate our results. The fact that some
students who do not appear eligible will receive the NSA and may therefore be
induced to enroll at Iowa may bias our results towards zero. If so, our results will
represent a lower bound of the impact of NSA eligibility on enrollment decisions.
IV. Data
The data for our analysis consists of admissions and financial aid records from
the University of Iowa. Eight cohorts of students are included, beginning with
applicants for the fall 2004 semester and continuing through applicants for fall
2011. The admissions data includes information on students’ state or country
of residence, admissions score, enrollment decision, and race/ethnicity, as well as
the college to which they applied and the semester for which they applied.68 The
financial aid data indicate which scholarships (if any) a student received, but they
do not provide scholarship amounts. As a result, we can determine the average
68Additional data, such as students’ ACT scores or transfer credits, are available and may be
used in future extensions or robustness checks.
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effect of receiving the “National Scholars Award” for each of the eight cohorts,
but are not currently able to provide an estimate of the NSA (or any other aid)
elasticity of enrollment.
We restrict our data on a number of dimensions. First, we exclude students
who do not have a recorded value for the relevant admissions score. Next, our
analysis is restricted to new entering freshmen applicants because the NSA is
awarded only to freshmen enrolling directly after high school. As a result, transfer
applicants and those with applications in multiple years are not relevant to our
analysis and are therefore dropped from the data. We also dropped students
who applied to multiple colleges within the same year. For example, students
who apply to both the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and the College of
Engineering have two applications on record but can enroll in only one college. If
one such student were to receive the NSA and enroll in the College of Engineering,
both application records would reflect NSA eligibility but only the application
record for the College of Engineering would indicate that the student enrolled.
As a result, this student would make the NSA appear less attractive to applicants
than it actually is (at least within the College of Liberal Arts). If this student
instead chose not to enroll at either school, it is unclear whether we should count
their decision twice in the data (since both colleges failed to attract the applicant)
or once (since one applicant chose not to enroll).69 Furthermore, such applicants
may be disproportionately likely to enroll, as their application profile implies a
willingness to attend their second-choice college within the University of Iowa.
Because these applicants make up 1.2 percent of the applicant pool (and 2.3
69If we count this applicant only once, we also have to determine which application to consider
her primary application, or whether to somehow combine multiple application profiles.
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percent of applications), dropping them from our analysis should not undermine
the validity of our results.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the data used in our analysis. We
divide our data into three time periods based on how the NSA is awarded and
provide statistics on the pooled sample and for each time period.
Our overall sample consists of 119,381 applicants, with 13,487 applying in
2004, 56,385 applying in 2005-2008, and 49,509 applying in 2009-2011. 35,470
students received the NSA over the eight years of our sample – 3,126 in 2004,
approximately 3,750 annually from 2005-2008, and approximately 5,750 annually
from 2009-2011. While RAI scores are available only in the final period, AIS
scores remained relatively stable – the mean AIS value was 121.9 in 2004, 122.8
in 2005-2008, and 123.8 in 2009-2011.
Approximately 70 percent of the students in our sample are from states other
than Iowa. Of these, approximately two-thirds are from Illinois, ten percent
are international, seven percent are from Minnesota, and four percent are from
Wisconsin. Missouri, California, and Nebraska are the only other states with
over one percent of the out-of-state applicants in our data. Approximately 90
percent of all applicants applied to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, partly
because the Tippie College of Business did not admit freshmen until fall 2008.
Approximately two percent applied to the business school, eight percent to the
College of Engineering, and under one-half of one percent applied to the College
of Nursing.70 Just over seventy-five percent of all applicants are listed as White,
four and a half percent as Asian-American, and approximately four percent each
70If we restrict our analysis to the 2008 cohort and later, just over three percent apply to Business,
eight percent to Engineering, and one-half of one percent to Nursing.
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as African-American or Hispanic. International students, who comprise nearly
eight percent of our sample, are listed as a separate ethnicity, making it difficult
to assign true ethnicities to these students.
Strong regression discontinuity estimates require large amounts of data near
the cutoff for receiving treatment. Having too little data could undermine valid
results in a variety of ways. First, if there was (hypothetically) exactly one student
with an RAI value of 290 (the cutscore), the percentage of students enrolling with
an RAI of 290 would appear in our data as either zero (if she did not enroll) or
one (if she did). Neither represents the actual probability that a random student
with an RAI of 290 will enroll. This problem is largely solved by pooling multiple
admission cohorts, ensuring that enough students are at each RAI position to
provide an accurate probability of enrollment.
The second potential problem arising from small sample sizes has to do with
optimal bandwidth selection. If our estimates are based on using a very small
number of data points, our results will be very susceptible to statistical “noise.”
If we were to use only RAI values of 288, 289, 290, and 291 in our analysis, noise
at any of these four values will have an extremely large effect on our estimates.
An unexpectedly large enrollment rate among students with an RAI of 289 could
then make the impact of the NSA appear extremely small (or even negative). It
is therefore important to have enough students near the cutoff for NSA eligibility
to reduce the chances of obtaining spurious results.
While we would optimally prefer to estimate regression discontinuity models
on many subsets of the data, the above sample size issues prevent us from doing
so. For example, we are unable to estimate the effect of NSA receipt on subgroups
such as applicants to the Tippie School of Business or Asian-American applicants
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because there are too few such students, especially near the NSA threshold, to
make accurate inferences. We are, however, able to separately examine the effect
of NSA receipt on nonresident applicants, applicants from Illinois, applicants
pooled from all states other than Illinois or Iowa, White applicants, and applicants
to the College of Liberal Arts.
Our estimates of the effect of the tiered NSA regime on enrollment may not
reflect the true impact of the NSA in 2004. This is partly due to sample size
issues; we have only one year of data in which the NSA was awarded at a tiered
rate compared to four years of data when the NSA was awarded at a flat rate
based on the AIS and three years in which it was awarded on a flat rate based on
RAI. Our estimates in 2004 may therefore be less stable than those in later years.
Our difficulty in estimating the effects of the NSA for 2004 is further exacerbated
by the tiered nature of the NSA in this year. If we use too large a bandwidth, the
data points we use will capture not only individuals near the cutoff for eligibility
for a particular NSA tier but also individuals around the cutoffs for higher or
lower NSA tiers. For instance, if we examine individuals far from the cutoff for
the lowest NSA tier, some of these individuals will have qualified not only for the
low-level NSA, but also for the medium-level NSA. The inclusion of students in
both the lowest and next highest tier would likely produce spurious results.
V. Results
We find evidence that eligibility for the NSA does increase the probability that
an admitted applicant will enroll at the University of Iowa. This finding holds
when conducting subgroup analysis on students from Illinois, from other states,
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on White students, and on applicants to the College of Liberal Arts. These
results are stronger when using larger bandwidths, but hold for some narrower
bandwidths as well. Falsification tests using in-state students, who are not eligible
for the NSA, reveal no statistically significant effect, implying that our estimates
are due to NSA receipt rather than to some unobserved factor.
Graphical evidence of the effect of NSA receipt is displayed in Figures 3.3, 3.4,
and 3.5. Figure 3.3 indicates the discontinuity in enrollment at the NSA cutoff
using a bandwidth of 30 RAI points and pooling over three admissions cycles
(2009, 2010, and 2011) in which the NSA was awarded at a flat rate based on
RAI. Reading across rows, the graphs provide a description of the enrollment yield
among 1) all nonresident applicants, 2) applicants from Illinois, 3) nonresident
applicants from states other than Illinois, 4) in-state applicants, 5) nonresident
White applicants, and 6) nonresident applicants to the College of Liberal Arts.
Figure 3.4 presents an analogous set of graphs, using a bandwidth of 20 AIS points
and pooling over four admissions cycles (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008) in which the
NSA was awarded at a flat rate based on AIS. Figure 3.5 estimates are for the
one available year in which NSA receipt was tiered (2004) and uses a bandwidth
of only 10 AIS points to avoid interference from discontinuities at neighboring
award tiers. Slopes are allowed to differ on opposite sides of the NSA cutoffs,
and the graphs present unconditional estimates (given the particular subgroup in
consideration). RAI and AIS scales in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are normalized
so that the cutoff is assigned a value of zero. In Figure 3.5, since there are three
NSA tiers, we opted not to normalize AIS values.
A number of patterns emerge. First, there is a visible jump in the predicted
probability of enrollment in five of six graphs in both Figures 3.3 and 3.4. As these
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graphs represent various samples of nonresident students, they provide evidence
that NSA eligibility does induce enrollment. The bottom-left graphs in these
figures, representing enrollment rates among Iowa residents, do not display a
noticeable jump at the cutoff for NSA eligibility. As the NSA is awarded only
to nonresidents, these bottom-left graphs serve as an important falsification test.
If these two graphs had indicated a jump in enrollment rates at the NSA cutoff,
it would be impossible to attribute this shift to the NSA and would raise the
question of whether some other factor is affecting enrollment rates. This would
pose a serious threat to the interpretation of the other five graphs. However, this
does not appear to be the case. Since nonresidents display a noticeable jump in
enrollment at the cutoff for NSA eligibility while Iowa residents do not, we are
able to interpret this jump in probability as the effect of the NSA.
Figure 3.5, which displays the predicted probability of enrollment in 2004, is
harder to interpret. There appear to be different effects at the cutoffs for each
NSA tier, and these effects vary substantially from graph to graph within Figure
3.5. There is a lack of a consistent effect on enrollment at the cutoff for the lowest
level of NSA eligibility. This could be due to heterogeneous responses to small
amounts of aid. For example, if White applicants tend to be wealthier than non-
White applicants, a low amount of aid would intuitively have a smaller impact
on White applicants than on non-White applicants. Alternatively, inconsistencies
in the impact of NSA eligibility could be due to small sample sizes and noise.
The largest sample used in creating the local linear estimates in these graphs is
2,131, an average of fewer than 200 students per AIS point. If ten students at
a particular AIS value unexpectedly choose to enroll, this would mean a shift of
over five percentage points in the enrollment yield at that AIS value.
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There are two main reasons why small sample sizes would pose problems in
Figure 3.5 but not in Figure 3.4. First, in Figure 3.4, we pool across four years of
data, meaning that a fixed amount of noise in our data will have approximately
one-fourth the effect in Figure 3.4 than it would in Figure 3.5. Assuming that we
have four times as many applicants at each AIS value, having ten students with the
same AIS value unexpectedly enroll would increase the enrollment yield at that
value by only 1.25 percentage points rather than five percentage points. Second,
since Figure 3.4 uses only a single cutoff, we are able to use larger bandwidths. A
local linear regression using 20 AIS values will be better able to withstand noise
at any one AIS value than a similar regression using only 10 AIS values.
There is a drop in the predicted probability of enrollment at the cutoff for
the medium level of NSA eligibility. This drop appears in all six graphs within
Figure 3.5. Without data on scholarship amounts, it is hard to interpret this
effect. While students with higher admissions scores will be more likely to receive
awards or admission at other institutions, these increased likelihoods should not
cause discontinuities in the probability of enrollment at Iowa. Even if many
scholarships and admissions offers become available at a single RAI level, it seems
curious that this would coincidentally happen at the cutoff for the medium level
of NSA eligibility. As the NSA does not crowd out other awards, students at this
cutoff should receive more financial aid than students below the cutoff – and it
seems implausible that the causal effect of receiving additional scholarship money
would be to discourage students from enrolling. Even if receiving this award makes
students more likely to apply to preferred institutions (perhaps due to a boost
in confidence), it seems highly unlikely that the net effect of a scholarship would
be to drive students away. A more likely interpretation is that the additional
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award money at this cutoff induces more students who are marginally interested
in the University of Iowa to apply – an interpretation backed by many of our
density checks. If these students enroll at lower rates than the general nonresident
population, the result may be a drop in enrollment yield. Alternatively, the drop
in the predicted probability of enrollment may be due to small sample sizes and
noise. Additional data would help determine which of these two factors is causing
the drop in enrollment.
At the cutoff for the highest level of NSA eligibility, however, there appears to
be a nearly uniform positive jump in the predicted probability of enrollment. As
students with higher RAI values will generally have larger choice sets of colleges
and are more likely to be admitted to a school that they prefer to the University
of Iowa (ceteris paribus), financial aid may play a disproportionately large role in
determining which school these students attend. Curiously, students from states
other than Illinois (and, of course, Iowa) do not appear to react very strongly
to the highest level of eligibility. It is unclear exactly why these students would
be less responsive to this tier of NSA eligibility – perhaps they were more likely
in 2004 to receive scholarships from schools in their respective states, or perhaps
Illinois students were better informed of the value of the NSA and applied specif-
ically with the award in mind. Obtaining data from additional years in which the
NSA was awarded at a tiered rate would also reduce the possibility that these
results are due to small sample sizes.
Tables 3.2.A, 3.2.B, and 3.2.C contain the point estimates and standard de-
viations associated with the discontinuities in Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. These
estimates confirm the intuition presented above – that the NSA does have a sta-
tistically significant impact on enrollment decisions and has stronger effects on
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minority applicants and those from states other than Illinios. Figure 3.3 is drawn
from column (4) in Table 3.2.A, Figure 3.4 drawn from column (4) in Table
3.2.B, and Figure 3.5 is drawn from columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 3.2.C. As
these tables reflect information contained in the graphs, they do not contain any
additional regressors. Although some columns have bandwidths too small for reli-
able estimates, larger bandwidths produce statistically significant discontinuities.
Whereas large bandwidths may reduce variance at the expense of introducing
bias, the discontinuities in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 do not appear to contain sub-
stantial bias relative to those from using narrow bandwidths. The one case in
which student behavior appears to change substantially at larger bandwidths is
the top-right graph in Figure 3.3, which represents non-resident students from
states other than Illinois in the admissions cycles from 2009-2011.
The top rows of Tables 3.2.A and 3.2.B indicate that NSA receipt increases
nonresident students’ probability of enrollment by five to seven percentage points
– a notable increase from a baseline of approximately 25 percent. Students from
states other than Illinois are affected between 1.5 and 3.5 percentage points more
than those from Illinois. This may be because students from Illinois enroll at a
higher baseline rate prior to receiving the NSA, making marginal enrollees from
Illinois quite different from those from other states. The magnitude of this effect
in Figure 3.2.A may be due to the drop in applications from applicants from states
other than Illinois at the cutoff for NSA eligibility, but the fact that a (smaller)
gap appears in Figure 3.2.B suggests that these students are indeed more receptive
to NSA receipt. The impact of NSA receipt on White students is approximately
0.75 percentage points lower than for nonresidents overall, which makes sense if
White students are better able to afford college to begin with. The impact on
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applicants to the College of Liberal Arts relative to all nonresident applicants is
unclear – Liberal Arts applicants in 2005-2008 are more affected by NSA receipt
than the full nonresident sample, while those in 2009-2011 are less so.
The fourth row of Tables 3.2.A, 3.2.B, and 3.2.C provide another version of the
falsification check discussed above. Since Iowa residents are not eligible for the
NSA, we estimate the first stage of 2SLS on out-of-state students (as in the first
row) and use the predicted probability of treatment obtained from stage one in
our second stage estimation. The resulting second stage estimates are both close
to zero and statistically insignificant, meaning that nonresident students show no
effects from crossing the cutoff for NSA eligibility. This lends credibility to the
causal interpretation of our estimates – that it is the NSA causing an increase in
the probability of enrollment for nonresidents and not some unobserved factors.
Estimates in Table 3.2.C, representing the 2004 admissions cycle, are largely
statistically insignificant, most likely because sample sizes are too small for ac-
curate inference. Columns (3) and (4) provide further evidence of a negative
discontinuity at the cutoff for the medium level of NSA eligibility. This may be
partly due to the fact that most density checks show an increase in applicants at
this threshold, but the actual magnitude is unclear. If these additional applicants
are only marginally interested in attending the University of Iowa, this could ex-
plain the apparent negative impact of the NSA at this point. The second entries
in columns (5) and (6) imply that Illinois residents react particularly strongly to
receiving the highest level of NSA. Given the small sample sizes used in Table
3.2.C, however, these results are more susceptible to bias and/or imprecision than
those in Tables 3.2.A and 3.2.B. The implications of these estimates are therefore
less clear than those presented earlier.
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We also conducted regression discontinuity analysis using additional covari-
ates. By doing so, we hope to both control for sampling variation and to lower
the error associated with our treatment estimates. In doing so we allow the level
and slope of the probability of enrollment to vary according to student charac-
teristics. We include three types of variables among these additional covariates:
indicator variables, single interactions, and double interactions. Indicators such
as ILLINOISi take on a value of one if applicant i is from Illinois and zero
otherwise. Single interactions such as ILLINOISi ∗RAIi are equal to applicant
i’s RAI if she is from Illinois and zero otherwise. Double interactions such as
ILLINOISi ∗ 1(RAIi ≥ 290) ∗RAIi are equal to applicant i’s RAI if she is from
Illinois and has an RAI of at least 290 and zero otherwise.
The covariates used here fall into three broad categories. The first contains
indicators, single interactions, and double interactions for students applying to the
Tippie College of Business, the College of Engineering, and the College of Nursing
(with the College of Liberal Arts as the omitted category). The second category
contains indicators, single interactions, and double interactions for respondents
who reported their ethnicity as Native American, African-American, Hispanic,
Asian-American, International, or Pacific Islander, as well as those who reported
no ethnicity (with White as the omitted category). The third category consists of
indicators, single interactions, and double interactions for students whose home
state is Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, California, or Missouri (with
any other state as the omitted category).71
Results using these additional covariates are presented in Tables 3.3.A, 3.3.B,
71Only international students did not have a state of residence listed. As these students are
already captured in the ethnicity variables, we do not include variables for students who did not
list a state of residence.
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and 3.3.C. Whereas point estimates in these tables are slightly lower than in the
results not including covariates, there is very little change in statistical signifi-
cance. In Table 3.3.A, including additional covariates reduces the impact of NSA
eligibility by over half a percentage point, from 6.95 to 6.27. Including covariates
for Illinois residents reduces the size of the impact (in percentage terms) slightly
more; lowering the effect of NSA eligibility from 5.99 to 5.29. The impact on
the other subgroups is smaller – the impact of NSA eligibility on non-Illinois res-
idents falls to 9.24, that on White applicants falls to 5.84, and that on Liberal
Arts applicants falls to 5.46. The impact on non-Illinois residents and on White
applicants falls by approximately a third of a percentage point, whereas that on
Liberal Arts applicants falls by just over one-tenth. Curiously, in Table 3.3.B,
adding covariates has a noticeable impact only on non-Illinois residents and Lib-
eral Arts applicants – all other point estimates remain very close to their values
in Table 3.2.B.
VI. Conclusion
Employing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design on data from the University of
Iowa, we find evidence that students who receive the National Scholars Award
are significantly more likely to enroll than their counterparts who do not receive
this award. Evidence is mixed on whether students from Illinois are affected
more than nonresident students from other states. The predicted probability
that White students enroll at the University of Iowa rises by less than that of
non-White students. Most importantly, falsification tests do not reveal any sta-
tistically significant effects among (ineligible) Iowa residents, lending credibility
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to the interpretation of our results as causal average treatment effects. These
results are fairly consistent whether the NSA is awarded based on RAI or on AIS,
though its precise impact on students from Illinois versus those from other states
is unclear. Data from 2004 is too limited for strong inference, but it does appear
that students at the highest tier of eligibility were significantly more likely to
enroll at the University of Iowa than students with lower AIS scores.
This information can be of use to admissions officers and other policy makers at
the university. First, our findings suggest that the award does achieve its stated
goal of increasing nonresident student enrollment. However, since many states
have had to reduce funding for their universities, it may make sense to target
awards more narrowly in order to save money. Given the NSA’s large impact on
enrollment, and given preliminary evidence from 2004 that this effect applies to
the highest-achieving students, it may be possible to reweight award amounts in
such a way that the University of Iowa both attracts extremely high-achieving
students and reduces its NSA expenditures. For example, rather than having a
$4,000 scholarship that is offered to over 40 percent of nonresident applicants,72
it might make sense for Iowa to target two specific groups of students. The
first is extremely high-achieving students. By reducing the number of students
eligible for the NSA and/or returning to a tier system, Iowa could potentially
reduce its scholarship outlays while simultaneously offering more attractive aid
packages to elite applicants. Remaining funding could be better targeted toward
financially needy students or to minority students, who are more responsive to
NSA receipt than more affluent or White students.73 This would allow Iowa to
72In recent years, more of these scholarships have been awarded – in 2010, over 47 percent of
applicants were offered the NSA.
73Alternatively, it could be used as need-based aid, as ethnicity is almost certainly correlated with
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simultaneously focus on recruiting a talented and diverse student body, while
reducing the amount of money spent in doing so. Future research could include
policy simulations to determine an optimal award structure, and experiments
could actually test whether this optimal structure works in practice.
There are several other possible extensions of this work. The first involves
computing financial aid elasticities of enrollment. As data on scholarship values
become available, we will incorporate it into extensions of this line of inquiry.
Another extension involves using these elasticities to simulate counterfactual aid
policies. While our current results suggest qualitative adjustments to Iowa’s fi-
nancial aid policies may be in order, we cannot yet recommend exactly how much
aid to allocate to each group of students. With some additional assumptions and
data it would be possible to suggest a range of possible actions and to predict
how they might impact Iowa’s enrollment yield and financial aid outlays.
Finally, one flaw in using RAI to evaluate students is that many students
do not have valid RAI values. In particular, many high schools do not provide
their students’ class rank. While admissions scores like the RAI are designed to
sacrifice some intensity of evaluation in favor of administrative efficiency, metrics
that do not apply to large swaths of students fail to either sacrifice intensity or
achieve efficiency. As a result, there should be some mechanism by which students
who are missing a component of RAI may be quickly evaluated. Design of such a
mechanism would preserve the intent of RAI while greatly reducing the amount
of time spent on student evaluation.
financial need and it may be that need, rather than ethnicity per se is causing differential responses
to NSA receipt across ethnic groups. Some research on this topic is possible using self-reported
family income values from SAT and ACT questionnaires, but FAFSA or similar data would provide
more reliable estimates.
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While students may have idiosyncratic tastes for college selectivity, location,
size, and any additional number of factors, they ought to have a limited willingness
to pay for each of these things. By systematically awarding merit aid to high-
achieving students, the University of Iowa has been able to attract a large number
of students who might not have otherwise enrolled. Due to its structured nature,
the NSA has allowed us a window into student decision-making, and may be of
great use in setting future education policy and in attracting an optimal mix of
students to the University of Iowa.
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Figure 3.1: Award Rate Comparison
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Figure 3.2.A: McCrary Density Tests, 2009-2011
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Figure 3.2.B: McCrary Density Tests, 2005-2008
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Figure 3.2.C: McCrary Density Tests, 2004
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Figure 3.3: RAI Graphs, Bandwidth 30
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Figure 3.4: AIS Flat Rate Graphs, Bandwidth 20
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Figure 3.5: AIS Tiered Graphs, Bandwidth 10
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
2004 2005-2008 2009-2011 Overall
N(Applicants) 13,487 56,385 49,509 119,381
N(Nonresident) 8,288 38,091 37,197 83,576
N(AnyNSA) 3,126 15,066 17,278 35,470
AIS Score
121.9 122.8 123.8 123.1
(2.39) (23.6) (24.3) (23.9)
RAI Score
- - 294.6 294.6
(38.1) (38.1)
Liberal Arts 0.923 0.913 0.877 0.899
Business 0.004 0.014 0.031 0.020
Engineering 0.070 0.072 0.087 0.078
White 0.837 0.808 0.693 0.763
Black 0.040 0.034 0.041 0.037
Hispanic 0.027 0.033 0.044 0.037
Asian 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.045
International 0.022 0.040 0.136 0.078
Iowa 0.386 0.324 0.249 0.300
Illinois 0.424 0.462 0.448 0.452
Minnesota 0.047 0.053 0.052 0.052
Missouri 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009
Nebraska 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.008
Wisconsin 0.029 0.031 0.029 0.030
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Table 3.2: RD Estimates Without Additional Regressors
Table 3.2.A: 2009-2011 Pooled
Sample
BW = 5 BW = 10 BW = 20 BW = 30
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS
Non-IA
0.7158 0.0478 0.7641 0.0253 0.8398 0.0566* 0.8704 0.0695***
(0.0348) (0.0666) (0.0305) (0.0435) (0.0278) (0.0298) (0.0238) (0.0242)
N = 1930 N = 3737 N = 7241 N = 10624
IL Res.
0.7234 0.0519 0.7639 -0.0231 0.8381 0.0370 0.8681 0.0599**
(0.0315) (0.0700) (0.0270) (0.0491) (0.0263) (0.0342) (0.0224) (0.0284)
N = 1482 N = 2885 N = 5544 N = 8124
Non-IL, IA
0.6921 0.0409 0.7617 0.1756* 0.8424 0.1090* 0.8765 0.0958**
(0.0482) (0.1208) (0.0441) (0.0904) (0.0353) (0.0547) (0.0308) (0.0424)
N = 448 N = 852 N = 1697 N = 2500
IA Res.
0.7158 0.0737 0.7641 -0.0099 0.8398 0.0293 0.8704 0.0303
(0.0348) (0.0430) (0.0305) (0.0552) (0.0278) (0.0378) (0.0238) (0.0303)
N1 = 1930, N2 = 907 N1 = 3737, N2 = 1766 N1 = 7241, N2 = 3488 N1 = 10624, N = 5092
White
0.7328 0.0482 0.7824 0.0268 0.8570 0.0539 0.8852 0.0617***
(0.0361) (0.0985) (0.0308) (0.0610) (0.0272) (0.0372) (0.0229) (0.0292)
N = 1529 N = 2951 N = 5737 N = 8437
Liberal Arts
0.7212 0.0316 0.7741 0.0211 0.8475 0.0468 0.8766 0.0559***
(0.0310) (0.0640) (0.0296) (0.0437) (0.0271) (0.0301) (0.0233) (0.0253)
N = 1734 N = 3334 N = 6446 N = 9376
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Table 3.2.B: 2005-2008 Pooled
Sample
BW = 5 BW = 10 BW = 15 BW = 20
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS
Non-IA
0.8068 0.0210 0.8540 0.0524* 0.8817 0.0487** 0.9001 0.0587***
(0.0241) (0.0289) (0.0233) (0.0279) (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0205) (0.0202)
N = 4660 N = 8794 N = 12646 N = 16070
IL Res.
0.8048 0.0217 0.8597 0.0554 0.8894 0.0476* 0.9065 0.0543**
(0.0244) (0.0382) (0.0252) (0.0325) (0.0238) (0.0257) (0.0218) (0.0226)
N = 3438 N = 6554 N = 9416 N = 11952
Non-IL, IA
0.8098 0.0184 0.8378 0.0397 0.8597 0.0506* 0.8813 0.0704**
(0.0254) (0.0464) (0.0208) (0.0395) (0.0188) (0.0298) (0.0181) (0.0275)
N = 1222 N = 2240 N = 3230 N = 4118
IA Res.
0.8068 -0.0054 0.8540 -0.0016 0.8817 0.0131 0.9001 -.0029
(0.0241) (0.0543) (0.0233) (0.0411) (0.0220) (0.0323) (0.0205) (0.0282)
N1 = 4660, N2 = 2589 N1 = 8794, N2 = 4776 N1 = 12646, N2 = 6883 N1 = 16070, N2 = 8777
White
0.8112 0.0276 0.8584 0.0460 0.8880 0.0420* 0.9061 0.0513**
(0.0262) (0.0318) (0.0244) (0.0291) (0.0228) (0.0244) (0.0212) (0.0229)
N = 3874 N = 7286 N = 10510 N = 13379
Liberal Arts
0.8194 0.0378 0.8620 0.0642** 0.8877 0.0577** 0.9050 0.0652***
(0.0243) (0.0281) (0.0219) (0.0283) (0.0205) (0.0220) (0.0191) (0.0201)




BW = 5, Low BW = 10, Low BW = 5, Med BW = 10, Med BW = 5, High BW = 10, High
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS
Non-IA
0.8590 -0.0133 0.8829 0.0170 0.8975 -0.0476 0.9286 -0.0647* 0.9020 0.0556 0.9392 0.0527
(0.0053) (0.0613) (0.0098) (0.0332) (0.0044) (0.0475) (0.0118) (0.0389) (0.0185) (0.0621) (0.0240) (0.0382)
N = 1169 N = 2131 N = 1064 N = 1963 N = 622 N = 1198
IL Res.
0.8747 0.0113 0.8970 0.0442 0.9103 -0.0221 0.9312 -0.0455 0.9590 0.0894* 0.9768 0.0849**
(0.0286) (0.0948) (0.0200) (0.0487) (0.0138) (0.0403) (0.0095) (0.0350) (0.0151) (0.0462) (0.0111) (0.0404)
N = 862 N = 1552 N = 742 N = 1401 N = 399 N = 778
Non-IL, IA
0.8244 -0.0817 0.8485 -0.0561 0.8703 -0.1140 0.9211 -0.1183* 0.8123 -0.0005 0.8748 -0.0074
(0.0722) (0.0923) (0.0399) (0.0632) (0.0242) (0.0817) (0.0301) (0.0658) (0.0499) (0.1168) (0.0535) (0.0650)
N = 307 N = 579 N = 322 N = 562 N = 223 N = 420
IA Res.
0.8590 -0.1007 0.8829 -0.0649 0.8975 0.0060 0.9286 -0.0902* 0.9020 0.0202 0.9392 -0.0034
(0.0053) (0.0795) (0.0098) (0.0487) (0.0044) (0.0340) (0.0118) (0.0460) (0.0185) (0.0520) (0.0240) (0.0580)
N1 = 1169, N2 = 734 N1 = 2131, N2 = 1409 N1 = 1064, N2 = 750 N1 = 1963, N2 = 1378 N1 = 622, N2 = 512 N1 = 1198, N2 = 950
White
0.8349 -0.0277 0.8711 0.0051 0.8905 -0.0319 0.9259 -0.0569 0.8879 0.0811 0.9397 0.0538
(0.0071) (0.0610) (0.0140) (0.0343) (0.0081) (0.0525) (0.0125) (0.0410) (0.0175) (0.0579) (0.0245) (0.0366)
N = 972 N = 1791 N = 925 N = 1693 N = 525 N = 1025
Liberal Arts
0.8636 0.0218 0.8906 0.0479 0.9085 -0.0197 0.9334 -0.0552 0.9143 0.0433 0.9459 0.0547
(0.0064) (0.0572) (0.0087) (0.0306) (0.0103) (0.0367) (0.0125) (0.0337) (0.0258) (0.0895) (0.0251) (0.0545)
N = 1079 N = 1971 N = 962 N = 1763 N = 525 N = 1022
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Table 3.3: RD Estimates With Additional Regressors
Table 3.3.A: 2009-2011 Pooled
Sample
BW = 5 BW = 10 BW = 20 BW = 30
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS
Non-IA
0.7158 0.0493 0.7641 0.0171 0.8398 0.0523* 0.8704 0.0627**
(0.0348) (0.0679) (0.0305) (0.0437) (0.0278) (0.0290) (0.0238) (0.0237)
N = 1930 N = 3737 N = 7241 N = 10624
IL Res.
0.7234 0.0621 0.7639 -0.0280 0.8381 0.0339 0.8681 0.0529*
(0.0315) (0.0710) (0.0270) (0.0486) (0.0263) (0.0327) (0.0224) (0.0274)
N = 1482 N = 2885 N = 5544 N = 8124
Non-IL, IA
0.6921 0.0263 0.7617 0.1585* 0.8424 0.1032* 0.8765 0.0924**
(0.0482) (0.1148) (0.0441) (0.0854) (0.0353) (0.0533) (0.0308) (0.0416)
N = 448 N = 852 N = 1697 N = 2500
IA Res.
0.7158 0.0620 0.7641 0.0082 0.8398 0.0325 0.8704 0.0330
(0.0348) (0.0422) (0.0305) (0.0519) (0.0278) (0.0367) (0.0238) (0.0298)
N1 = 1930, N2 = 907 N1 = 3737, N2 = 1766 N1 = 7241, N2 = 3488 N1 = 10624, N = 5092
White
0.7328 0.0523 0.7824 0.0282 0.8570 0.0512 0.8852 0.0584**
(0.0361) (0.0931) (0.0308) (0.0591) (0.0272) (0.0361) (0.0229) (0.0284)
N = 1529 N = 2951 N = 5737 N = 8437
Liberal Arts
0.7212 0.0325 0.7741 0.0078 0.8475 0.0425 0.8766 0.0546**
(0.0310) (0.0681) (0.0296) (0.0443) (0.0271) (0.0295) (0.0233) (0.0244)
N = 1734 N = 3334 N = 6446 N = 9376
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Table 3.3.B: 2005-2008 Pooled
Sample
BW = 5 BW = 10 BW = 15 BW = 20
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS
Non-IA
0.8068 0.0228 0.8540 0.0496* 0.8817 0.0476** 0.9001 0.0586***
(0.0241) (0.0287) (0.0233) (0.0275) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0205) (0.0200)
N = 4660 N = 8794 N = 12646 N = 16070
IL Res.
0.8048 0.0218 0.8597 0.0554 0.8894 0.0502* 0.9065 0.0573**
(0.0244) (0.0395) (0.0252) (0.0330) (0.0238) (0.0260) (0.0218) (0.0226)
N = 3438 N = 6554 N = 9416 N = 11952
Non-IL, IA
0.8098 0.0147 0.8378 0.0336 0.8597 0.0440 0.8813 0.0650**
(0.0254) (0.0404) (0.0208) (0.0367) (0.0188) (0.0290) (0.0181) (0.0266)
N = 1222 N = 2240 N = 3230 N = 4118
IA Res.
0.8068 -0.0056 0.8540 -0.0027 0.8817 0.0145 0.9001 0.0019
(0.0241) (0.0546) (0.0233) (0.0394) (0.0220) (0.0317) (0.0205) (0.0273)
N1 = 4660, N2 = 2589 N1 = 8795, N2 = 4776 N1 = 12647, N2 = 6883 N1 = 16071, N2 = 8777
White
0.8112 0.0260 0.8584 0.0434 0.8880 0.0228* 0.9061 0.0515**
(0.0262) (0.0333) (0.0244) (0.0294) (0.0228) (0.0247) (0.0212) (0.0227)
N = 3874 N = 7286 N = 10510 N = 13379
Liberal Arts
0.8194 0.0407 0.8620 0.0605** 0.8877 0.0536** 0.9050 0.0625***
(0.0243) (0.0264) (0.0219) (0.0273) (0.0205) (0.0216) (0.0191) (0.0198)




BW = 5, Low BW = 10, Low BW = 5, Med BW = 10, Med BW = 5, High BW = 10, High
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS
Non-IA
0.8590 -0.0194 0.8829 0.0138 0.8975 -0.0330 0.9286 -0.0528 0.9020 0.0490 0.9392 0.0566
(0.0053) (0.0659) (0.0098) (0.0355) (0.0044) (0.0528) (0.0118) (0.0399) (0.0185) (0.0724) (0.0240) (0.0389)
N = 1169 N = 2131 N = 1064 N = 1963 N = 622 N = 1198
IL Res.
0.8747 0.0178 0.8970 0.0429 0.9103 -0.0120 0.9312 -0.0315 0.9590 0.0640 0.9768 0.0893**
(0.0286) (0.0981) (0.0200) (0.0510) (0.0138) (0.0406) (0.0095) (0.0340) (0.0151) (0.0519) (0.0111) (0.0408)
N = 862 N = 1552 N = 742 N = 1401 N = 399 N = 778
Non-IL, IA
0.8244 -0.1625 0.8485 -0.0754 0.8703 -0.0937 0.9211 -0.0990 0.8123 -0.0795 0.8748 -0.0297
(0.0722) (0.0912) (0.0399) (0.0551) (0.0242) (0.1118) (0.0301) (0.0748) (0.0490) (0.1499) (0.0535) (0.0577)
N = 307 N = 579 N = 322 N = 562 N = 223 N = 420
IA Res.
0.8590 -0.0943 0.8829 -0.0674 0.8975 -0.0069 0.9286 -0.0919* 0.9020 0.0226 0.9392 -0.0203
(0.0053) (0.0668) (0.0098) (0.0463) (0.0044) (0.0341) (0.0118) (0.0476) (0.0185) (0.0531) (0.0240) (0.0661)
N1 = 1169, N2 = 734 N1 = 2131, N2 = 1409 N1 = 1064, N2 = 750 N1 = 1963, N2 = 1378 N1 = 622, N2 = 512 N1 = 1198, N2 = 950
White
0.8349 -0.0375 0.8711 0.0003 0.8905 -0.0276 0.9259 -0.0513 0.8879 0.0533 0.9397 0.0551
(0.0071) (0.0690) (0.0140) (0.0359) (0.0081) (0.0559) (0.0125) (0.0424) (0.0175) (0.0675) (0.0245) (0.0422)
N = 972 N = 1791 N = 925 N = 1693 N = 525 N = 1025
Liberal Arts
0.8636 0.0200 0.8906 0.0489 0.9085 -0.0049 0.9334 -0.0474 0.9143 0.0423 0.9459 0.0376
(0.0064) (0.0585) (0.0087) (0.0331) (0.0103) (0.0404) (0.0125) (0.0361) (0.0258) (0.0760) (0.0251) (0.0495)
N = 1079 N = 1971 N = 962 N = 1763 N = 525 N = 1022
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School Name UGPop ANP SAT ACT SAT25M SAT75M SAT25V SAT75V ACT25 ACT75 µSAT σSAT
U. of Alabama 24,882 $16,255 1,200 4,447 500 650 500 620 22 29 1135 200.15
U. of Arizona 30,592 $12,185 4,816 2,999 490 620 480 610 21 27 1100 192.74
U. of Arkansas 17,247 $9,987 1,247 4,101 520 630 500 610 23 28 1130 163.09
U. of California-Berkeley 25,540 $15,589 3,894 1,567 630 760 600 730 27 32 1360 192.74
U. of Colorado-Boulder 26,648 $18,377 2,869 4,436 540 650 520 630 24 28 1170 163.09
U. of Connecticut 17,345 $14,877 3,080 865 580 670 550 640 25 29 1220 133.43
U. of Delaware 17,507 $13,376 4,144 1,265 560 660 540 650 24 28 1205 155.67
U. of Florida 32,660 $11,579 4,404 1,953 590 690 570 670 24 30 1260 148.26
U. of Georgia 25,947 $9,693 4,281 2,624 560 670 560 660 25 29 1225 155.67
U. of Hawaii-Manoa 13,912 $10,484 1,524 470 510 610 480 580 21 25 1090 148.26
U. of Idaho 9,573 $13,253 772 1,143 490 610 480 600 20 26 1090 177.91
U. of Illinois-UC 31,540 $15,610 1,761 5,967 690 780 540 660 26 31 1335 155.67
Indiana U.-Bloomington 32,367 $10,342 5,541 4,067 540 650 510 630 24 29 1165 170.50
U. of Iowa 21,176 $14,245 395 4,078 540 685 450 630 23 28 1152.5 240.92
U. of Kansas 20,343 $14,768 - 3,522 - - - - 22 28 1145 170.50
U. of Kentucky 19,927 $12,916 834 4,048 500 630 490 620 22 28 1120 192.74
Louisiana State U. 23,685 $10,629 767 4,700 530 650 510 630 23 28 1160 177.91
U. of Maine 9,183 $15,075 1,713 222 480 600 480 590 21 27 1075 170.5
U. of Maryland-College Park 26,922 $13,625 3,685 - 610 710 580 680 - - 1290 148.26
U. of Massachusetts-Amherst 21,373 $16,145 4,433 898 560 650 530 630 24 28 1185 140.85
U. of Michigan-Ann Arbor 27,027 $14,074 2,147 4,977 670 770 630 730 29 33 1400 148.26
U. of Minnesota-Twin Cities 33,607 $16,019 817 4,882 610 740 540 690 25 30 1290 207.56
U. of Mississippi 14,159 $12,516 1,100 3,038 470 590 460 590 20 27 1055 185.33
U. of Missouri-Columbia 24,834 $15,759 575 5,880 530 650 530 650 23 28 1180 222.39
U. of Montana 13,335 $13,937 854 1,271 490 600 490 600 21 26 1090 163.09
U. of Nebraska-Lincoln 19,383 $13,108 346 3,877 520 670 510 660 22 28 1180 222.39
U. of Nevada-Reno 14,185 $14,127 2,211 1,370 470 590 470 580 20 26 1055 170.50
U. of New Hampshire 12,458 $18,439 2,805 13 510 610 490 590 - - 1100 148.26
Rutgers U.-New Brunswick 30,351 $15,905 5,839 - 560 680 520 630 - - 1195 170.50
U. of New Mexico 22,476 $10,272 725 3,198 480 620 480 620 19 25 1100 207.56
Binghamton U. 14,746 $14,031 2,186 680 620 700 580 670 26 30 1285 126.02
UNC-Chapel Hill 18,579 $11,952 3,762 1,362 610 710 590 700 27 31 1305 155.67
U. of North Dakota 11,139 $11,952 - 1,895 - - - - 21 26 1090 148.26
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Appendix (cont.)
School Name UGPop ANP SAT ACT SAT25M SAT75M SAT25V SAT75V ACT25 ACT75 µSAT σSAT
Ohio State U. 42,082 $19,082 2,996 6,057 600 700 540 660 26 30 1250 163.09
U. of Okahoma-Norman 19,779 $15,289 1,436 3,444 540 655 510 650 23 29 1177.5 189.03
U. of Oregon 19,528 $14,669 3,158 608 499 611 492 607 22 27 1104.5 168.28
Pennsylvania State U. 38,594 $21,342 5,851 966 560 670 530 630 25 29 1195 155.67
U. of Rhode Island 13,093 $14,667 2,825 478 490 590 470 570 21 26 1060 148.26
USC-Columbia 21,385 $15,487 2,926 2,506 560 650 530 630 24 29 1185 140.85
U. of South Dakota 7,220 $12,961 51 1,159 460 580 460 550 20 26 1025 155.67
U. of Tennessee 21,392 $13,758 848 3,977 530 640 520 640 24 29 1165 170.50
U. of Texas-Austin 38,420 $14,629 6,118 3,776 580 710 540 670 25 31 1250 192.74
U. of Utah 23,371 $8,773 444 2,829 513 650 490 630 21 27 1141.5 205.34
U. of Vermont 11,593 $13,864 2,061 789 550 640 540 640 24 29 1185 140.85
U. of Virginia 15,595 $11,590 3,197 1,129 630 740 610 720 28 32 1350 163.09
U. of Washington-Seattle 29,307 $8,739 4,927 1,752 580 700 520 650 24 30 1225 185.33
West Virginia U. 22,303 $8,344 2,297 2,638 480 580 460 560 21 26 1040 148.26
U. of Wisconsin 30,170 $14,940 1,226 5,185 620 740 530 670 26 30 1280 192.74
U. of Wyoming 10,079 $10,776 236 1,340 490 610 490 600 21 27 1095 170.50
All data computed for the 2010-2011 entering class. UGPop = Undergraduate Population; ANP = Average Net Price for entering in-state
students awarded Title IV financial aid; SAT = number of enrollees submitting an SAT score; ACT = number of enrollees submitting an
ACT score; SAT(##)j = (##)th percentile of enrollee scores on SAT section j; ACT(##) = (##)th percentile of enrollees’ composite
ACT scores; µSAT =
SAT25M+SAT75M+SAT25V+SAT75V
2 ; σSAT =
mathrmSAT75M+SAT75V−µSAT
Φ−1(0.75) . Alaska is not listed because its state flagship
is open admission; Washington, DC is not listed because it does not have a flagship university. While New York technically does not have
a flagship, it has an extensive system of public universities; as a result, use Binghamton University, the most university with the highest
SAT interquartile range among enrollees, as the de facto flagship.
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